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Abstract
This thesis consists o f three self contained essays in financial economics 
where agents interact under asymmetric information about some latent economic 
fundamentals.
The chapter on “Asset pricing under noisy rating signals: Does benchmarking 
on ratings matter?”, demonstrates that, in the presence o f noise traders who bench­
mark their supply of a traded asset to public signals (ratings), informed traders are 
induced to rationally overreact to news about fundamentals, leading to excess asset 
price volatility. The analysis also shows that if  market participants use public rat­
ings solely for price discovery purposes then, under no circumstances ratings could 
weaken price efficiency, even in the presence of higher order beliefs.
The chapter on “Prudential liquidity regulation and the insurance aspect of 
lender of last resort” considers prudential liquidity regulation as quid pro quo for 
emergency liquidity assistance by the central bank. In the presence o f bank fund­
ing constraints, information-induced bank runs and an objective by the central bank 
to maintain a balanced budget under its lender of last resort (LOLR) facility, it is 
shown that prudential liquidity regulation is socially desirable if  the banking sec­
tor is characterised by sufficient funding constraints, high profit opportunities and a 
relatively volatile deposit base. Otherwise, liquidity regulation is too costly from a 
welfare perspective, even after taking into account the social value of LOLR insur­
ance.
Ill
Abstract iv
Finally, the chapter titled “Co-ordination failure and the signalling role of 
banks in debt-exchange offers” studies the out-of-court restructuring of debt when 
a creditor bank makes concessions conditional on other creditors’ actions. In line 
with empirical evidence, the analysis shows that a bank’s conditional commitment 
to restructure injects a degree o f strategic solidity among other creditors, who then 
accept restructuring more easily. That leads to resolution o f financial distress at 
lower levels of firm’s fimdamentals, compared to the situation with no bank in the 
game, that could imply a lower deadweight cost of inefihcient liquidation. It is also 
discussed how conditional restructuring concessions may lead to a combination of 
herding incentives and co-ordination problems where, depending on the extent o f 
conditionality, one may dominate the other.
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Introduction
In economic settings with multiple agents and asymmetric information, there are 
two equilibrium concepts that one could apply to draw economic predictions. That is, the 
competitive Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) and the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium 
(BNE). The REE assumes consensus about a deterministic price function that maps agents’ 
information sets into prices and rules out systematic forecast errors by requiring agents’ 
conjectures to coincide with the actual price function that those conjectures generate. The 
BNE allows for strategic interactions among agents, assuming mutual knowledge o f agents’ 
rationality and typically common priors. In a BNE, agents make conjectures about other 
agents’ strategies, which then coincide with agents’ best responses to those conjectures.
This thesis contains three self-contained essays in financial economics, where a com­
mon theme that emerges is that agents interact under asymmetric information about some 
latent economic fundamentals. Chapter 1 uses the REE concept to discuss possible as­
set pricing implications of public announcements regarding the quality o f a risky asset. 
Chapter 2 employs a BNE framework to analyse optimal liquidity holdings by the banking 
sector in the presence of information induced bank runs and potential emergency liquidity 
assistance by the central bank. Also within a BNE fi’amework. Chapter 3 discusses the out- 
of-court restructuring of the contractual obligations o f a financially distressed firm, under 
conditions o f asymmetric information among the firm’s creditors and in situations where a 
creditor bank makes concessions conditional on other creditors’ actions.
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Before undertaking a comprehensive analysis o f these issues in further chapters, we 
briefly summarise and discuss some of the main results in the remaining o f this chapter.
1.1 Asset pricing and ratings
Chapter 1 discusses an intertemporal model o f asset pricing under asymmetric information, 
demonstrating how noisy public signals (ratings) about the quality of a risky asset could en­
hance information efi&ciency, albeit at a cost of higher asset price volatility. The analysis 
also draws implications for benchmarking investment decisions on ratings. In particular, it 
considers a stylised version o f benchmarking investment decisions to public information, 
whereby a residual class o f (noise) traders link their net supply o f the risky asset to some 
measure of the probability that the rating next period will fall below a given rating thresh­
old. Thus, benchmarking to ratings can be rationalised as the result o f forced sales by a 
class o f regulated investors (e.g. pension funds) that are restricted to hold the risky asset 
only if its rating is above a prespecified threshold and unload their holdings to the market 
proportionally to the probability such ‘downgrading’ will take place.
The main conclusion from the analysis is that price efficiency drops with the extent 
of benchmarking in the market while volatility increases, suggesting that benchmarking is 
a possible component o f the excess volatility puzzle. That is because perceived changes 
in fundamentals feed into prices not only through changes in perceptions about future in­
come from holding the asset, but also through beliefs about capital gains that depend on the 
net supply o f the asset. Given that benchmarking renders the net supply o f the risky asset 
partly forecastable, informed traders are inclined to trade more aggressively on any item
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of news that could imply a change in fundamentals in order to exploit perceived mispric­
ings. Thus, they become more prone to misinterpret any item of news as information about 
fundamentals leading to less informative and more volatile prices.
1.2 Prudential liquidity and the lender of last resort
Chapter 2 discusses a rationale for prudential liquidity standards for banks by consider­
ing prudential liquidity as quid pro quo for emergency liquidity assistance by the central 
bank. In the presence of bank funding constraints, information-induced bank runs and an 
objective by the central bank to maintain a balanced budget under its lender o f last resort 
(LOLR) facility, it is shown that prudential liquidity regulation is socially desirable if the 
banking sector is characterised by sufficient funding constraints, high profit opportunities 
and a relatively volatile deposit base. Otherwise, liquidity regulation is too costly from a 
welfare perspective, even after taking into account the social value o f LOLR insurance.
Debt constraints in the model arise from depositors’ rational anticipation o f bankers’ 
moral hazard problems which, in the spirit o f Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000), 
could relate to the extent of financial liberalisation o f the banking sector. Also, the possi­
bility o f information-induced bank runs aims at capturing banks’ inherent fragility due to 
high leverage, short term funding and asymmetric information which, in the presence of 
adverse economic conditions, could lead to loss of confidence to banking institutions and 
unanticipated foreclosures of wholesale interbank lines. In the presence o f such frictions, 
the analysis provides a necessary and sufficient condition for prudential liquidity regulation 
to be socially desirable, showing that the more debt-constrained the banking sector is and
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the higher its profit opportunities, the more prudential liquidity regulation becomes socially 
desirable by augmenting the insurance value o f LOLR safety net.
1.3 Banks and debt-exchange offers
Chapter 3 discusses the out-of-court restructuring o f debt, under conditions o f asymmet­
ric information among a firm’s creditors and in situations where a creditor bank makes 
concessions conditional on other creditors’ actions. Debt restructuring is modelled as a 
debt-exchange offer to small creditors and a request for new credit by the bank. Condi­
tionality in the restructuring action is modelled as a minimum tendering rate that needs to 
be reached before new funds are injected to the firm and old contractual obligations are 
exchanged with new.
In line with empirical evidence, the analysis suggests that a bank’s conditional con­
cession may inject a degree of strategic solidity among other creditors, who may then ac­
cept to restructure more easily. That could lead to resolution o f financial distress at a lower 
level of firm’s fimdamentals compared to the situation with no bank in the game.
However, for high minimum tendering rates, herding incentives may dominate co­
ordination problems, as creditors tend to rely more on average opinion -  that is reflected 
in the debt-restructuring outcome -  rather than on private signals about the solvency o f the 
firm. In equilibrium, herding incentives are common knowledge and the bank chooses its 
strategy in a way that accounts for other creditors’ incentive to play a low strategy when the 
bank plays a high one, and vice versa. That leads to multiple equilibria in the restructuring
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game, where the strategy that is followed by the bank is decreasing in the strategy that is 
followed by other creditors and vice versa.
Because of the conditionality in creditors’ actions and the sequential feature of the 
game between the bank and other creditors, the analysis becomes involved rather quickly 
and sometimes unspecified assumptions on endogenous variables are needed to make it 
whole. For example, we assume a continues mapping fi*om bank’s strategy into that of  
other creditors, although the only thing we know about such a mapping is a set o f con­
ditions that are specified by proposition 8. Nevertheless, as the information precision of 
the bank increases relative to that o f other creditors, equilibrium selection no longer mat­
ters. However, we intend to revisit this point in future research, considering a more general 
information structure among creditors.
1.4 Asymmetric information
Asymmetric information typically imposes a requirement on rational agents to use their 
private signals not only to update their beliefs about some hidden economic fundamentals, 
but also to infer the beliefs of other agents. In other words, under asymmetric information, 
rational behaviour requires agents to hold beliefs of higher order, whereby devoting intelli­
gence to anticipate what average opinion is, what average opinion expects average opinion 
to be, and so on. That is because, a rational agent will realise that her expected utility from 
undertaking a certain action does not only depend on the actual economic fundamentals, 
but also on the actions o f other agents. In all essays presented in this thesis, a common 
feature that emerges in the analysis is that tractability in accounting for higher order be-
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liefs, both in a REE and a BNE framework, is preserved without requiring agents to apply 
extremely sophisticated reasoning.
In chapter 1, rational agents are required to run autoregressive moving average (ARMA) 
models to forecast observable variables and extract information about fundamentals. In 
other words, rational agents do not only use past realisations of observable variables to 
update their beliefs, but also use their forecast errors. Such a modelling technique is con­
sistent with explicit consideration of higher order beliefs and allows us to pin down a unique 
REE equilibrium in ARMA coefficients, where agents’ forecasting models are consistent 
with the actual law of motion that those models generate. Existence o f such an equilib­
rium is inferred from the results of Marcet and Sargent (1989a,b) on the convergence of 
least squares learning mechanisms and was firstly applied by Sargent (1991), and later by 
Hussman (1992), to study rational expectations equilibria with signal extraction from en­
dogenous variables.
In chapters 2 and 3, strategic interactions among agents are modelled using a global 
games methodology. A global game is first defined in Carlsson and van Damme (1993) 
as a game of incomplete information where the actual pay-off structure is determined by 
a random draw from a given distribution and where each player receives a noisy signal o f 
the realisation. Carlsson and van Damme (1993) show this result for a two player binary 
action game. Morris and Shin (1998) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) extend the result 
by Carlsson and van Damme to the case where there is a continuum of agents.
As of Morris and Shin (1998), if  a binary action global game satisfies full (global) 
strategic complementarities -  i.e. an agent’s incentive to take a particular action increases
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with the proportion of other agents undertaking the same action -  and if  the upper and lower 
dominant regions are non empty then, there exists a unique dominant solvable equilibrium 
strategy. That is a strategy that survives the iterated deletion o f strictly dominated strategies. 
Under such a strategy, all agents undertake a particular action if  and only if  their signals 
fall below a critical signal threshold. Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) extend Morris and Shin 
(1998) by offering a uniqueness result under one-sided strategic complementarities. This 
is when an agent’s incentive to undertake an action increases with the proportion o f other 
agents undertaking the same action, provided that that proportion is relatively small.
Global games capture the idea that agents may be induced to undertake certain actions 
because they believe others will do. Moreover, in a number o f economic setups where 
agents face co-ordination problems, such as those discussed in chapters 2 and 3, global 
games allow us to pin down a unique equilibrium and to link the probability o f economic 
outcomes to the underlying economic fundamentals. That, in turn, allows us to deliver 
intuitive comparative static predictions and implications for optimal policy analysis.
Chapter 1 
Asset pricing under noisy rating signals: 
Does benchmarking on ratings matter?
LI Introduction
Credit ratings are summary statistics that reflect a rating agency’s opinion, as o f a spe­
cific date, o f the creditworthiness and financial robustness of a particular entity. Rating 
agencies’ assessment is mainly based on fundamental analysis and have traditionally mea­
sured creditworthiness in the context o f a capital, asset quality, management, earnings and 
liquidity analysis.
Following a series o f high-profile credit events (e.g. the Enron bankruptcy in 2001), 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act o f 2002 has required the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to conduct a study on rating agencies and their role in securities markets.  ^ In the 
course of that study, market representatives have suggested, among others, that ratings 
cause undue volatility in securities markets and have called for more transparency regarding 
the information relied upon by the rating agencies. For example, a market participant  ^has 
claimed that
.. .  one o f  the first things we wonder is what is it that
 ^ US Securities and Exchange Commission, "Report on the Role and Function o f Credit Rating Agencies in 
the Operation o f the Securities Markets', January 2003.
 ^ Testimony of Cynthia L. Strauss, Director of Taxable Bond Research, Fidelity Investments Money Man­
agement Inc., 15 November 2002.
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they [the rating agencies] know, and I  think that adds
unnecessary volatility and uncertainty to the marketplace. ..
Also the scope and application o f credit ratings nowadays stretches beyond the provision 
of information to market participants. Ratings, for example, have been used to facilitate 
monitoring the risk of investments by regulated entities and to set capital charges for banks 
and securities firms. Two notable examples that relate to the use o f ratings for capital 
adequacy purposes are the rules under the New Capital Accord, that have been proposed 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and will apply to banks, and the US Net 
Capital Rule  ^ that applies to broker-dealers. Both sets o f rules provide for the deduction 
from capital of a certain percentages o f the value o f security holdings depending on the 
credit rating of those securities. Moreover, regulators often restrict certain classes o f market 
participants from investing in securities below a rating threshold, with most notable the 
dichotomy between investment and subinvestment grade credits.  ^ Rule 2a-7 of the US 
Investment Company Act, for example, restricts money market funds firom investing in 
commercial paper below a rating threshold. Similar rules apply to insurance companies 
and pension funds.
From a theoretical perspective, the role o f information in asset pricing has been dis­
cussed both in a competitive market context and in the presence o f strategic interactions 
among market participants. For example, Kyle (1985) and its extensions^ consider an
 ^ See Adoption o f Alternative Net Capital Requirement for Certain Brokers and Dealers, Release No. 40 
FR 29795 (16 July 1975).
Namely, ratings above or below BBS grade, in Standard & Poor’s representation.
® See, for example, Michener and Tighe (1991), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan 
(1993).
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oligopoly of imperfectly informed investors having identical information. They show that, 
with identical information, there is an intense pre-emption phase where informed investors 
compete very aggressively and, as a result, information is incorporated into prices very 
quickly. Foster and Viswanathan (1996) introduce heterogeneous information in a Kyle 
(1985) context showing that trading outcomes depend critically on the initial correlation 
of private information that traders possess. They show the lower the degree o f initial cor­
relation of traders’ information -  namely the more heterogeneous information becomes -  
the higher the degree o f their monopoly power, with respect to their information advan­
tage, which then gives rise to an attrition trickle and an incentive to trade less aggressively. 
Given that a public signal about fundamentals, such as a public rating, could increase the 
initial correlation (i.e. reduce heterogeneity) o f traders’ information, ratings could possibly 
be viewed as inducing strategic traders to trade more aggressively and prices to incorporate 
information more quickly.
This paper is in the line o f literature initiated by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and 
Hellwig (1980). In the context o f a discrete-time asset pricing model of infinite horizon, 
we consider a competitive asset market where market participants are asymmetrically in­
formed and able to place their orders with a Walrasian auctioneer conditionally on prices.® 
However, in addition to private information that market participant may possess, we intro­
duce a public signal (rating) in every trading round that is produced by a non-trading and 
non-strategic party (rating agency). Such a public signal is assumed to be produced on 
the basis of a stylised, time-invariant process (the rating process), which is consistent with
See also Hellwig (1980), Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) and Allen, Morris and Shin (2003).
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investors’ beliefs/ Thus, in this paper we are able to discuss possible asset pricing implica­
tions both from the use o f ratings for their information content and, in addition, the impact 
that arises from benchmarking investment decisions and capital requirements on ratings.
Our solution approach involves the calculation o f a rational expectations equilibrium 
(REE) o f a securities market with ratings, assuming that the true state-variables of the 
market are never perfectly revealed neither to investors, nor to the rating agency, but they 
are observed with some error. Thus, agents need to filter information from the variables 
that they observe. In particular, the rating agency is assumed to apply a Kalman filter 
approach to update its ratings on the basis of private information that it observes, while 
investors are assumed to fit linear econometric models on observable variables. In addition, 
our modelling approach allows for higher order beliefs to have a material impact on asset 
prices.* That is in line with Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003) and Allen, Morris and Shin 
(2003) who argue that under beliefs o f higher order asset prices may become biased towards 
the public information, regardless how sound that information might be. Thus it would be 
of interest to examine whether a similar result also follows in our set-up and whether a 
world vrithout ratings would be preferable to a world vrith, but imprecise, ratings.
However, in discrete-time models with asymmetric information, agents’ rationality 
requires one to address the inferences that agents make from observable variables, know-
 ^ In this paper, we adopt a reduced-form approach to ratings process, by abstracting from the information 
economics of ratings (e.g. Diamond (1985) and Veldkamp (2003)), from the financial intermediation un­
derpinnings of ratings agencies (e.g. Millon and Thakor (1985)) and the possibility of strategic information 
revelation {cheap talk) by rating agencies.
® Higher order beliefs is a basic feature of asset pricing under asymmetric information and it refers to the 
situation where opinions of other investors’ opinions, and higher order than that, may have a material impact 
on asset prices. That is in line with Keynes’ (1936) famous metaphor that the market is similar to a beauty 
contest, where an agent’s subjective payoff from choosing the prettiest face from a list of contestants depends 
on how close her prediction were to the average opinion of other agents.
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ing that others act in a similar fashion. Thus beliefs, beliefs about beliefs and higher order 
than that, become hidden state variables and the dimension o f the state vector, associated 
with agents’ signal extraction problems, becomes unbounded. In order to deal with the 
problem of infinite regress in expectations, we apply the techniques o f Sargent (1991), as 
applied by Hussman (1992). More specifically, we extend Hussman (1992) by allowing rat­
ing announcements to augment investors’ information sets and introducing ratings-based 
frictions, such as ratings-based capital requirements and benchmarking of investment deci­
sions to ratings.
In equilibrium, investors’ subjective beliefs have to be consistent with the actual law 
of motion that those beliefs generate. Thus, equilibrium in our model is calculated as a 
fixed point in the mapping from investors perceived laws of motion to the actual law of  
motion that investors’ perceptions generate. This is by taking as given the econometric 
techniques that investors apply and assuming that those techniques belong to the same 
class of linear models. In particular, we focus on the situation where investors fit first- 
order vector autoregressive moving average (ARMA) models. As of Sargent (1991) and 
Hussman (1992), the equilibrium in first-order ARMA models is consistent with higher 
order beliefs and is such that investors have no incentive to increase the order o f either the 
AR or the MA component of their forecasting rules in order to improve their forecasts.
However, for purposes o f comparison with the ARMA case, we also describe equi­
libria (with and without ratings) when investors’ forecasting rules are restricted to be first- 
order vector autoregressive (AR) processes. As we know from Townsend (1983), those 
first-order autoregressions are always too short to give optimal forecasts because o f the in-
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finite regress problem. That is, in equilibrium, the prediction errors from first-order vector 
autoregressions will never be orthogonal to information that lagged two periods or more.  ^
We consider the case where investors use vector AR forecasting rules as a proxy for low 
market sophistication, in contrast to high market sophistication when investors run ARMA 
models.
The analysis shows that, when ratings are used for price discovery alone they may in­
crease price volatility, but this is consistent in the model with an increase in price efficiency 
(i.e. prices become more correlated with fundamentals). Also, the type o f forecasting 
techniques that market participants use to form their beliefs matters for trading outcomes. 
Moreover, for reasonable levels o f rating-based capital requirements, the volatility o f prices 
drops, although at a cost o f lower price efficiency.
Yet benchmarking o f asset holdings on ratings may cause both a reduction in price 
efficiency and an increase in volatility. This is despite an optimistic presumption in the 
model that agents have common knowledge of how the economy works, there are no struc­
tural breaks in the economy and investors trust the rating agency in its objective to produce 
timely, accurate and objective information. In fact, regulatory and other constraints that 
force a residual class of market players to link their investment decisions to ratings, may 
generate a sequence of perceived mispricings in the market and drive other investors to 
overreact to news about fundamentals. That way, benchmarking magnifies the effect o f
® This is, the prediction errors fi'om first-order vector autoregressions will never be orthogonal to the Hilbert 
space that is generated by all past history of investors’ information.
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news on prices in such a way that prices may respond to changes in fundamentals even in 
excess o f the full-information case.*®
The remainder o f the paper is organised as follows: Section 1.2 describes the model 
and the solution method. Section 1.3 presents the results under no rating-based frictions and 
discusses persistence implications and comparative statics. Section 1.4 introduces rating- 
based frictions, such as rating-based capital requirements and benchmarking o f asset hold­
ings on ratings, and discusses equilibrium implications. Section 1.5 concludes. Proofs, 
technical details and figures are included in the appendix.
1.2 The model
We consider a competitive market for a risky asset that pays a risky pay-ofif Dt that varies 
over time t. Pay-off Dt consists of two independent factors 6 it and 621 -  hereinafter called 
fundamental factors -  that have some persistence over time, as well as o f a transitory com­
ponent Ut
Dt = 9it + 921-^ Ut ( 1 1 )
We assume that factors where 9jt, j  =  1,2, evolve according to the following first-order 
autoregressive processes
9jt =  p9jt-i +  Vjt j  =  1,2 (1-2)
with {ut},  {vj t }  be i.i.d. white noise innovations with mean zero and variances cr^  and <7 .^ 
For simplicity and without loss o f generality of our analysis, we assume that the persistence
This is, the hypothetical situation where investors observe perfectly any innovation in fundamentals and 
they do not need to solve filtering problems.
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p is the same for the two fundamental factors, but equally one could consider different 
degrees of persistence, where one of the factors could be thought of as long term and the 
other as short term." In addition, we assume that the fundamental factors are stationary, 
i.e. they do not grow explosively for ever, by assuming that |p| <  1.
The market is populated by N  privately informed investors that belong to classes 
indexed by j  =  1,2 depending on the type o f private information that they observe. Pro­
portion a  belong to class 1 and observe private signals about factor 6 i, while proportion 
1 — a  to class 2, observing signals about 62. We consider an overlapping generation o f  
those investors who live for two periods and their preferences over future wealth demon­
strate constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) with coefficient Informed investors are 
able to trade conditionally on prices -  i.e. place limit orders -  in the first period and invest 
their wealth in the risky asset or, alternatively, in a safe asset yielding a return R.
There is also a residual set o f traders, called noise traders, who trade both for non- 
fundamental (liquidity) purposes and for benchmarking reasons, whereby they link their 
supply of the risky asset to some public information.^  ^ Non-fundamental trade implies a 
random supply { q }  o f the asset, which is i.i.d. normal with mean zero and variance crj, 
while noise trading for benchmarking reasons is introduced in Section 1.4.2.
Informed investors o f class j  =  1,2 are assumed to observe private signals sj about 
the actual realisation of fundamental factor 6ju  which are subject to an element of idiosyn-
However, that would increase the computational intensity of our calculations when we would have to 
derive an equilibrium of our asset market.
That is discussed in more detail in Section 1.4.
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cratic noise 77^ ^
4  =  ^jt +11 jt j  =  1,2 (1.3)
where { 77^ 4} are i.i.d. white noise innovations, orthogonal to {e^t} and {vj t} ,  with zero 
mean and variance Thus we consider informed investors as having special price dis­
covery skills (e.g. macro versus sector funds), while such an information structure as given 
exogenously without modelling explicitly the actual decision o f investors to acquire infor­
mation, as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) for example. Instead, we focus exclusively on 
informed investors’ problem of filtering information about fundamentals from observable 
variables, including their private signals { 4 } -
1.2.1 Ratings
In addition to private signals that informed investors observe and to publicly observed 
prices and asset pay-offs, we assume that in every trading period a non-trading, indepen­
dent and non-strategic party (henceforth called the rating agency) produces a public signal 
rt (henceforth called the rating) about the factors that affect the pay-offs of the risky asset. 
Consistently with real-world features of ratings, we assume that ratings are public signals 
in the form of summary statistics, i.e. they summarise all the information that the rating 
agency has received over time about the fundamental factors that affect asset pay-offs. In 
addition, as we discuss below, ratings in this model are updated on the basis o f a recur-
In this paper, we abstract from the information economics that underpin the existence and functioning 
of rating agencies, as well as from possible principal-agent problems in the disclosure of information to the 
ratings agency.
In the real world, this may allow the agency to obfuscate the reason behind the rating change when this is 
based on confidential information.
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sive process, which is in analogy to the rating process outlined in rating policy guidelines 
of rating agencies. Finally, we assume that the rating agency uses only its private signals 
in order to produce its ratings, ignoring any element o f public information such as prices,^  ^
and does not publicly announce the individual elements o f its private information.
Thus, the rating r* is assumed to be an unbiased estimator of the sum o f the two 
fundamental factors conditional on all private signals that the rating agency has observed 
up to that period. In particular, the rating agency is assumed to be receive noisy private 
signals and sjt of the form
(1.4)
^2t — +  €2t
where {ejt}  are white noise innovations, orthogonal to {ut},  {vj t }  and {rjjt},  with 
mean zero and variance By assuming that the rating agency possesses information 
about both fundamental factors, while individual investors are separated in two groups with 
each one receiving a different signal, we aim to address possible information advantages of 
rating agencies relative to individual market participants. That is supported by the adoption 
of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD) by the US Securities and Exchange Com­
mission in October 2000, which prohibits selective disclosure of non-public information 
by firms, but provides an exception for rating agencies. Having said that, the rating process 
in this model is given by
n  =  E  [9it +  92t I ggs, s < t ]  (1.5)
 ^ This is consistent with the Standard & Poor’s approach to ratings, as outlined in their rating policies 
guidelines.
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Given that the rating r* in 1.5 depends on all past history of signals Sp we may express it in 
a recursive form as a function o f the previous rating r t- i  and the signals observed in period 
t. That can be achieved by using the following Kalman filter representation.
Lemma 1 The rating process {rt}, as defined by \ . 5, exhibits positive autocorrelation 
and is generated by the following on-line algorithm.
r t  — p  [ l  — E  ( S  +  1 )  T t - \  +  p E  ( E  +  1 )   ^ [ s î t _ i  +  5 2 t _ i ]
- 1
where, parameter E is given by
' - a
(1.6)
(1.7)
Proof See appendix ■
From 1.6 and 1.7, the degree o f serial correlation in the rating process depends on 
the relative precision of the rating agency’s signal errors, relative to that o f fundamental 
innovations, rather than on the actual levels. Although this is a standard Kalman filter result, 
in the context of our ratings representation it suggests that the better the access of a rating 
agency to information the more confident the agency will be to rate more aggressively and 
to give a rating that may contradict a previous one. Also, the rating process in 1.6 was 
evaluated on the basis of a steady-state assumption,^® assuming that the market runs for a 
long time. That assumption may not fit well in a situation o f a regime change (e.g. industry
That is, we use the unconditional variance of the rating forecast error. More details are discussed in the 
appendix.
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liberalisation), or an economy in transition, but in those cases, rational expectations and 
common knowledge o f model parameters would not fit well either.
1.2.2 Definition of rational expectations equilibrium
Informed investors o f class j  =  1,2 are characterised by the information sets 
Ijt =  {Ps, Ds, Ts, si; s < t } ,  which are a records o f data Zjt o f the form
- Pt, Dt, n, 4 (1.8)
Let also Cj be conditional forecast errors, conditional on investors’ information sets and on 
the type o f forecasting techniques that investors use to form their beliefs. Let also ç* be the 
net supply o f the risky asset in period t, where {ç*} are assumed to be i.i.d. white noise 
innovations. Then, the state vector zt that describes the market for the risky asset in period 
t is
P t Dt n si si Bit 92t Ç t  C i t  C 2t (1.9)
State vector Zt includes all variables that are directly and collectively observed by investors, 
as well as the two latent factors B\ and 2^, the random supply ç of the risky asset and 
investors’ forecast errors Q. Also, the noise o f the model at t  is specified by a vector et 
which includes all the white noise innovations
Pit P2t '^ It l^t-1 2^t-l U ( 1.10)
where, the white noise innovations {%}, {v j) , { p j ]  and {c j}  are defined by 1.1, 1.2, 1.3,
1.4 and {ç} are shocks to the aggregate supply o f the risky asset.
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The fundamental requirement that a REE must satisfy is that equilibrium prices have 
to be consistent with the presumption that investors know the actual law of motion of the 
securities market and choose their demands schedules accordingly. Within a given class 
of linear forecasting rules (e.g. ARMA), a competitive REE for our securities market is 
defined by the following steps:
Step 1: Investors make conjectures about the law o f motion o f variables that they observe. 
Given their information sets, investors use statistically optimal predictors to derive the 
perceived law o f motion for their observable variables.
Step 2: Investors select their demand schedules so as to maximise their expected utilities.
In order to calculate expected utilities, investors use their perceived laws o f motion o f the 
variables they observe.
Step 3: Given investors ’ demand schedules, the price pt o f the risky asset clears the market. 
Step 4: Investors ’perceived laws o f motion are correct. That is, there is a fixed point in the 
correspondence that maps investors’ perceived laws o f motion to the actual law o f  motion 
that those perceptions generate.
In general, the properties of a REE of our securities market will depend on the type 
of linear forecasting models that investors are assumed to run. Following Sargent (1991), 
if  an equilibrium is such that investors find it optimal to form their beliefs by fitting more 
complicated (linear) models on their observable variables, that equilibrium would be de-
As we discuss below, conjecturing a law of motion about observable variables is equivalent to assume that 
investors conjecture an actual law of motion for the state vector zt.
In other words, conditional on their perceived laws of motion, investors form subjective beliefs about the 
variables they observe and the riskiness of their forecast errors.
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fined as a reduced-order equilibrium. In contrast, a full-order equilibrium would be one 
where investors have no incentive to increase the order of either the AR or the MA part of 
their forecasting rules. Given the structure o f information that is stipulated in this model, 
Sargent (1991) and Hussman (1992) have shown that an equilibrium that is calculated on 
the assumption of investors fitting ARMA(1,1) models on observable variables is o f full or­
der and we focus on that type of equilibrium. Thus, conditioning investors’ forecasts on an 
infinite history of data is equivalent to conditioning those forecasts only on first-order lags 
and the information sets Ijt (j =  1,2) can be restated as: Ijt =  {pt, A ,  U, W}-
1.2.3 Beliefs
Following Sargent (1991) and Hussman (1992), informed investors’ perceptions about the 
law of motion of their observable variables are assumed to be of the general ARMA(1,1) 
form
+ C j t + l  "b ^ j C j t  J — 2 (1.11)
where Zj^  = Pt, Dt, n, si , Cjf+i is the vector o f conditional forecast errors and
A j, C j are matrices of ARMA coefficients that can be recasted such that 1.11 becomes
^jt+i — ^jXjt +  Vjf+i j  — 1 , 2 (1.12)
with Xjt = ^jt
Cjt
be the vector of variables that privately informed investors observe
in every period, including their realised forecast errors Vjt+i = Cjt+i
Cjt+l
, B j  =
Aj C,
O 4  O 4
and O4 be 4 X 4 matrices o f zeros. Given 1.12, informed investors can
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forecast Xjt+i on the basis o f observable xjt
^  I ~  ^jX jt (1.13)
Beliefs 1.13 affect investors’ optimal demands for the risky asset and, as a result, prices 
in equilibrium. In Sections 1.2.4 and 1.2.5 we discuss the solution to investors’ optimal 
portfolio choice problem and we solve for equilibrium prices.
1.2.4 Investor optimisation
We assume that investors o f class j  =  1,2 demonstrate CARA preferences over future 
wealth with coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion We also assume that4>j
ratings may influence investment decisions not only through the information they convey 
to market participants, but also through ratings-based capital requirements. Such capital 
requirements are assumed to imply an opportunity cost o f funds that investors need to set 
aside as capital, which is proportional to the risky-asset holdings o f each individual investor.
Thus, in this model, we examine the possibility that ratings-based capital require­
ments may have an impact on investment decisions by focusing on the opportunity cost of  
funds that such requirements would imply for market participants. In particular, we adopt 
a reduced form approach to ratings-based capital charges whereby investors face an oppor­
tunity cost (gain) due to capital requirements at a given period, which is proportional to the 
extent of deterioration (improvement) in the rating quality o f the risky asset over that pe­
riod. For example, if the rating o f the risky asset decreases, then an investor with positive 
asset holdings would face an opportunity cost of funds due to capital charges, proportional
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to the quantity of his risky-asset h o ld in gs.In  particular, we assume that investors of class 
j  =  1 , 2  choose their optimal demands qî for the risky asset in order to maximise their 
expected utility over next period’s wealth
4  =  Arg maxE [ -  exp | ;  =  1 , 2  (14a)
subject to
=  R (wl -  qlpt) +  q* {Pt+i +  Dt+i) +  kq* (n+i -  n )  (14b)
where R  is the constant gross interest rate on an alternative risk-free investment and, as 
said before, parameter k is aimed to capture the opportunity cost o f funds that investors 
have to set aside as capital.^ ® The above maximisation problem gives the following optimal 
demands
J  A ^  k +1 +  A +1 +  krt+i I Ijt] — Rpt — krt . ,  ^ / i  i  c \
1.2.5 Market clearing
We assume that investors’ optimal demands are aggregated by a central auctioneer who 
finds, if  possible, a market-clearing price.^  ^ At a rational expectations equilibrium the price
In order to preserve the linearity of our model, we are going to assume that a rating increase would imply 
the release of some capital and, as a result, the investor would face a negative opportunity cost (i.e. a gain).
Given that the alternative investment that we consider is the risk-free asset, the opportunity cost k must 
be inversely related to the level of risk-free interest rates R. Moreover, the opportunity cost parameter k 
has to take into account the slope in the risk-weights scale that is specified by regulators. For example, the 
Standardised Approach, under the proposed New Basel Capital Accord, stipulates the following (discrete) 
scale of risk wei^ts: 0% for assets that are rated between AAA and AA-, 20% for A+ to A-, 50% for BBB+ 
to BBB-, 100% for BB+ to B- and 150% for assets with a rating below B-.
That formulation differs from Kyle (1985) and its extensions, where prices are set by a market-maker on 
the basis of a semistrong market efficiency rule.
1.2 The model 24
Pt must clear the market
aN q] +  (1 -  a ) Nq^ =  (116)
where q\ and q^  are agents’ optimal demands for the risky asset, as given by 1.15, and {çf} 
are i.i.d. white noises with mean zero, variance crj and mutually orthogonal in all lags to 
any other noise term in the model. From 1.15 and 1.16 the price process pt becomes
Pt =  [acrlN<j)-^Ei [•] +  (1 -  a) o\N(j)2E2 [•] -  M n  -  o \a lçt] (117)
where Ej [•] =  E [ p « + i  +  A + i  +  kn+i | Ijt] ,a] = Var [ C f + j  +  C < + i  +  ^ C t + i  I 
j  =  1 ,2 , and parameters A, M  are given by
A =  R N  H- (Ti (1 — a)
M  =  kN  (1 — a) (^ 2]
Both, subjective beliefs Ej [•] and subjective measures o f riskiness cr| are determined in 
equilibrium on the basis o f investors’ perceived laws of motion, as discussed in Section 
1.2.3.
1.2.6 Solving for a REE
We assume that investors conjecture that the state vector zt evolves according to the fol­
lowing law of motion
Zt =  T { B ) z t - i - \ - V ( B ) e t  (1.18)
where B  =  [Bi B 2I and T  (B), V  (B) are matrices of actual coefficients. If all eigenvalues 
of T (B) lie inside the unit circle,^  ^ then equation 1.18 determines a covariance-stationary
It can be easily verified that in our model all eigenvalues of matrix T  (B) lie inside the unit circle. This is 
because of the assumption that the autoregressive parameters are such that \pj \ < 1 {j = 1,2).
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distribution for the state vector Zt, whose moment matrix solves
M , =  r  (B) M ,T  (B)' +  V  (B) n v  (B)' (1.19)
where Q. is the moment matrix of the vector et o f white noise iimovations and B  =  [Bi B 2]. 
Given that matrix V  (B) f lV  (B)  ^is symmetric, equation 1.19 defines a discrete-time Lya­
punov equation. Then, with all eigenvalues of T (B) less than unity in modulus, there is a 
unique^  ^ symmetric matrix that solves equation 1.19. With in hand we can derive 
the variance covariance matrices Ma;^ . o f investors’ observable variables Xjt and the covari­
ance matrix of the state vector zt with the vector of observable variables x jt ,  j  — 1,2 .
Using an appropriate selector matrix Uj, matrices and are given by
M x ,= u ,M ,u '  ( 1 2 0 )
Let us now consider the linear projection of vector Xjt+i, o f investor’s ^observable vari­
ables, on its previous realisation Xjt
E [xjt+i I Xjt] =  Sj (B) Xjt j  =  1,2 (1-21)
Using matrices Ma,^ . and we are able to evaluate the matrix Sj (B) o f statistically 
optimal estimators as follows
Sj (B) =  UjT (B) (1.22)
where and yizxj are given by 1 .2 0  and is a matrix that selects the subvector of 
observable variables Xjt from the state-space vector zt.
From standard theory, there is a unique symmetric matrix (B) that solves (1.19) i.f.f. no eigenvalue 
of r  (B) is the reciprocal of any other eigenvalue of T  (B). This is, i.f.f. eig [T (B)] eig [T (B)]' — 1 0.
Given that all eigenvalues of T  (B) lie inside the unit circle, none of them can be the reciprocal of another 
eigenvalue of T (B).
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Let S (B) =  [Si (B) Sg (B)], then, a rational expectations equilibrium is a fixed 
point in the correspondence that maps investors’ perceptions -  as defined by the VAR coef­
ficients B  in 1.13 -  into statistically optimal projections S (B), given the actual law of mo­
tion 1.18 that investors’ perceptions generate. It is worth emphasising that, in this model, 
conjectures about the coefficient matrix B  are equivalent to conjectures about the actual 
law of motion 1.18 of the state vector Zt. Such an equivalence stems from the fact that, 
for a given coefficient matrix B , equation 1.19 defines a unique moment matrix for the 
state vector zu which in turn, defines matrices T  (B) and V  (B) o f the actual coefficients. 
In other words, there is a one-to-one relationship between conjectures about coefficient ma­
trix B  and matrices T (B), V (B). That becomes evident in Section 1 .A.2 where we outline 
the fixed-point solution algorithm and how matrices T (B) and V (B) are evaluated.
1.3 Ratings and price discovery
In this section we examine the effect of ratings on price volatility and efficiency under the 
presumption that they are used solely for price discovery and not for any other purpose, 
such as to benchmark investment decisions or to set capital requirements. The equilibrium 
coefficients of investors’ forecasting models were calculated using Matlab programs under
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the following basic parameterisation.
Risk tolerance
Investor proportions a=0.5
Gross interest rate R=1.02
Constants N=I,  c l = l
Persistence o f fundamentals p=0 .8
Variance of fundamental innovations al=0.1
Variance of errors in investors’ private signals
Variance o f errors in rating agency’s signal a\=0.1
Variance of noise in the supply o f the risky asset ct2 =o.o;
The above parameterisation was chosen mainly to illustrate the potential impact o f rating
announcements on asset prices, but has not been calibrated to match any actual data. More­
over, it allows us to search for a symmetric equilibrium, whereby the coefficients in the 
forecasting models of each class of investors are equal. In Section 1.3.3, we present a com­
parative statics analysis where we examine the sensitivity of our results to different levels 
of risk aversion and precision of rating information.
In order to gauge the impact o f ratings on asset prices, we consider two benchmark 
cases, namely, the case with asymmetric information, but without ratings, and the case 
of full information. '^* Given the linearity o f the model and the assumption that all inno-
Under the full information benchmark, investors are assumed to observe perfectly the realisation of both 
fundamental factors, but they still remain uncertain about future realisations of these factors. As in Hussman 
(1992), one can show that for fundamental shocks Vjt, j  =  1,2, the price process (pt) under full information 
is given by:
P" = {r - pU i - pD
which implies the following expression for the unconditional variance of prices:
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vations in the model are normally distributed, correlations are considered in terms o f the 
coefficient o f linear correlation. Market efficiency is then considered with respect to the 
informativeness o f prices and the extent to which prices correlate with fundamentals.
Section 1 .A.3 in the appendix presents the equilibrium coefficients o f investors’ fore­
casting techniques and second moments o f prices when investors are assumed to run vector 
ARMA(1,1) models. The ARMA(1,1) case is called the high-sophistication case, in the 
sense that investors cannot improve further their predictions by incorporating more lags 
in their forecasting models.^  ^ Also in the appendix we present the equilibrium when in­
vestors’ forecasting techniques are restricted to a first-order vector AR(1) process. This 
allows for an examination o f the extent to which our results might be sensitive to the as­
sumption o f the type o f forecasting techniques that investors are using at the REE. The case 
where investors run simple AR(1) models is called the low-sophistication case, in a sense 
that investors could further improve their forecasts by adding more lags in their time-series 
models.
Based on the results that we derive under both the high and low-sophistication case, 
we discuss how the use of ratings for price discovery may impact on market efficiency and 
price volatility.
and the covariance of prices with fundamentals 6jt, j  = 1,2:
Using the above expressions and the fact that the unconditional variance of fundamentals is Var {6jt) = 
we can derive the coefficient of linear correlation of prices with fundamentals under full information. 
See, for example, Sargent (1991) and Hussman (1992).
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1.3.1 Results
Tables I and II below, compare the equilibrium results when there is incomplete information 
under both the highly sophisticated (ARMA) and less sophisticated (AR) forecasting rules, 
both with and without ratings. Table I reports the equilibrium variance o f asset prices in the 
different cases, while Table II shows the impact on price efficiency (i.e. how much prices 
correlate with fundamentals). The benchmark case o f full information is also shown in the 
following tables.
Table I: Price Volatility Table II: Price Efficiency
Full-information benchmark 
7.3462
Full-information benchmark 
0.7071
Incomplete information without ratings 
High sophistication Low sophistication 
4.3608 0.3988
Incomplete information without ratings 
High sophistication Low sophistication 
0.4914 0.3927
Incomplete information with ratings 
High sophistication Low sophistication 
5.0634 4.5017
Incomplete information with ratings 
High sophistication Low sophistication 
0.5429 0.5400
We observe that, in the incomplete information equilibrium, and regardless of the fore­
casting techniques used, the introduction of ratings increases the volatility o f prices but 
they also enhance price informativeness. In particular. Table II shows that, under both the 
ARMA and the AR case, the introduction o f ratings increases the correlation of prices with 
fundamentals 6j { j =  1,2) albeit at a cost of higher price volatility. The increase in price 
volatility is much stronger under the low-sophistication case where the introduction of rat­
ings results in an increase in volatility from, approximately, 0.4 to 4.5. However, under the 
high-sophistication case, the increase is less striking from approximately 4.4 to 5.1.
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In the following section we examine how non-fundamental shocks (çf) impact on 
prices under both the ratings and no-ratings case. We also consider the impact of a one-off 
shock in fundamentals Ut -  i.e. the impact of a single shock in fundamentals that is isolated 
from the impact o f any other shock in the model -  as well as the impulse response of prices 
to pay-off innovations Ut and private signal errors 77^ .
1.3.2 Persistence
Under the full-information benchmark, non-fundamental shocks have no persistence on 
prices because non-fundamental shocks themselves have no persistence. However, when 
the full information assumption is relaxed, non-fundamental shocks may have a persistent 
effect on prices. That is because fundamentals are latent variables and investors rely on past 
values of observable variables to filter information about fundamentals and form their be­
liefs. Given that prices are affected, through market clearing, by one-off non-fundamental 
shocks, those shocks may continue to affect prices in future periods through investors’ fil­
tering problems. In other words, persistence o f non-fundamental shocks on prices is driven 
by, what Bacchetta and van Wincoop call, persistence o f investors’ rational confusion that 
eventually dissipates as investors gradually learn about the realisation o f fundamentals in 
previous periods.
Similarly, rational confusion may inhibit investors from responding effectively to 
fundamental shocks i/t and it may also drive them to misinterpret non-fundamental noise Ut 
in asset pay-offs as being fundamental information. The extent to which ratings ameliorate 
investors’ rational confusion and facilitate the incorporation o f fundamental information
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into prices will determine to what extent rating agencies provide a useful service to the 
market. Finally, errors in investors’ private signals may have a different impact on prices 
under the ratings and the no-ratings case. Private signal errors are expected to afifect prices 
through channels o f both subjective beliefs and subjective measures o f riskiness. As with 
all other types of shocks that we consider, the impulse response o f prices to private signal 
errors will be determined by the sign and relative importance of elements in the VAR matrix 
T (B), as defined by equation 1.18.
The impulse response of prices to various shocks in the model will be determined by 
the sign and relative importance of elements in the VAR matrix T  (B),  as defined by equa­
tion (1.18). From 1.18, the impulse response of prices to a one standard deviation shock 
in the element o f innovations vector St, as defined in 1 .1 0 , is given by the following 
function:
/  (<) =  [T (B)*-' V  (B)] (''') <Ti (1.23)
where T  (B) and V  (B) are defined by 1.18, <7  ^ is the standard deviation o f the element 
of vector £*, superscript (1 , i) refers to the element in the first row of the matrix in 
brackets and t =  1 , 2 , ...oo.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the impulse response of prices to a one standard deviation shock 
in non-fundamental trade. Under the no-ratings case, the rational confusion that follows the 
shock induces a price overreaction almost three times larger than the case with ratings. It 
then takes around 13 trading rounds for most o f the rational confusion to unwind, compared 
to eight trading periods under the ratings case. Similarly, figure 1.2 shows how prices
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respond to an idiosyncratic shock u in asset pay-offs. We observe that ratings mitigate any 
undue price impact of a one-off shock in asset pay-ofiFs that is not related to fundamentals.
Figure 1.3 shows the price response to a shock of one standard deviation in funda­
mentals. Although, initially, the price responds to the shock in the same fashion under 
both the ratings and the no-ratings case, over the next couple of trading rounds prices tend 
to move closer towards the full-information benchmark under the ratings case, compared 
with the no-ratings case. This confirms our earlier finding -  by using the equilibrium vari­
ance/covariance matrix of our state variables -  that ratings improve the informativeness 
of prices. Finally, in figure 1.4, we report the impact on prices o f a one standard devia­
tion shock in private signal errors. The non-monotonicity in the impulse response is due to 
a particular combination o f positive and negative elements in the VAR coefficient matrix 
T  (B), the endogenous nature of prices and forecast errors and the fact that private signals 
may play a more pronounced role in affecting investors’ forecast errors than any other state 
variable.
1.3.3 Comparative statics
In this section we present a comparative statics o f different degrees in risk aversion and of 
the precision of rating information relative to that o f privately informed investors.
Risk aversion
According to financial economics, agents trade securities for two different motives:
(i) to share risk when they are endowed with different quantities o f the risky asset and
(ii), to exploit information when they have access to different information sources and
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possess different assessments of risky asset pay-ofiFs. The two motives for trading may 
combine together and affect prices in various ways depending on the model parameters. In 
particular, as with Hellwig’s (1980) static model, as risk aversion increases in the market 
the risk-sharing motive dominates that o f exploiting information. As a result, risk aversion 
results in less informative prices, which is consistent with the results that our dynamic 
model produces and are shown in figure 1.5.
As far as price volatility is concerned, it depends both on the degree of price in­
formativeness and serial correlation. On the one hand, we have seen already that price 
informativeness increases with ratings towards that o f the full-information benchmark and 
this is mainly because prices, by becoming more informative, respond better to fundamen­
tal innovations. On the other hand, the higher the serial correlation (in absolute terms) of 
prices the higher the unconditional variance o f the price process. Prices, however, may be­
come serially correlated as a result of serially correlated fundamentals, strong risk-sharing 
motives, filtering problems, or other externalities that may induce investors to trade with 
less confidence on private information and place more weight on publicly observed signals, 
such as prices.
Figure 1.6  reports the impact of risk aversion on price volatility and figure 1.7 the re­
lationship between risk aversion and investors’ modelled risk-perceptions. Figures 1.6 and 
1.7 illustrate that, ceteris paribus, in a market with high risk aversion rational investors are 
aware that risk-sharing motives dominate those of information exploitation and prices be­
come less informative.^® As a result, the accuracy of investors’ optimal forecasts, which
26 This is consistent with Hellwig (1980),
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depend among other things on how informative prices are, diminishes. Given that the lon- 
grun (unconditional) mean o f prices is common knowledge among investors and prices are 
competitive, less accurate forecasts induce investments to weigh more on the fact that any 
price deviations from its unconditional mean will be reversed afterwards.^  ^ Consequently, 
prices are characterised by strong mean reversion and, as a result, high serial correlation 
and price volatility.
Rating precision
As far as the effect of the precision of ratings on prices is concerned, figure 1.8 shows 
that the lower the precision o f rating information the less precise investors’ optimal fore­
casts become, but they still remain more precise than in the no-ratings case. Consequently, 
as the precision of rating information diminishes relative to that o f investors’ private sig­
nals, investors trade less aggressively for information reasons and the informativeness o f 
prices drops towards the no-ratings case benchmark. The relationship between price infor­
mativeness and the precision of rating information is illustrated in figure 1.9.
Moreover, as the precision o f ratings decreases, relative to that of investors’ private 
information, the market turns out to ignore ratings and the volatility o f prices drops towards 
the level under the no-ratings case. This effect is quite distinct from the impact of risk 
aversion on prices; while risk aversion induces higher serial correlation in prices and, as a
We could argue that the less accurate investors’ forecasts become, the price tends to become a focal point 
around which investors co-ordinate their beliefs. As a result, long-run (unconditional) mean reversion of 
prices becomes self-fulfilled at earlier trading rounds and it becomes more likely to affect the decisions of 
currently lived investors. This is consistent with the results of Allen, Morris and Shin (2003) who solve a 
similar type of equilibrium but with three trading rounds, totally uninformative prices and a public signal 
about fundamentals that acts as a focal point and skews agents beliefs towards it. In our case, however, the 
focal point is still the price signal itself.
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result, higher unconditional volatility of prices, the lower the precision o f ratings, relative 
to that of investors’ private signals, the more rational investors tend to ignore ratings and 
focus more on their private information. This point is illustrated in figure 1.10.
1.4 Ratings and benchmarking
We now turn to examine how prices may be affected by frictions that relate to the use of 
ratings not only for pure information discovery purposes, but also for rating-based capital 
requirements and benchmarking o f investment decisions on ratings.
1.4.1 Rating-based capital requirements
Regulatory rules often allow regulated entities, such as banks and securities houses, to use 
credit ratings for capital adequacy purposes. The usual requirement that those entities have 
to meet is to deduct from capital a certain percentage o f the value o f their security holdings, 
depending on the rating that those securities receive from recognised rating agencies. In 
addition, regulated entities are required by law to maintain a minimum level o f capital to 
withstand potential future losses and, should their capital fall towards that level, they have 
either to reduce their exposures to risky investments, or to recapitalise.
But setting capital aside for prudential regulation purposes entails an opportunity cost 
of foregone interest from investing in more profitable risky assets rather than in risk-free 
securities. This is especially the case when an investor’s internal assessment o f the fun­
damental value of traded securities conflicts with that of a rating agency. Consequently, 
via rating-based capital requirements, ratings could impose a constraint on investment de-
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cisions, forcing investors to respond to rating changes in a way that is possibly contrary to 
their private assessments. That, in turn, could have a material impact on both price effi­
ciency and volatility. What such an impact could be is an open question that we attempt to 
address through our stylised model in this section.
From Section 1.2.4, parameter k captures the opportunity cost o f funds due to rating- 
based capital charges. So far, k has been set equal to zero, but now turn to examine the 
case with rating-based capital requirements, that is when k > 0, and their impact on the 
informativeness and volatility o f prices. Figure 1.11 shows that the informativeness of 
prices decreases the higher the parameter k, namely, the higher the incentives that capital 
adequacy rules offer to investors to forecast next period’s rating. At the same time, the 
volatility o f prices drops for an initial range of parameter k and then increases as investors’ 
incentives to forecast the rating process increase further. This is illustrated in figure 1.12.
However, high levels of parameter k would be far from relevant to existing rating- 
based capital adequacy rules. In particular, the risk-weighting scale of asset holdings under 
the proposed New Basel Accord, along with the 8 % Basel ratio, and low levels o f world in­
terest rates would imply a relatively modest level o f incentives to forecast ratings for capital 
adequacy purposes. Thus, any realistic set of rating-based capital rules would be expected 
to imply a low fc, under which both price efficiency and volatility would possibly drop. 
Moreover, in the real world, the dispersion of information across investors would possibly 
be higher than in our model, where only two classes o f informed investors have been as­
sumed. Higher dispersion of beliefs across investors would lead to greater heterogeneity in 
asset holdings across portfolios and, as a result, the impact o f rating-based capital require­
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ments on the informativeness of prices at an aggregate level would be less pronounced than 
what our model implies.
1.4.2 Benchmarking noise trades to ratings
An increasing number o f policymakers and market participants, including the rating agen­
cies themselves, have pointed to the fact that the use of ratings for reasons other than their 
information content may impose a negative externality on the efl&cient functioning o f secu­
rities markets. In particular, linking investment decisions to ratings, with the most notable 
example the dichotomy between investment and subinvestment grade credits, may distort fi­
nancial markets from pooling information and allocating financial resources in an efiicient 
way.
Such a distortion could arise as a result of both regulatory rules and market prac­
tices. In particular, many institutional investors are forced by law, or their own charter, 
to sell bonds whose credit rating has crossed some critical threshold level. In the United 
States, for example, regulators place restrictions on the quality o f assets pension funds and 
insurance companies can invest in and those restrictions are explicitly linked to the credit 
ratings produced by the Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisations (NRSROs). 
Although these rating-linked constraints may not be necessarily hard -  in a sense of pre­
scribing immediate liquidation o f affected assets -  they may adversely interfere vdth in­
vestment decisions and drive investors’ interest away from assets whose economic value 
would, otherwise, warrant a better treatment by the market.
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In this section we attempt to touch upon the issue o f linking investment decisions to 
ratings and to examine the efficiency implications of such practices. However, the idea of 
having to liquidate a position in an asset, whose rating has fallen below a certain threshold, 
implies an optimal investment strategy that allows for the possibility of downgrade-and-sell 
scenarios.^® In a multi-period context that would require us to track individual investors’ 
asset holdings over time and to incorporate them into the state-space representation of our 
securities market.
To avoid such a complication, we consider the situation where both fundamental and 
non-fundamental trade takes place on the basis of a one-period horizon. Then, we relate 
the non-fundamental trade to ratings by assuming that there is a set of residual market 
participants who supply the risky asset proportionately to the probability the rating next 
period will fall below a certain threshold f . Threshold r is assumed common knowledge 
among investors. For simplicity, we also assume that the residual investors do not learn 
from prices or asset pay-offs, but they only consider ratings.^  ^ Thus, the empirical ratings 
distribution of those investors is conditional only on past rating information. Given the 
Kalman filter representation o f the rating process in lemma 1, the above conditionality can 
be stated simply in terms of the currently observed rating rt and not on the basis of the 
whole history of ratings up to period t.
In that case, evaluating optimal holdings in the risky asset would require techniques similar to those for 
pricing barrier contracts.
This assumption is without loss of generality and is imposed in order to avoid the complication of having 
to consider non-fundamental investors running econometric models. In a real-world context, one could think 
of a competitive intra-dealer market and institutional investors with limited price discovery capabilities and 
restricted access to competitive prices. This would be possibly not far from the realities of corporate bond 
markets.
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Noise traders are assumed to benchmark their supply o f the risky asset to some mea­
sure of the probability the rating next period will fall below a given threshold f . Bench­
marking, in this way, can be rationalised as the result of forced sales by a class o f regulated 
investors that are restricted to hold the asset only if  its rating is above r  and unload their 
holdings to the market proportionally to the probability such downgrading will take place. 
For computational convenience and without loss o f generality we assume that noise traders 
consider only ratings for computing such a probability and do not filter information from 
prices and asset pay-offs. Thus, the total net supply St o f the risky asset in period t  is 
assumed to be of the form:
S t C t A P i  (rt+i <  f |  n )  +  çt (1.24)
where v4 is a constant that captures the extent o f benchmarking o f noise trades to ratings. 
Normality is preserved by conditional expectations, thus, by taking the first-order Taylor 
expansion of the probability term in 1.24 we may express St as
where by application of the Projection Theorem and from 1.6
E  (n+il r.) =  | p  [1 -  S  (S  +  1)-'] +  2pE (E +  1 )- ' n  (1.26)
and
F a r (r ,+ i|n )  =  2 [p E (E  +  l ) - ‘] (1.27)
V ar  (r)
where parameter E is given by 1.7 and all unconditional second moments in 1.26 and 1.27 
can be derived from the equilibrium moment matrix Mz o f state vector Zt. By substituting 
1.25 into the price equation 1.17 we can derive an expression for the state-space represen­
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tation of the new price process. We can then compute the price dynamics in the new REE 
and consider the efficiency implications of benchmarking investment decisions to ratings.
It is worth reiterating that both the benchmarking parameter A  and the rating thresh­
old r are assumed common knowledge among investors. Thus, the supply o f the risky asset 
that is due to benchmarking of asset holdings on ratings is also common knowledge in 
every period. That allows us to avoid any further complication of having to consider higher 
order beliefs about the extent o f ratings benchmarking in the market and investors’ individ­
ual threshold levels. Moreover, regarding the supply o f the risky asset, no more noise was 
added in the model and, as a result, the extent o f noise trading ç* in our securities market 
remains unaltered. Despite that, however, we will see next that the effect o f benchmarking 
on the second moments of asset prices, and consequently on efficiency, is non trivial.
Assuming a relative precision of 0.9 between private and rating information^® and by 
varying the level o f benchmarking parameter A, we show that price efficiency drops with 
the extent of benchmarking (A) in the market while volatility increases, as illustrated in 
figures 1.13 and 1.14. That occurs despite informed investors being fully rational and no 
extra source o f noise was added in the model. In fact, at the beginning of each trading 
round, investors observe the realisation of the rating and, by the time investment decisions 
are made, everyone knows exactly the amount o f concurrent residual supply that is due to 
benchmarking.^* But, instead of that having a trivial levels-impact on prices, benchmarking 
on ratings has a material impact on the second moments o f prices.
We have repeated the analysis using different levels of relative information precision and the results look 
qualitatively the same.
In reality, uncertainty about the extent of benchmarking on ratings may further amplify the loss of effi­
ciency.
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Such an impact o f benchmarking on asset prices can be justified on the grounds that 
perceived changes in fundamentals feed into prices not only through changes in perceptions 
about future income from holding the asset, but also through beliefs about capital gains that 
depend on the net supply o f the asset. Given that benchmarking renders the net supply of the 
risky asset partly forecastable, informed investors are inclined to trade more aggressively 
on any item o f information in order to exploit perceived mispricings and become more 
prone to misinterpret any item of news as information about fundamentals.
More formally, figures 1.15 to 1.18 report the impulse response of prices to a one 
standard deviation shock in various noise terms in the model, demonstrating how rational 
confusion due to asymmetric information could impact on prices. Figures 1.15 to 1.17 show 
that benchmarking magnifies any undue price response to non-fundamental shocks in pay­
offs and errors in private signals and ratings.F igure 1.18 shows that, in the presence of 
benchmarking of noise trades to ratings, prices overreact to innovations in fundamentals by 
overshooting even the full information case, which captures the basic accounting identity 
between prices and asset pay-offs and is represented by a dotted, downward-sloping line in 
figure 1.18.
The chart below presents a simulation of REE prices with and without benchmarking 
(solid line), illustrating the magnifying impact o f benchmarking on price variations.
Notice that, by construction, it is only informed traders who observe pay-offs and private signals. As a 
result, any price overreaction at least to non-fundamental pay-off shocks and private signal errors is due to 
trading by informed traders rather than stemming directly from noise trading.
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Consequently, benchmarking of noise trades to ratings could induce informed traders to 
trade aggressively on any item of news, sound or not, in order to exploit perceived mispric­
ings in the traded asset. In that case, even relatively unimportant news -  i.e. news that is 
unrelated to fundamentals -  could lead to large price swings, resulting in excess asset price 
volatility and low price efficiency.
1.5 Conclusions and extensions
The role and importance of rating agencies in capital markets has been criticised in recent 
years because agencies have failed to foresee a number of high-profile credit events, such 
as the Asian crisis in 1997, the Russian default in 1998 and the Enron bankruptcy in 2001. 
Agencies have also been criticised for increasing volatility in financial markets, while there
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have also been voices arguing that ratings are of marginal value to financial markets because 
the information they provide is stale and has already been reflected into share prices.^^
The model presented in this paper demonstrated that, even if  ratings lag the market, 
they may enhance price efficiency when they are used solely for price discovery by market 
participants and not for other purposes, such as benchmarking o f asset holdings on ratings 
or rating-based capital requirements. On the other hand, the introduction o f ratings could 
add to asset price volatility, but this was found to be consistent with improved market 
efficiency. This is under the presumption that investors believe that what the rating agency 
announces is its best guess about fimdamentals, and investors, despite having different 
information, have common knowledge o f how the economy works.
We also showed that the quantitative impact resulting fi-om the use of ratings for price 
discovery purposes may depend on the way that rating information is rationally processed 
by investors. The lower the sophistication of the forecasting techniques used, the more 
pronounced the impact o f ratings on market outcomes. Qualitatively, however, our results 
remain robust to the type of forecasting techniques that are used by investors.
Regarding the use of ratings for reasons other than price discovery, we distinguished 
between two types of ratings-related fiictions: (i) rating-based capital requirements that ap­
ply to investors on the basis o f their individual holdings o f a rated asset, (ii) benchmarking 
of asset holdings to ratings from a residual set of investors (e.g. pension funds, insurance 
companies) whose sole concern is to sell assets whose rating is likely to fall below a certain 
threshold.
See, for example, J. DuPratt White Professor of Law at Cornell Law School, testimony in front of the US 
Senate’s Committee on Governmental Affairs, 21 March 2002,
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As far as rating-based capital requirements are concerned, our analysis indicated that 
if  investors’ incentives to track ratings for capital adequacy purposes are relatively modest 
then, rating-based capital requirements may reduce price volatility, yet at the cost o f lower 
price efficiency. However, if  incentives to track ratings are sufficiently strong then, rating- 
based capital requirements could, under certain conditions, add to asset price volatility.
In order to analyse the impact o f benchmarking asset holdings to ratings, we con­
sidered a residual class o f (noise) traders that link their net supply o f the risky asset to 
some measure of the probability that the rating next period will fall below a certain thresh­
old. Benchmarking, in this way, was rationalised as the result o f forced sales by a class of 
regulated market participants who face restrictions on the rating quality o f assets they hold.
Our results demonstrated that benchmarking o f asset holdings to ratings by certain 
market participants could induce other investors to overreact to any item of news about 
fundamentals, leading to lower price efficiency and higher asset price volatility. We argued 
that this is because perceived changes in fundamentals feed into prices not only through 
changes in perceptions about future income from holding the asset, but also through beliefs 
about capital gains that depend on the net supply o f the asset. Given that benchmarking 
renders the net supply of the risky asset partly forecastable, informed traders are inclined 
to trade more aggressively on any item of news that could imply a change in fundamentals, 
even if  they face no restrictions on the rating quality o f assets they hold. As a result, 
informed investors become more prone to misinterpret any item o f news as information 
about fundamentals leading to less informative and more volatile prices.
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At this point, it is worth drawing a parallel between our results, in case o f bench­
marking asset holdings to ratings, and the UK market experience in the second half o f  
2002. Market commentators at the time attributed the rapid swings in market sentiment 
partly to a regulatory resilience test that applies to life insurance companies. According to 
that test, firms have to demonstrate solvency in the face of a further 25% decline in their 
asset holdings. In view of a rapid decline in stock prices that period, the resilience test was 
suspended for several weeks in order to mitigate forced sales of stocks by major market 
players.^ "*
In a sense, the resilience test that applies to life insurers is a form of benchmarking 
similar in nature to the rating-based benchmarking that we discussed in this paper. That 
is, in both cases, a class o f market participants benchmarks its investment decisions on a 
public signal which also conveys information about fundamentals. In our model that public 
signal was the rating; regarding the resilience-test case, that signal was the price. Similar 
parallels one could draw with respect to the 1987 stock market crash and the role o f portfolio 
insurance, as another form of benchmarking on prices, in exacerbating market turbulence.
Looking forward, the model could be extended to incorporate an explicit objective, 
by the rating agency, to smooth the rating process (e.g. to avoid rating reversals) and to 
examine how that might impact on market outcomes. That, o f course, would require us 
to introduce an adjustment cost in the rating process and the rating agency, in the model, 
to solve a dynamic programming problem rather than running a simple Kalman filter to 
assign its ratings. Moreover, a different, though still time invariant, rating process could be
See, FSA Guidance Note 4 (2002), "Resilience test for insurers'.
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adopted that would share more similarities with the actual way that ratings are announced in 
the marketplace, namely, not in every trading round. A good candidate could be a Markov 
arrival o f rating information under which a rating would be announced in randomly selected 
periods according to a Markov process. From a modelling perspective, an appealing feature 
of a Markov formulation would be that, as with the Kalman filter, it has a state-space 
representation and can be easily incorporated into our fi-amework.
Finally, it would be worth exploring how the results would be affected by an increase 
in the information dispersion among investors about fimdamentals and consider more than 
two classes of privately informed investors. That would possibly allow us to compare our 
results with earlier findings on the impact o f public information on asset prices, such as in 
Allen, Morris and Shin (2003).
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1.A Appendix 
1.A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let Sj(_ibe the vector o f signals that the rating agency receives up to t — 1 about factor 6j, 
j  — 1 ,2 . Given normality of 6jt and signal vector the conditional distribution o f 6jt, 
conditional on signal vector is also normal with conditional mean and variance
=  E (Ojt I S j f - i )  ( 1 . 2 8 )
=  Var (Ojt I (1.29)
Let us suppose that the conditional mean Ojt\t~i and variance have been calculated 
and with those in hand we are able to evaluate Ojt+i\t and From 1.4 we easily
derive the conditional expectation of the signals that the rating agency receives in period t, 
conditional on the agency’s signal information up to period t  — 1
^  I  ^  I  S j f - i )  =  (1.30)
Moreover, the forecast error 5^^ — E  | is
^  ( s j f  I  S j t - i )  =  +  C j t  ( 1 . 3 1 )
Since ejt are independent over time and orthogonal to 6jt, they are also independent o f 
Ojt\t-i. This implies that the conditional variance of the forecast error 1.31 is
V ar  [(sj, -  E  | s ,V i))]  =  +  c l  (1.32)
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where o \ =  V ar [ejt]. Similarly, the conditional covariance between the forecast errors
^  ( 4  I S j t - i )  and  -  E  ( 0 , ,  | is
Cov I
E  \(6jt — + ejt) (9jt — 03(|(-i)]
(1.33)
From 1.28, 1.29, 1.30, 1.32 and 1.33 we get the conditional joint distribution o f signal Sj^ . 
and fundamental factor Ojt, conditional on signal information up to period t  — 1
(1.34)
Let us now define Ojt\t as the conditional expectation o f factor Ojt conditional on signal 
vector Sjf, namely, all signals Sj up to period t
4 4 -1 ^  TV ( Ojt\t—i
_9jt 4 - 1 . V
Ojt\t = E  (Ojt I Sjt) 
= E  (Ojt \ s‘j^\sj^_l) (1.35)
The conditional expectation Ojt\t and the conditional variance T,t\t o f the forecast error can 
be evaluated by applying the Projection Theorem, using the join distribution in 1.34
+  <^ e) (Sjf — 
'^t\t = 'E>t\t-i — '^t\t-i (^t\t-i + crl)
(1.36)
(1.37)
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Moreover, from 1.2 and also the fact that Vjt are orthogonal to every element o f the signal 
vector we get
0jt+i\t = E {6jt+\ I
= E [p6jt + Vjt I
=  P^ jt\t
(1.38)
Var {9jt+i I
=  Var{pOjt +  Vjt\s^jt) 
=
(1.39)
Combining 1.36 with 1.38, and 1.37 with 1.39 we derive the following Kalman filter rep­
resentation that gives the one-period forecast Ojt+i\t as a function o f Ojt\t-i
or
1  —  +  C ^ e ) +  P^ t\t-1 +  CTg) ( 1 - 4 0 )
where Ht+i|t solves
(1.41)
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Given that \p\ <  I, crl >  0 and a l >  0, the conditional variance converges to a
unique (positive) steady-state constant E* that solves^^
E* =  / E 1 -  E* (E* +  a l)2 \ - l (1.42)
It is easy to show that the solution to 1.42 is
a ' - a
(1.43)
Independence between 6i and 62, s ï and sJ implies that the rating process rt is given by
rt — E [6it +  621 \ <  t]
or, from 1.40
(1.44)
where E =  ^
Q .E .a
I.A.2 Fixed-point solution algorithm
Following Hussman (1992), we outline here the main steps we need to follow in order to 
calculate a linear REE equilibrium of our securities market. To derive such an equilibrium 
we need to evaluate matrices T (B) and F  (B) o f the actual law o f motion 1.18. We start by 
choosing arbitrary values for their first row, which corresponds to the price process, and for 
the conditional variances a  ^ and coefficient matrices B ,, j  =  1,2. We also define selector
35 See, for example, Hamilton (1994), Proposition 13.1, page 390.
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matrices e i, 6 2 , u i, U2 that satisfy the following set o f equations
Z\t =  X\i =  \l\Zf,
Z2t =  G2Zt X2t =  U2%( (1-45)
Tt — ^rZt Çt —
Let also matrix c be such that pt+i 4- A + i +  kn+i =  cxjt+i. Given 1.45, we can easily 
see that E  \pt+i +  A + i +  kn+i | Ijt] =  cBjUjZt { j =  1,2) and the equilibrium price 1.17 
can be restated as
Pt =  A“  ^ [aa^N(f)-^cBiUi +  (1 — a) alN(l)2cB 2U2 — Me^] Zt — AT^(j\a\esSt (146)
Substituting Zt from 1.18 into the price equation 1.46 we derive the following expression 
for the price process
Pt ~  1 4“
where row matrices dp and €p define the first row o f T (B) and y  (B), respectively, and 
they are given by
dp =  A“  ^ [aa^N(j)-^cBi\ii 4- (1 — a )  G\N(j)2EB2U2 —  Me^] T  (B)
6p =  A“  ^ [0 :0-2  A'^icBiUi 4- (1 — o;) a\N(j)2cB 2M2 —  Me^] V  (B) — A“ ViO-^eg
The second row o f T (B) and V  (B), which corresponds to the pay-off process Du is
implied by 1 .1, while the third row, which corresponds to the rating process, is implied by
lemma 1. The fourth and fifth row of T  (B) and V  (B), which correspond to investors’
private signals s{ ( j =  1 ,2) are implied by 1.3, and the sixth and seventh row by 1.2. Row
eight of y  (B) corresponds to supply of the risky asset and is set equal to
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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With respect to investors’ forecast errors (j =  1,2) we define selector matrices e^j such 
that
Cjt — ^zjZt
From the actual law of motion 1.18, from investors’ perceptions 1.11 and from selector 
matrices and e ,^ the forecast errors Cjt can be written as
Cu — (B) — AiCi — Cie^i] z t- i  +  eiV  ^(B) £t
^2t — (B) — A 262 — C 2GZ2] Zt-\ +  02y  (B) £t
Equations in 1.47 define the following matrices and
dr =
oiT  (B) — AiOi — Cio^i 
62 T (B) — A 2O2 — CbOz2 
e iy ( B )
6 2 y ( B )
(1.47)
Matrix d  ^defines rows 9 to 16 of T (B), while matrix 0 ( defines rows 9 to 16 o f F  (B). It 
is worth noting that in equations 1.47 selector matrices oi and 02  select elements only from 
the first five rows o f matrices T (B) and V  (B). However, the rows o f matrices T (B) and 
V  (B) that are relevant to are rows 9 to 12, while for ^2* rows 13 to 16. Consequently, 
ei and 02 do not select any of the coefficients o f matrices T (B) and V  (B) that are relevant 
to the evaluation o f forecast errors and Cgc Thus, there is no need to evaluate a fixed 
point for the rows o f T  (B) and V  (B) that correspond to investors’ forecast errors.
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1.A.3 Equilibrium in the high-sophistication case
Under the benchmark case without ratings, the equilibrium ARMA(1,1) coefficients of the
observable variables Pt Dt si Q are calculated to be
B j =
0.5527 0.9359 -0.0734 -0.3720 -0.3491 0.2081
-0.0000 0.8000 -0.0000 0.0356 -0.6326 0.0793
0.0000 -0.0000 0.8000 -0.0120 0.0952 -0.6797
0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
-0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
-0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
The last three rows of B j give the coefficients in the projection of forecast errors ({  on 
Pt-u  A - i ,  and CJ i. That these coefficients are zero is a necessary condition for ({  
to be conditional vector white noise, conditional on observable information of investors o f 
type j  =  1,2. At the REE, from the moment matrix M^, we derive the following variance-
covariance matrix M  for the variables Pt D t 5J sf 9 it 02t Ç*
M  =
4.3608 2.0202 0.6740 0.6740 0.5409 0.5409 -0.0736
2.0202 1.5556 0.2778 0.2778 0.2778 0.2778 -0.0000
0.6740 0.2778 1.2778 0.0000 0.2778 0.0000 0.0000
0.6740 0.2778 -0.0000 1.2778 0.0000 0.2778 -0.0000
0.5409 0.2778 0.2778 0.0000 0.2778 0.0000 0.0000
0.5409 0.2778 -0.0000 0.2778 0.0000 0.2778 -0.0000
-0.0736 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0100
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By introducing ratings in the information sets o f investors, the equilibrium ARMA(1,1)
coefficients o f the observable variables Pt Dt n 4 Ci are calculated to be
=
0.3364 1.7162 -0.0002 -0.0601 -0.2136 -1.2186 1.6445 0.2319
0.0000 0.8000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0277 -0.6607 0.4579 0.0659
0.0000 0.4624 0.3376 -0.0000 0.0160 -0.3819 0.2647 0.0381
0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.8000 -0.0138 0.0798 0.2331 -0.6844
0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
-0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
-0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
From the moment matrix we derive the following variance-covariance matrix M  for 
the variables [ p, £), r, sJ s? 6i, 02t
M  =
5.0634 2.0202 1.0239 0.7806 0.7806 0.6439 0.6439 -0.0668
2.0202 1.5556 0.2816 0.2778 0.2778 0.2778 0.2778 0.0000
1.0239 0.2816 0.2816 0.1408 0.1408 0.1408 0.1408 -0.0000
0.7806 0.2778 0.1408 1.2778 0.0000 0.2778 0.0000 -0.0000
0.7806 0.2778 0.1408 1.2778 1.2778 0.0000 0.2778 0.0000
0.6439 0.2778 0.1408 0.2778 0.0000 0.2778 0.0000 0.0000
0.6439 0.2778 0.1408 0.0000 0.2778 -0.0000 0.2778 0.0000
-0.0668 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0100
We now briefly present the equilibrium forecasting techniques under the low-sophistication 
case where investors are restricted to run vector AR(1) models.^^
As with the ARMA case, the NREE when the market is using vector AR techniques is calculated using 
Matlab programs.
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1.A.4 Equilibrium in low-sophistication case
U n d er the benchm ark ca se  o f  a sym m etric  in form ation  w ith o u t ratings, th e  equ ilibrium
A R (1 ) co e ffic ien ts  o f  the ob servab le  variab les Pt D t  SÎ are ca lcu la ted  to  be
Bj =
0.0510 0.1044 0.0503
0.1081 0.2221 0.1068
-0.0235 0.1258 0.1508
A t the R E E , from  the m o m en t m atrix w e  derive th e fo llo w in g  varian ce-covarian ce
for the variab les Pt D t Oit ^2t Q
0.3988 0.6408 0.2220 0.2220 0.1307 0.1307 -0.0339
0.6408 1.5556 0.2778 0.2778 0.2778 0.2778 -0.0000
0.2220 0.2778 1.2778 0.0000 0.2778 -0.0000 -0.0000
M  = 0.2220 0.2778 -0.0000 1.2778 -0.0000 0.2778 0.0000
0.1307 0.2778 0.2778 -0.0000 0.2778 -0.0000 -0.0000
0.1307 0.2778 -0.0000 0.2778 -0.0000 0.2778 -0.0000
-0.0339 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0100
W e co n sid er  n o w  the ca se  w ith  ratings that are u sed  b y  investors for in form ation  d isco v ery  
pu rp oses on ly . In  th is  ca se , the equ ilibrium  A R (1 )  co e ffic ien ts  o f  the ob servab le  variab les
Pt D t  n  s i are ca lcu la ted  to  be
B , =
0.0808 0.3467 2.1872 0.1625
0.0339 0.1454 0.4974 0.0681
0.0196 0.0840 0.6251 0.0394
-0.0210 0.0838 0.3266 0.1317
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From the moment matrix we derive the following variance-covariance matrix M  of the
variables Pt D t rt s} s? ûit 02t U
4.5017 1.7513 1.0239 0.7312 0.7312
1.7513 1.5556 0.2816 0.2778 0.2778
1.0239 0.2816 0.2816 0.1408 0.1408
0.7312 0.2778 0.1408 1.2778 -0.0000
0.7312 0.2778 0.1408 -0.0000 1.2778
0.6039 0.2778 0.1408 0.2778 -0.0000
0.6039 0.2778 0.1408 -0.0000 0.2778
-0.0572 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
M  =
0.6039
0.2778
0.1408
0.2778
- 0.0000
0.2778
- 0.0000
0.0000
0.6039
0.2778
0.1408
- 0.0000
0.2778
- 0.0000
0.2778
- 0.0000
-0.0572
0.0000
0.0000
- 0.0000
- 0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0100
Pt D t rt sJ 9 it 02t U underAs expected, the moment matrices of vector 
the ARMA and AR equilibrium differ only with respect to their first row and column that 
correspond to the second moments of prices. This is because the price process is the only 
endogenously determined process in the vector, while all other variables are assumed to be 
exogenous and remain unaffected by the equilibrium allocations o f asset holdings among 
investors.
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Chapter 2 
Prudential liquidity regulation and the 
insurance aspect of lender of last resort
2.1 Introduction
Central banks have been deeply involved in the design of banking regulation even in cases 
where responsibilities for supervision o f banking institutions have been transferred to other 
authorities. An often cited reason for central banks’ involvement in regulatory design is its 
possible impact on the likelihood o f lender of last resort (henceforth LOLR) intervention 
and the possibility of unintended consequences for central banks’ balance sheet.^  ^ More­
over, the LOLR facility conflicts with the best principles that central banks wish to operate 
in money markets. That is predictability in their actions and lack o f favouritism in the 
choice of counterparties.^* Thus, among central bankers, emergency liquidity assistance 
has been perceived as literally a last resort policy tool, rather than an alternative to banking 
regulation that should aim to forestal the need for LOLR intervention.
The focus of this paper is on liquidity regulation, meaning prudential standards for 
banks specifying an appropriate level o f highly liquid assets that banks need to maintain 
in relation to their liabilities.^  ^ What we have in mind is a quantitative liquidity require-
Regulatory design may also impact on financial stability, in which central banks have a vested interest due 
to possible implications for monetary policy. Bank failures, for example, are often associated with systemic 
externalities and may have macro implications (e.g. Japan in 1990s), but so does regulatory intervention, 
depending on design.
I am grateful to Charles Goodhart for pointing this out.
Such a requirement is distinct fi’om reserve balances that banks need to maintain with central banks
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ment similar to the Sterling Stock Liquidity Ratio (SSLR) o f the UK’s Financial Services 
Authority (FSA)/° Under FSA’s rules, banks need to hold liquid assets to meet outflows 
over a period of five days, allowing a bank in crisis to continue business for some time 
and to arrange more permanent funding solutions.^  ^ Conventional wisdom also suggests 
that the five-day horizon is to cover the worst case scenario where a bank faces a liquidity 
crisis on a Monday, while authorities are allowed to reach the following weekend and con­
sider the possibility of LOLR intervention without undue pressure from pending market 
developments.
In the literature, official sector involvement to deal with liquidity crisis in the banking 
system has received substantial attention both in terms of crisis prevention and crisis man­
agement. To mention just a few notable examples. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue in 
favour of a deposit insurance scheme to resolve co-ordination problems among depositors 
that could lead to bank runs, inefficient liquidation of bank assets and bankruptcy. Bhat- 
tacharya and Gale (1987) offer a rationale for official monitoring o f liquid asset holdings by 
banks, suggesting that liquidity shortages may arise as a result o f banks’ incentives to free- 
ride on interbank liquidity, rather than holding liquid assets themselves. Dewatripont and 
Tirole (1994) argue that capital requirements provide an instrument for allocating control
in certain jurisdictions -  including the U.S. -  that have typically been used by governments to tax bank 
profits and to enhance central banks’ ability to implement monetary policy. Feinman (1993) offers a detailed 
discussion of reserve balances with the central bank and their historical evolution.
According to a resent survey by the Bank of England on the prudential regulation of banks’ liquidity (see 
Financial Stability Review, 15) there is currently no harmonisation of supervisory liquidity requirements at 
either a GIO or EU level. In February 2000, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published “Sound 
Practices for Managing Liquidity in Banking Organizations”, which sets out broad qualitative guidelines for 
how banks should manage liquidity risk.
See FSA Interim Prudential sourcebook, pp. 533-534.
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rights to the deposit insurance fund if things go badly. Holmstrom and Tirole (1998, 2000) 
suggest that the ofiicial sector can improve welfare by managing the supply of government 
debt, given that banks may fail to cross-insure firms if liquidity shocks are correlated. Last 
but not least, Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) argue in favour of an interest rate 
ceiling on deposits to complement capital requirements in mitigating bank moral hazard by 
increasing the franchise value of banks.
Regarding the role o f LOLR in dealing with banking crises, Goodfnend and King 
(1988) argue that solvent banks could perfectly insure against the possibility of a bank run 
via a sophisticated interbank market, suggesting that central banks should concentrate on 
maintaining a sufficient amount of liquidity in the banking system, rather than providing 
the LOLR facility. However, Donaldson (1992) finds evidence supporting the view that 
liquidity-rich banks may act strategically and abuse the market by charging higher than 
the competitive rate in case of crisis, which could justify LOLR intervention. Rochet and 
Vives (2002) argue that the LOLR may prevent inefficient liquidation of bank’s assets and 
improve welfare if the central bank has perfect foresight o f bank’s fundamentals. Repullo 
(2003) discusses the effect o f LOLR existence on holdings of liquid assets by banks, show­
ing that a bank may end up keeping a lower level o f liquid assets, which is consistent with 
empirical evidence by Gonzalez-Eiras (2003)."^  ^ Repullo (2003) also argues that the ex­
istence of the LOLR may lead to more efficient outcomes since holding liquid assets is 
typically costly. Yet Naqvi (2003) suggests that if the supervisory process o f the LOLR is
In December 1996, the central bank of Argentina received access to contingent credit lines from a group 
of international banks, which enhanced its ability to act as a LOLR, Banks have indicated their reliance 
on the enhanced ability of tiie central bank to provide liquidity by reducing their liquid asset holdings by 
approximately 6.7 %.
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subject to noise, then the gains from ex-post efficiency, from holding a lower stock o f liq­
uid assets, may be outweighed by ex ante inefficiencies induced by moral hazard which is 
conducive to lower lending rates in the economy. Goodhart and Huang (2004) favour the 
existence of an LOLR arguing that the interbank market cannot provide sufficient liquid­
ity when the amount needed to bail out a bank is too large to be accommodated by a single 
bank and concerted action by a group of banks may be inhibited by co-ordination prob­
lems, They also suggest that the interbank market might not be able to provide insurance 
against liquidity shocks if  those shocks happen to be systemic, affecting the whole banking 
sector.
In this article we consider the implicit costs associated with liquidity regulation as 
an insurance premium paid by the banking sector,''  ^ quid pro quo for (partial) liquidity 
insurance by the official sector under the LOLR facility. Then, we investigate how liq­
uidity regulation for banks could be optimally combined with a LOLR policy in order to 
maximise the expected surplus from financial intermediation and we search for conditions 
under which a combination of prudential liquidity regulation and LOLR insurance could be 
welfare improving of a laisser-faire regime without prudential liquidity requirements and 
a LOLR safety net.
The idea of considering regulation, in general, as a form of implicit insurance, and 
regulatory costs as insurance premia -  or taxes -  against the implicit subsidy that such an 
insurance would imply, is not new. It dates back to Posner (1971) who explains a number
According to FSA’s Interim Prudential sourcebook, p. 495, banks are reluctant to hold a large stock 
of immediately available cash or marketable assets, as these generate no return (in the case o f cash) or a 
comparatively low yield (in the case o f easily marketable assets, e.g. government bonds).
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of phenomena of regulated industries through the prism of taxation by regulation. Buser, 
Chen and Kane (1981) also consider banking regulations by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) as a condition for banks receiving deposit insurance. They interpret 
the deadweight costs o f such regulations as implicit insurance premia which develop over 
and above the explicit fees that are charged by the FDIC.'^ '^  They also argue that the FDIC, 
through regulatory interference, effectively employs a risk-based -  as opposed to a flat -  
structure of insurance premia. Yet Buser et al. sketch a model o f interaction between FDIC 
regulation and deposit insurance, stopping short o f analysing optimal FDIC response. Thus, 
they offer no insights into welfare implications of FDIC insurance/regulation and whether 
or not such an ofiicial intervention is warranted from a welfare perspective.
Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992) focus on information problems between de­
posit insurers and banks, showing that the mere notion o f a competitive banking industry 
contradicts the possibility o f fairly priced deposit insurance, i.e. when the deposit insurer 
breaks even on every insured bank. Along the lines o f Buser et al. (1981), they show that 
deposit-linked subsidies -  such as underpriced deposit insurance -  are necessary in resolv­
ing moral hazard problems associated with bankers’ risk-shifting motives in the presence of 
information asymmetries between deposit insurers and banks. However, Chan et al. (1992) 
abstract from welfare implications of deposit insurance which, from a LOLR perspective, 
is the main focus o f our analysis.
According to Buser et al. (1981), in order for the FDIC to induce voluntary participation of banks in 
its regulatory jurisdiction, its sets its explicit insurance premium below market value. As a result, the FDIC 
insurance fimd amounts to only about 0.80 per cent of total deposits in insured banks and FDIC regulations 
aim at protecting a bank’s charter value, serving as a first line of defence against bank losses.
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Sleet and Smith (2000) provide a rigorous analysis o f the design o f a safety net for the 
banking system in the presence of both full deposit insurance and a LOLR. Using a general 
equilibrium framework, they argue that the pricing o f deposit insurance is irrelevant from 
a welfare perspective, although the same does not hold as regards the operation of the 
discount window. Sleet and Smith (2000) illustrate that, in the presence o f high discount- 
window rates, the ex-post costs, associated ^vith banks’ perverse incentives to shift risk 
to the government, offset the ex-ante benefits of inducing banks to invest prudently. But 
in the presence of multiple equilibria, the LOLR can be used as an equilibrium selection 
method. However, they consider regulation only implicitly via a lump-sum tax that is levied 
to depositors, allowing the official sector to run a balanced budget. That way, they illustrate 
that taxing deposits does not affect aggregate welfare, which may be due to the assumption 
that taxes are levied on deposits rather than on banks’ profits.
In this paper we focus on the interaction between LOLR policy and first-best liquidity 
regulation, how they may affect investment decisions by the banking sector and under what 
circumstances they becomes socially desirable.'*  ^ The central bank in our model represents 
the official sector, acting both as an banking regulator and an LOLR. Moreover, we adopt 
the working hypothesis that the central bank has a welfare maximisation objective, under 
the constraint to maintain a zero expected cost o f potential LOLR intervention.
We also consider a banking sector that faces funding constraints and the possibility 
of information-induced bank runs. Funding constraints in the model arise from depositors’
Without prejudice to potential information problems between banks and the official sector, those problems 
are assumed away in our analysis, mainly for analytical tractability. Consequently, the role of prudential 
liquidity as a possible medium to buy time in case of crisis is not analysed in this paper.
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rational anticipation of bankers’ moral hazard problems, similar to Dewatripont and Tirole
(1994) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998, 2000). The possibility of information-induced 
bank runs aims at capturing banks’ inherent fragility due to high leverage, short term fund­
ing and asymmetric information which, in the presence o f adverse economic conditions, 
may lead to loss o f confidence to banking institutions'*® and unanticipated foreclosures of  
wholesale interbank lines.'*^  In the presence o f such fnctions, the analysis provides a nec­
essary and sufficient condition for prudential liquidity regulation to be socially desirable 
(proposition 6), showing that the more debt-constrained the banking sector is, the higher 
its profit opportunities and the less stable its deposit base is, the more prudential liquidity 
regulation becomes socially desirable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the eco­
nomic environment that we analyse. Section 2.3 presents the benchmark case o f no liq­
uidity regulation and Section 2.4 solves for the optimal regulatory contract. Section 2.5 
considers welfare implications of prudential liquidity regulation and Section 2.6 concludes. 
Proofs are included in the appendix.
2.2 Basic environment
We consider a model with three dates (t =  0 ,1 ,2 ) and three active sectors o f risk neutral 
agents: i) commercial bankers that receive uninsured wholesale deposits and extend loans, 
ii) fund-managers who manage depositors’ funds that are kept with the bank and iii) a
See, for example, Calomiris and Gorton (1991) and Gorton (1988). 
See, for example. Rochet and Vives (2002).
2.2 Basic environment 85
central bank that represents the ofi&cial sector acting both as a banking regulator and a 
LOLR.
2.2.1 Bankers
As o f t =  0, the bank can invest in a perfectly diversified portfolio o f risky loans with 
constant returns to scale, where the total amount o f investment 7 is a continuous variable 
that can be chosen fi'eely. Bank’s investment portfolio is financed through capital A  and a 
volume of deposits D. The bank is assumed to invest on behalf o f everyone in this economy 
by choosing an amount o f investment that maximises its expected surplus, while it keeps 
any remaining fimds in liquid assets I that pay no interest. That implies the following 
budget constraint as of ^  =  0:
I  +  l =  A +  D  (2.1)
We assume that pay-offs per unit of investment depend on the realisation o f a productivity 
shock (j), which represents the proportion o f loans that succeed a t t  =  2 and is uniformly 
distributed ^  U ( l  — with |  <  (f> <  1. Moreover, loan pay-offs are binary with 
one unit of loan investment paying a gross return R >  1 at t =  2, in case o f a successful 
investment, otherwise it pays zero.
As in Diamond (1984), we introduce moral hazard firom the bankers’ side in the 
medium to long run, i.e. between periods t  =  1 and  ^ =  2. In particular, bankers in the 
model act as delegated monitors of loan investments, undertaking an unobservable decision 
either to manage their loans prudently or to engage in excess risk taking. Excess risk taking 
yields a private benefit B  per unit of investment that is paid out to bankers only if  the bank
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does not fail at t =  2, but it also scales down the proportion o f successful loans from ÿ  
to  ^ with j3 > 1. That is consistent with Kane (1989) and Cole, McKenzie and Lawrence
(1995) who document that banks opt for a risky investment strategy that pays out a private 
benefit if the gamble succeeds, but leaves depositors with the losses if  the gamble fails."**
2.2.2 Fund managers
Deposits in this model are typically repaid at t =  2, but can also be withdrawn at f =  1. 
By this is meant that depositors do not face liquidity needs in the interim period. Thus, 
the emphasis here is shifted from depositors’ liquidity insurance to a situation where bank 
runs may occur because imperfectly informed creditors may refuse to renew their credit 
lines with the bank."*® As in Rochet and Vives (2003), we assume that the management of 
deposits is delegated to a continuum of intermediaries (fund managers) o f total measure 
D, who are able to costlessly monitor the performance o f bank loans. Fund managers then 
decide whether to rollover or withdraw their funds by observing private signals Si about the 
proportion of successful loans, of the form:
S i  =  (f) £ i
where {%} are i.i.d. innovations with Z* ^  U (—£, +£) and e >  0. By introducing infor­
mation asymmetries among bank’s creditors, the analysis allows for endogenous liquidity
We could also think of private benefit B  as the cost of investing in state-of-the-art risk management 
systems that enhance bankers’ ability to improve the credit quality of loan portfolios.
We recognise that in a model with only late depositors, any problems arising from premature liquidation 
of deposits could be avoided by prohibiting such an action explicitly in the deposit contract. We could 
consider early depositors in the model by introducing preference shocks â la Diamond and Dybvig (1983), in 
which case the bank should hold an additional amount of asset as liquid reserves. For simplicity, we do not 
distinguish between early and late consumers.
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shocks to interrelate with the general economic environment, such as the actual economic 
fundamentals of the banking sector, LOLR policy and prudential liquidity requirements. 
For example, if  a high proportion o f creditors observe bad signals, then early deposit with­
drawals may occur in a large scale and the bank may face a liquidity crisis. But what 
constitutes a bad signal may not only depend on the realisation of <j), but also on what poli­
cies are in place by the official sector, as well as what are creditors’ beliefs are about other 
creditors’ actions.^® We consider the following definition o f bank liquidity crisis.
Definition 1 A bank liquidity crisis occurs if  bank’s stock o f liquid assets at t  =  1 is 
insufficient to meet fund managers ’ demand to withdraw their deposits.
Depending on their actions at f =  1, fund managers’ pay-offs are as follows:
Fund Managers NC&ND C&ND D
Withdraw tt{1 — k) tt (1 — fc) ir {1 — k)
Rollover tt tt (1 — fc) 0
NC denotes the events of no liquidity crisis and ND that o f no bank default. Also, C stands
for the event of liquidity crisis and D for default. Fund managers are assumed to receive
a private benefit t t  if the bank faces no problems (i.e. no liquidity crisis and no default).
Otherwise, that pay-off is reduced by a proportion k € (0,1) in case o f premature withdraw
of deposits for whatever reason -  given that, in the absence o f liquidity needs at f =  1,
deposits are supposed to stay put for two periods -  or if they fail to foresee a liquidity crisis
and shift their deposits elsewhere. In case o f default, fund managers are assumed to lose
their total bonus. Such a pay-off structure allows the introduction o f information-induced
That is in contrast to exogenous liquidity shocks that are assumed, for example, in Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1998, 2000).
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bank runs in the model using a simple global game argument and preventing the analysis 
from becoming messier through a more elaborate bank run model with endogenous pay­
offs à la Diamond and Dybvig.
2.2.3 Central bank
The central bank is assumed to set its LOLR policy in a way that satisfies a two-fold ob­
jective: First, to maximise the expected surplus from financial intermediation. Second, 
to maintain a zero expected fiscal cost of LOLR intervention, i.e. to break even in loans 
extended under its LOLR facility without systematically losing money under its LOLR op­
erations, which would inevitably require it to draw on its fiscal backup. We conjecture a 
level (j)** of productivity shock 0  such that in case o f liquidity crisis, the central bank bails 
out the bank if and only if  0 >  (j)**. Consequently, given the interpretation of shock 0, 
the central bank could be considered as more forbearing in accommodating adverse liq­
uidity shocks to the bank, the lower the threshold 0** that determines its LOLR policy. 
In that sense, ambiguity about LOLR intervention is not constructive, but simply stems 
from uncertainty about the actual realisation of shock 0. Moreover, we assume that any 
LOLR intervention takes the form of a capital injection, abstracting firom the possibility of 
preferential access to collateral by the central bank.
In relation to its role as banking regulator, the central bank is assumed to prescribe 
certain holdings of liquid assets by the bank as a proportion to its deposits. As discussed 
in Section 2.4, given central bank’s LOLR policy 0**, such a liquidity requirement aims at 
implementing the loan investment by the bank that is socially optimal. In that sense, one
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may also consider prudential liquidity regulation as an expedient for the central bank to 
precommit to its LOLR policy. The figure below summarises the sequence of moves.
t=0 t=l t=2
Continuation
Central bank sets Loan 
LOLR & prudential investment 
liquidity policy
Realisation of tf).
Fund managers 
observe private signals
’
Liquidity crisi 
LOLR support
Moral hazard
5&no 
: default
A ►
Payoff realisation
Fig. 2.1. Time line o f the model 
First, the central bank precommits to a LOLR policy (j)** requiring the bank to maintain a 
certain ratio o f liquid assets to deposits, while investing all remaining fimds in risky loans. 
As discussed in Section 2.4, such a prudential liquidity ratio turns out to be higher than in 
the absence o f both regulatory restrictions and a LOLR facility and we find a necessary and 
sufficient condition for that to be socially desirable. Second, a productivity shock (j) hits 
the bank’s loan portfolio and, on the basis o f private signals about <j), fund managers decide 
whether to rollover their deposits with the bank, or to withdraw. If as a result of fund man­
agers’ withdrawals the bank faces a liquidity crisis then, if  the realised productivity shock 
ÿ is greater than 0**, the central bank intervenes and bails-out the bank, otherwise it lets 
the bank to fail. If continuation occurs, either because o f no liquidity crisis, or due to a 
bail-out by the central bank, bankers face a moral hazard problem due to risk-taking oppor­
tunities for a private benefit B. Finally, investment pay-ofifs are realised, bank’s creditors 
are repaid and any residual value is assumed by bank’s shareholders.
The model time-line in figure 1, aims at capturing the basic presumption that liquidity 
crises may occur abruptly due to loss of confidence, preceding possible solvency problems
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that could develop more gradually, for example, due to misconduct o f business by bankers 
(moral hazard). Next, we introduce a number of technical restrictions on the model pa­
rameters that allow us to focus on short/medium term prudential liquidity policy, while 
solvency considerations are left with depositors who, at the deposit raising stage, restrict 
the debt capacity of the bank to the extent that deposits become incentive compatible.
2.2.4 Basic assumptions
In order for the bank in our model to function as a proper financial intermediary, we impose 
the following basic assumptions.
Assumption 1: R >
4>
Assumption 2: R — >  0.
Assumption 3: R — <  1.
Assumption 1 implies that bank’s investment has a positive net present value, i.e.
the risky investment is socially optimal, and assumption 2 that bank’s investment has a
higher net present value when bank’s managers behave properly rather than when they 
engage in excess risk taking. Finally, assumption 3 implies that the bank is sufficiently 
debt constrained that it needs also capital to finance all its investment.^'
2.2.5 Equilibrium in fund managers’ strategies
The liquidity shock that hits the bank at t =  1 is characterised here in terms o f the equi­
librium strategy by fimd managers, following realisation of their private signals { s j .  In
This point is discussed in more detail in section 2.4.2.
2.2 Basic environment 91
particular, we assume that fund managers follow a trigger strategy s* that is defined as 
follows.
Definition 2 A trigger strategy s* is a rule o f action that maps the realization o f  a fund 
manager's signal Si to one o f the following actions: to withdraw if  signal Si is less than s*, 
or to rollover if  Si is greater than or equal to s*.
As of Morris and Shin (2002) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) and given that fund 
managers’ payoffs satisfy global strategic complementarities,^^ if  a trigger strategy s* ex­
ists and is unique, then it is the only dominant solvable equilibrium strategy by fund man- 
agers.^  ^ A uniquely determined s* would then allow us to characterise liquidity shocks to 
the bank not only in terms of the realised value of productivity shock ÿ, but also in terms 
of the general economic environment, such as the extent o f prudential liquidity maintained 
by the banking sector, central bank’s LOLR policy (p** and the degree o f noise e in fund 
managers’ signals. Assuming that all model parameters, LOLR policy cp** and the prior dis­
tribution o f (p are common knowledge, as well as the realised sample distribution o f fund 
managers is the common distribution o f their signals {sj}, we prove the following result.
Lemma 2 The critical level o f  productivity shock (p* below which a liquidity crisis 
occurs, is given by:
(p* =  s* £ ( l  — 2—1
That is, the incentive of a fund manager to rollover/withdraw increases with the proportion of others 
undertaking the same action.
In other words, s* is the only strategy that survives the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. 
That typically requires non-empty upper and lower dominance regions, namely the existence of a level of 
fundamentals above (below) which all fund managers accept (refuse) rollovering.
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Proof See appendix ■
We observe that the minimum level o f productivity shock ÿ* that the bank could 
sustain without incurring a liquidity crisis is decreasing in the proportion o f deposits that 
the bank maintains as liquid assets and increasing in the strategy that is followed by fund 
managers. Such a strategy is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Fund managers ' equilibrium in trigger strategies s* is given by:
where, <j>** is the level o f productivity shock below which the bank is not bailed out and ^  
is the ratio o f liquid assets to deposits that is maintained by the bank.
Proof See appendix ■
The trigger strategy s* essentially captures fund managers’ sensitivity to news about 
productivity shock (j). The lower the 5* the less sensitive fund managers’ become to private 
signals about 0, implying a more stable deposit base, and vice versa. As o f lemma 3, s* 
increases with the extent o f asymmetric information e among fund managers about funda­
mentals 0. In addition, the willingness to rollover deposits with the bank increases in the 
penalty parameter k, as well as in bank’s liquidity ratio ^  and the extent o f central bank’s 
readiness to extend the LOLR facility in case o f crisis.
Provided that the realisation of 0 is not too low, such as everyone runs, and not too 
high, such as no deposits are withdrawn, lemmas 2 and 3 imply that the proportion p o f
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deposits withdrawn for a given realisation o f the productivity shock is given by
r  +  2 e ( l - y ^ A ) _ ÿ
2e
As a result, deposit withdrawals at t =  1 imply a liquidity shock to the bank that is increas­
ing in the extent o f noise e in fund managers’ signals. Moreover, it is increasing in ÿ** 
meaning that, ceteris paribus, the more pariai the LOLR insurance the higher the liquidity 
shock p. In addition, p decreases in the ratio o f liquid assets to deposits, in parameter k and 
in productivity shock (j).
It is also straightforward to show that, for a sufficiently low penalty parameter k, there 
is a threshold (j)ij such that if  ÿ E [(f>u, ^ , all fund managers decide to rollover their de­
posits with the bank. The range is referred as the upper dominance region and cor­
responds to realisations of fundamentals high enough to prevent any information-induced 
outflow of funds from the bank. Similarly, there is also a such that if  ÿ E [l — ÿ, 0^,], 
all fund managers decide to withdraw their funds. The range [l — ÿ, is referred as the 
lower dominance region, corresponding to very weak realisations o f fundamentals that in­
duce a massive outflow of funds from the bank. Both (j)u and </>£,, are given by the following 
result.
Corollary 1 The upper and lower dominance region for productivity shock ÿ are de­
fined by the following thresholds (j)jj and 0^, respectively:
k I \
<t>u -  <!>
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where (p** is given by proposition 3 and defines central hank’s LOLR policy, while ^  is 
bank’s ratio o f liquid assets to deposits that we solve for in the following section.
Proof It follows from lemmas 2 and 3 and the fact that P r  {si <  s*\<t)u) =  0, while 
Pr{si<s*\(t>,^) = im
Consequently, depending on the realisation of productivity shock ÿ, the event line of 
the model is as follows.
Everybody runs 
No LOLR
Liquidity crisis ! Liquidity crisis 
No LOLR i LOLR
No liquidity 
crisis
Nobody runs
Fig. 2.2. Event line depending on realisation o f <j)
Next, we discuss the case without liquidity regulation and LOLR safety net, which is used 
later as a benchmark to draw welfare implications of official sector involvement both in 
terms of prudential liquidity regulation and LOLR policy.
2.3 No-regulation benchmark
We consider the simple case where the bank faces no restrictions on its holdings o f liquid 
assets. Moreover, if  the bank faces a liquidity shock at  ^ =  1, it is possible to raise new 
funds and avoid liquidation, provided that it has sufficient collateral to pledge. Having 
assumed a fixed amount o f bank capital A, let Iq be the bank’s chosen level of investment, 
Iq the amount o f voluntary liquid holdings and D q the amount o f deposits that the bank 
would be able to raise at t =  0. Let also (pQ be a threshold productivity shock below which
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the bank cannot deal with a liquidity crisis, due to lack of collateral, and is liquidated. Such 
a threshold satisfies the following break-even condition:
( j ) o R I o  =  D q  —  I q  (2.2)
By substituting { D q  —  I q )  from the budget constraint (2.1) into (2.2) and rearranging, we 
get
h  (2.3)
Iq — A  
R I q
Let also m  (Iq)  be the marginal net expected return per unit o f investment Iq.  Then, the
expected surplus of bank’s investment is given by U ( Iq )  = m  ( Iq)  Iq.
2.3.1 Voluntary liquidity holdings
In this model, both depositors and the central bank are assumed to make no profits. Thus, 
the surplus o f bank’s investment is equal to the bank’s net expected utility firom investment 
Iq,  which solves the following optimisation problem:
maxU ( Iq )  (2.4a)
I q
subject to:
{R h  -  Do) >  (Rio - D o  +  B io) (2.4b)
Iq Iq — A Dq (2.4c)
Inequality (2.4b) is bank’s incentive compatibility condition, (2.4c) is its budget constraint 
and 00 is given by (2.3). It is important to realise that the amount o f deposits Dq is set 
before the bank’s choice o f its optimal investment and is such that, taking into account
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the bank’s equilibrium investment Iq, bankers have no incentive to take excessive risks for 
the private benefit B. Thus, the incentive compatibility condition (2.4b) can be written as 
follows.
(4a)
Moreover, by assumption 1, bank’s investment has positive net present value and also the 
cost o f borrowing from depositors (normalised to zero) is less than the expected net pay-off 
per unit of investment. Thus, given risk neutrality, the bank has always an incentive to take 
on more deposits in order to increase its investment. As a result, the incentive compatibility 
condition (2.4b) binds.
D o = ( R - - ^ ' ] h  (2.5)
We may now show that the proportion of deposits that the bank keeps in liquid assets is 
given by the following result.
Proposition 1 In a laisser-faire environment -  i.e. under no regulatory requirements 
and a LOLR safety net -  the liquidity ratio ^  that the bank opts to maintain is given by:
k  1
R
Proof See appendix ■
In relation to proposition 1, the next result follows.
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Corollary 2 In the absence o f  prudential liquidity regulation, the bank opts to hold a 
positive amount o f  liquid assets if  and only if  its loans-to-deposits ratio is such that:
Do 1 - y i -
where C2 =
Proof It follows immediately from the incentive compatibility condition (1.5) and propo­
sition 1 by setting Zq > 0 ■
It is worth noting that any voluntary liquidity holdings in this model can be consid­
ered as spare liquidity in the presence o f bank capital A  and an optimal amount o f loan 
investment /q by the bank. Thus, a stock of liquidity in our benchmark case plays solely 
a residual role, rather than serving a deeper economic purpose. However, proposition 2 is 
needed in order to account properly for bank capital and offer a consistent benchmark for 
comparison with our regulatory case where, as we 'will see, prudential liquidity enhances 
the scope o f LOLR policy.
2.4 Regulatory contract
The optimal regulatory contract provides for two things: First, an optimal LOLR policy by 
the central bank. Second, an optimal liquidity ratio that the bank is required to maintain. As 
discussed in Section 2.2.3, a LOLR policy stipulates an intervention threshold (j)** such that 
the expected surplus o f bank’s investment is maximised under the following constraints: i) 
The total amount o f deposits D  is incentive compatible, i.e. bankers are given appropriate
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incentives not to engage in excess risk-taking, ii) The central bank expects not to incur 
systematic losses under the LOLR facility, iii) The budget constraint o f the bank is satisfied.
As in the no-regulation benchmark, bank’s creditors are assumed to make no profits. 
Thus, the surplus o f bank’s investment is equal to the bank’s expected surplus fi"om loan 
investment. Let m {(j)**) be the marginal net expected return per unit o f investment. Then 
the expected surplus U o f bank’s investment is U =  m  ((/)**) I  (</>**) and the central 
bank’s optimisation problem can be written as follows:
m ^ U  {<!)**) (2.6a)
subject to:
{R I - D ) >  ( R I - D  +  BI )  (2.6b)
■'^ J - R I  > D - I  (2.6c)
I  +  l =  A  +  D  (2.6d)
where (2.6b) is bank’s incentive compatibility condition, (2.6c) is central bank’s break­
even condition and (2.6d) is bank’s budget constraint. Also, I denotes the amount o f bank’s 
liquid asset holdings, while A  the amount of bank’s capital. However, in order to determine 
central bank’s optimal LOLR policy, we first need to establish what is the optimal amount 
of bank investment I  ((/>**) for a given LOLR policy ÿ**, that is, for a given level of liquidity 
insurance extended by the central bank.
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2.4.1 Optimal loan investment
As with the no-regulation benchmark, the amount of deposits D  is set before the bank’s 
choice o f its optimal investment, and is such that bank’s managers have no incentive to 
gamble for the private benefit B.  Thus, taking into account bank’s equilibrium investment 
7, the incentive compatibility condition (2.6b) is binding and can be written as follows:
We note that the ratio of loans to deposits is fixed and equal to 7^2 — regardless
of the choice of investment amount 7. Given also positive returns to investment and that 
the central bank makes no profits, the break even condition (2.6c) o f the central bank also 
binds and can be written as follows:
RI  =  { D - l )  (2.8)
Central bank’s break even condition (2.8) implies that, conditional on LOLR intervention, 
the shareholders o f the bank are expected to receive just nothing. Whether they will eventu­
ally receive something, i.e. R I — D  — l, will depend on the actual realisation of productivity 
shock (j). Nevertheless, a LOLR policy (j)** that is consistent with a zero expected cost of 
the LOLR facility must be such that, conditional on LOLR intervention, shareholders are 
not expected to receive anything. Having said that, the next result follows.
Proposition 2 For a given LOLR policy (j)**, the amount o f investment I  (</>**) that 
satisfies simultaneously bank’s incentive compatibility condition (2.7), central bank’s break
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even condition (2.S) and bank’s budget constraint (2.6d), is given by:
■* i - 5 * :
— k - r i  <“ >
where Ci =  and a =
Proof See appendix ■
Having calculated bank’s optimal loan investment for given LOLR policy 0**, we 
can now turn to evaluate the optimal LOLR policy (j)** that maximises the expected surplus 
from bank’s loan investment.
2.4.2 Optimal LOLR policy
Proposition 2 provides the optimal investment I  (ÿ**) by the bank for a given LOLR policy 
With I  ((/)**) in hand, the optimal LOLR policy maximises the expected surplus from 
bank’s investment. We prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Central bank’s optimal LOLR policy is to bail out the bank if  and only 
if  the level ofproductivity shock ÿ is such that ÿ  >  0**, where:
4 > "  =  C l -  y jc i -  c q
where Ci =  ^ -  C2 =  and a =
Proof See appendix ■
An optimal LOLR policy 0** could also be considered in terms o f the induced prob­
ability o f liquidity crisis at the optimum. In fact, lemmas 2 and 3 imply a one-to-one
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mapping from central bank’s optimal intervention threshold (j>** to the critical level of pro­
ductivity shock 0* below which a liquidity crisis occurs. Consequently, by choosing an 
LOLR policy </>**, the central bank implicitly induces a certain probability o f liquidity cri­
sis in equilibrium. That is consistent with Allen and Gale (1998) and the idea o f optimalfi­
nancial crisis that could induce banks to hold efficient portfolios of risky assets. Moreover, 
the provision o f appropriate LOLR insurance, conditional on banks conforming vsdth costly 
liquidity regulation, is consistent with the principle o f Proportionality which is widely used 
in political debate about the extent and intensity of action by the official sector.^ "*
2.4.3 Optimal liquidity regulation
Having established central bank’s optimal response to a liquidity crisis and the commensu­
rate optimal investment I  {(j)**) by the bank, that level o f investment can be implemented 
by regulating the level of bank’s liquid assets. We prove the following result.
Proposition 4 Under the optimal regulatory contract, the bank is required to maintain 
a liquid-assets-to-deposits ratio such that:
I  ^ 1 I RyJC^  -  g |
^ ( R -  (fl -  jri -  “-Rs)
where i  
Proof See appendix ■
and 0, =
Under the proportionality principle, the content and form of actions by the official sector shall not exceed 
what is necessary to achieve its policy objective. In our case, such an official sector objective is the max­
imization of the surplus from financial intermediation, conditional on avoiding systematic losses under the 
LOLR facility.
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From proposition 4, we can easily show that if  fund managers’ incentives to keep 
their deposits with the bank are sufficiently high -  i.e. the penalty parameter k is not too 
low -  then the prudential liquidity ratio increases with e, namely with the extent of 
asymmetric information about bank’s fundamentals. That implies that the higher the extent 
of transparency about bank’s fundamentals -  i.e. the lower the s -  the lower the prudential 
liquidity ratio that the bank is required to maintain. Also, from propositions 1 and 4 it 
is easy to show that, as the noise in fund managers’ signals decreases towards zero, the 
prudential liquidity ratio converges towards the level that the bank would voluntarily hold 
absent any official sector intervention. Yet for e >  0, the next result follows.
Proposition 5 Under the optimal regulatory contract, the ratio o f liquid assets to 
deposits that the bank is required to maintain is higher that in the absence o f  official sector 
involvement, i.e. under no liquidity requirements and LOLR insurance.
Proof See appendix ■
Let us now search for conditions under which requiring banks to maintain a higher 
ratio of liquid assets to deposits than they would hold in a laisser-faire regime is, if  at all, 
welfare improving.
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2.5 Wel fare analysis
From Section 2.4, the expected surplus U o f bank’s investment under the optimal regulatory 
contract ((/>**, ;^) is given by
By substituting the optimal LOLR policy (j)** from proposition 3 into (2.10) we get
^ “ :r^ " )
with Cl =  ^ -  ^ -i)  ^ C2 =  \J(j^ -  and a =  Similarly, from
Section 2.3, the expected surplus Uq o f bank’s investment under no liquidity regulation is 
given by
A r 1 n 7
(2.12)
Clearly, from (2.11) and (2.12) it follows that asymmetric information plays a pivotal role 
in the analysis o f welfare implications o f liquidity regulation. We may observe that as the 
noise in fund managers’ signals tends to zero, i.e. £ —> 0, the expected surplus of bank’s 
investment under the optimal regulatory contract becomes equal to the no-regulation bench­
mark. That is, when asymmetric information among fund managers dissipates, regulating 
a bank’s holdings o f liquid assets leads to no welfare improvement/deterioration o f the no 
regulation benchmark.
However, for e > 0, liquidity regulation may or may not lead to a welfare improve­
ment of the no-regulation case. As we show next, that depends on the extent o f bank’s 
funding constraints, as measured by the ratio of optimal loan investment to deposits. For 
example, for different levels of parameter £, figure 3 plots the expected surplus of bank’s
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investment under the optimal regulatory contract for a loans-to-deposits ratio equal to 1.4 
and 1.95. The horizontal line between the two curves corresponds to the expected surplus 
from bank’s investment under the no-regulation benchmark.
1.55
1.5
1.45
1.4
I/D=1.4
1.35
Extent of noise in depositors' signals
Fig. 2.3. Welfare implications of liquidity regulation 
As of figure 2.3, we should expect prudential liquidity regulation, combined with an appro­
priate LOLR policy, to be socially desirable the more debt-constraint the banking sector is, 
i.e. the higher the ratio of loans to deposits. Otherwise, prudential liquidity may turn out 
to be too costly even after taking into account the insurance value of the LOLR. Here we 
derive a threshold for the loans-to-deposits ratio above which liquidity regulation leads to 
welfare improvement of the no-regulation case.
P roposition  6  A necessary and  sufficient condition fo r  liquidity regulation to be w el­
fa re  improving o f  the no-regulation benchmark is b a n k ’s loans-to-deposits ratio to be such
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that:
where C2 =  \  d? — and a =R  —  l - f c '
Proof See appendix ■
Proposition 6 suggests that liquidity regulation becomes socially desirable if  and only 
if  the debt capacity o f the banking sector is sufficiently low. Essentially, prudential liquid­
ity allows the central bank to extend LOLR insurance while maintaining, on average, a 
balanced budget under the LOLR facility. Thus, the lower the debt capacity of the banking 
sector, LOLR insurance becomes increasingly essential for realising the benefits of finan­
cial intermediation. That is by raising the expected return per unit o f investment and, as a 
consequence o f that, increasing bankers’ willingness to employ more fimds in productive 
assets.^^
However, in this model, the ex ante objective by the central bank to run a balanced 
budget under the LOLR facility is attained by controlling credit extension through pruden­
tial liquidity restrictions. In the absence of such restrictions, bankers would choose to take 
on excessive risks by investing all available funds in risky loans, free riding, effectively, on 
central bank’s LOLR insurance.^  ^ But such regulatory restrictions also impose an (oppor­
tunity) cost on the banking sector. Thus, if  prudential liquidity is to be socially desirable.
From (2.24) we may observe that, in the absence of a LOLR, the expected marginal return from invest­
ment decreases in the total amount of investment and, as a result, bankers become less willing to employ 
more funds in productive investments.
That is because the marginal expected return from loan inveshnent would not depend anymore on the total 
loan amount and, thus, bank’s expected surplus would be strictly increasing in the total amount lent.
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that cost needs to be traded off against the social benefit firom LOLR insurance. Not sur­
prisingly, it is when LOLR insurance is mostly needed that its benefits outweigh the costs 
of liquidity regulation and this is when the banking sector is sufiBciently debt constrained.
Proposition 6 also suggests that liquidity regulation is more likely to be welfare im­
proving the higher the potential return R  per unit o f loan investment. That also is not 
surprising given that the social value o f LOLR insurance is higher when the potential re­
turn from keeping a bank alive is relatively high. Finally, we note that the RHS of (2.13) is 
increasing in parameter k, which determines the penalty that fund managers face for pre­
mature withdrawal o f their deposits. That implies that the more stable the deposit base is 
-  i.e. the higher the penalty parameter k and the lower the incentive to withdraw deposits 
prematurely -  the more difficult it is for inequality (2.13) to be satisfied and, as a result, for 
prudential liquidity regulation to be welfare improving.
Thus, our model suggests that prudential liquidity regulation, coupled by an appropri­
ate LOLR policy, is expected to be more appropriate for banking systems characterised by 
high profit opportunities, a less stable deposit base and sufficient funding constraints, which 
in our model were captured through moral hazard concerns regarding bankers’ incentives. 
In the following section we provide a more formal exposition o f the basic trade-off between 
LOLR insurance benefit and the cost o f liquidity regulation that gives rise to proposition 6.
2.5.1 Regulatory cost vs. insurance benefit
From lemmas 2 and 3, the distance between the critical level o f productivity shock ÿ*, 
below which a liquidity crisis arises, and the level of shock below which the central
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bank does not bailout the bank, is given by
1 - k D j
(2.14)
Equation (2.14) implies that, conditional on LOLR intervention, the support o f productivity 
shock (f> is increasing in e, i.e. the extent of noise in fund managers’ signals, and decreasing 
in the bank’s liquidity ratio Moreover, for a given reahsation o f 0 in the interval [0*, 0**]
and investment I  by the bank, the expected recovery rate o f a LOLR funds can be written 
as
Expected recovery rate  =  min 1 ^  1 
i - i ’
(2.15)
Consequently, the minimum level 0g o f productivity shock below which the central bank 
expects to recover less than the full amount of its LOLR funds is
(2.16)
We note that 0g is decreasing in both the bank’s liquidity ratio and the ratio o f loans to 
deposits. Not surprisingly, given that the break-even condition (2.6c) o f the central bank is 
binding at the optimum, 0g must be equal to the expected productivity shock conditional on 
LOLR intervention, i.e. 0g =  . That is shown in figure 4 and can easily be verified
by comparing (2.8) with (2.16).
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Fig. 2.4. Expected recovery rate of LOLR loan.
Let us now suppose that for a given balance-sheet structure of the bank and LOLR policy 
(j)**, was higher than . Then central bank’s break-even condition (2.6c) would be 
violated and, as of t =  0, the central bank would be unable to insure bank’s liquidity shocks 
to a level as low as (/>**. Given that is decreasing in the central bank would then be 
able to augment the scope of its liquidity insurance by increasing the reserve requirement 
to the bank up to the point where becomes equal to the expected productivity shock 
conditional on LOLR intervention, i.e. ^
Thus, by increasing the liquidity requirement to the bank, the central bank is allowed 
to provide LOLR insurance against a wider range of productivity shocks that might hit 
bank’s loan portfolio. That, in turn, would result in an increase in bank’s expected profits, 
but on the downside, would also increase the regulatory burden to the bank by requiring 
it to hold costly liquid assets in excess of what it would opt to maintain in a laisser-faire 
regime. In equilibrium, such a trade-off could result in adverse welfare implications of 
liquidity regulation, with the regulatory costs from holding liquid assets outweighing the 
insurance benefits from the LOLR.
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However, <j)^  is not only decreasing in the ratio of liquid assets to deposits, but also 
in the bank’s loans-to-deposits ratio. Thus, ceteris paribus, the higher the ratio of loans to 
deposits the lower the proportion of deposits that should be maintained as liquid assets by 
the bank, in order for the central bank to satisfy its break even condition. Consequently, 
there must also be a threshold for the loans-to-deposits ratio above which the insurance 
benefits brought by the LOLR outweigh the regulatory costs firom holding costly liquid 
assets. Such a threshold was explicitly derived in proposition 6. Finally, for e —> 0 and 
from (2.14), the analysis collapses to the simple case where (j)* =  (j)** and, in terms of 
welfare implications, there is no distinction between the case with or without liquidity 
regulation.
2.6 Concluding remarks
In the spirit o f Posner (1971), we regarded prudential liquidity regulation for banks as quid 
pro quo for emergency liquidity assistance by the central bank, where prudential liquidity 
allows the central bank to run a balanced budget under its LOLR safety net by imposing 
an implicit insurance premium to the banking sector for (partial) LOLR insurance. In 
the presence o f bank funding constraints, asymmetric information among bank’s creditors 
about the quality o f bank’s loan portfolio turned out to be key in describing prudential 
liquidity policy. It was shown that the more diverse creditors’ beliefs are about bank’s 
fundamentals, the higher the prudential liquidity ratio that the bank would be required to 
maintain. However, as asymmetric information about bank’s fundamentals dissipates, that
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ratio converges towards the level that the bank would voluntarily maintain in the absence 
of intervention by the official sector.
We showed that optimal liquidity regulation implies a ratio o f liquid assets to deposits 
that is higher than what the bank would voluntarily maintain, absent any official sector 
involvement. However, such a higher liquidity ratio is not to guarantee the existence of a 
stock o f high-quality assets against which central banks can lend in a crisis, but it is rather 
to enable the bank to meet liquidity shocks from its own resources and to a certain level 
of confidence. In other words, we viewed prudential liquidity regulation serving as a first 
line o f defence against bank liquidity problems that allows the central bank to maintain a 
zero expected cost o f LOLR intervention, while counteracting excessive risk-taking due to 
LOLR safety net.
We also derived a necessary and sufficient condition for liquidity regulation to be 
welfare improving of the no-regulation case, showing that this is the case if  and only if the 
bank’s total loans-to-deposits ratio is above a certain threshold that was explicitly evaluated. 
Otherwise, liquidity regulation becomes too costly from a welfare perspective, even after 
taking into account the social value of LOLR insurance. Finally, the more stable a bank’s 
deposit base is -  i.e. the lower the prima facie incentive of bank’s creditors to foreclose 
their exposures to the bank -  the more unlikely it is for prudential liquidity regulation to be 
welfare improving.
Hellmann et al. (2000) argue that financial liberalisation grants more freedom to 
banks in determining their lending portfolios, exacerbating moral hazard problems by of­
fering more gambling opportunities. Along those lines, and in conjunction to our proposi­
2.6 Concluding remarks 111
tion 6, we may conclude that it is when banks’ funding constraints are pronounced due to 
moral hazard concerns and their profit opportunities are possibly substantial that prudential 
liquidity regulation is more likely to be welfare improving. But it is in a context o f a liber­
alised financial system that an official safety net could prove to be more valuable and, as a 
result, its social value could possibly outweigh the cost o f prudential liquidity regulation.
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2.A Appendix 
2.A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Conditional on productivity shock ÿ, fund managers’ signals { s j  are i.i.d. uniform with 
support on [(/> — e, 0 +  e]. Given 0 and fund managers’ equilibrium trigger strategies s*, 
the proportion o f deposits withdrawn is equal to the probability that a given signal is less 
than or equal to s*\
P r ( s i < s * | 0 )  =  ^ - = ^ ^  (2.17)
From (2.17), the critical level o f shock 0* solves the following:
0* =  s* +  £ ^1 — 2—^ (2.18)
Q.E.D.
2.A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Conditional on observing signal Si =  s*, let Pqo be the conditional probabilities o f no 
liquidity crisis at f =  1 and no default at f =  2. Similarly, let Pio be the probability of  
liquidity crisis at f =  1 and no default at f =  2 conditional on signal Si =  s*. Probabilities 
Poo and Piq are calculated as follows:
Poo =  (2.19)
By substituting 4>* from lemma 2 into (2.19) we get
Pqo =  ^  (2.20)
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where I is the amount of liquid assets held by the bank and D  is the total amount o f deposits. 
Similarly, given (j)* and </>**, Pio is given by
=  ^  (2.21)
With Poo and Piq in hand, fund managers’ equilibrium in trigger strategies s* is such that a 
fund manager who observes signal Si =  s* is indifferent between withdrawing and rollover­
ing. That is, s* solves the following:
'TtPqo +  7t ( l  — fc) P io =  7T ( l  — k) (2 .22)
where Poo and Pio are given by equations (2.20) and (2.21). The LHS o f (2.22) is the 
expected pay-ofiF from rollovering, conditional on s*, while the RHS is the (certain) pay-ofif 
from withdrawing. By substituting Poo and Pio from (2.20), (2.21) into (2.22), we get:
3 ^  +  "  2g~  ~  ^(1 -  A;) =  7T (1 -  A:) (2.23)
Then, by substituting (/)* from lemma 2 into (2.23), s* is given by:
Q.E.D.
2.A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Equation (2.3) implies that the net expected return m (7o) per unit o f investment is given 
by:
/n — A .C i - cRh (2.24)
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where C2 =  (j>^ — Then, the bank’s expected utility from investment Iq is:
Uo =  m  (Jo) lo (2.25)
Given (2.24), (2.25) can be written as
R
Uq = c ? - l o - A '
RIa2 (20 -  1)
where the amount o f investment Iq that maximises Uq in (2.26) is given by:
/ 0 =  ^
(2.26)
(2.27)
Thus, from (2.1), (2.4b) and (2.27), the amount of liquid assets Iq that the bank would hold 
voluntarily is given by:
In = 1 -
1______
- A) - a )
Finally, from (2.4b) and (2.28), the ratio of liquid assets to deposits, under no intervention
(2.28)
by the ofiicial sector, is given by:
^ =  1 -  «Do R - -^ 1 A )
(2.29)
Q.E.D.
2.A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
By substituting (2.6d) into (2.8) we get:
0* +  0' R I =  I - A
'I
From lemmas 2 and 3, the term on the LHS of (2.30) can be written as:
0* +  0 -
(2.30)
(2.31)
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Thus, by substituting (2.31) into (2.30) and setting a =  the central bank’s break-even 
condition becomes:
(/)** +  e ( l -  a— R I  =  I - A (132)
Then, from the incentive compatibility condition (2.7) and budget constraint (2.6d), (2.32) 
becomes:
ae
R  R - j = i
(2.33)
where Ci =  ^ — s — and a =  Then, equation (2.33) implies that, for a 
given ÿ**, the amount o f investment I  {(p**) that satisfies simultaneously constraints (2.6b), 
(2.6c) and (2.6d) is given by:
7 ( 0 " )  = (Cl -  <t>n
(2.34)
Q.E.D.
2.A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
For a given LOLR policy 0**, bank’s net expected return per unit o f investment is given by:
m  (0" ) =  [1 -  F  (0 -)]  -  1 (2.35)
which can be restated as
R
2 (2(p — l)
(c^ -  0 " :) (2.36)
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where C2 =  \ J Given (2.36), central bank’s optimisation problem (2.6a) is 
equivalent to the following unconstrained problem:
m ^ U  {(!>**) (2.37)
where U (</>**) =  m  (</>**) I  (0**), I  {<!>**) is given by proposition 2 and m  (0**) is the net 
expected return per unit o f investment. Given (2.36), (2.37) can be expressed as
■ ^ 2 ( 2 ? - ! )  K I  : • • ) ’ ( '
where Ci =  ^ -  \  Q  =  and a =  However, max­
imising the expression in (2.38) is equivalent to maximising the following expression of
0" :
/  {r) =  C l+r  -  (2.39)
The first derivative o f /  (•) with respect to 0** is:
while the second derivative is given by:
d ^ { r )  . C l - C l  22 41.
(Cl -
We consider two cases: i) C\ <  C2 and ii) for Ci >  C2. However, we can easily show 
that inequality Ci <  C2 holds if  and only if the bank’s loans-to-deposits ratio is such that 
D — which for small values of e  implies a high value of Nevertheless, given
that the loans-to-deposits ratio under both the regulation and the no-regulation case is equal 
to , the case where C\ <  C2 can easily be ruled out from corollary 2. Thus,
the only relevant case to consider is for C\ >  C2, under which (2.41) becomes negative
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and the optimal LOLR policy 0** is given by:
r *  =  Cl -  y jc f i - c %  (2.42)
Q.E.D.
2. A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
From bank’s budget constraint (2.1), the liquidity ratio ^  can be expressed as:
By substituting (2.7) and (2.34) into (2.43), we derive the following expression for the ratio 
of liquid assets to deposits:
where Ci =  ^ ~  and a =  y ^ .C i =  ^ - e  -  1^. Then, by sub­
stituting (f)** from proposition 3 into (2.44) and setting C2 =  V the optimalR
liquidity ratio is given by
I 1 I Ry/Cl -Cj
^  ( ^  -  ;gZi) ( ^  -  ;gZî -  aRe^
Q.E.D,
2.A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Propositions 1 and 4 imply that ^  if  and only if:
1 o + ( l - o ) ( B - ^ )
\ ] w ~ ^ 2  _______
{ R - - ^ -  a R sj
(2.45)
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By recasting (2.45), we derive the following inequality:
i C y   ^ 1 / o + ( l - q ) j r y /  K  V
clR  j  (1 — d y  y A  [o -t- (1 — û) K \ J cRR? (1 — Z»)
(2.46)
where K  =  R — ^  , L =  {RC2Ÿ  and C2 =  ^ W i t h  respect to 6, the 
geometric locuses defined by the LHS and RHS of (2.46) are parabolas. The parabola 
defined by the LHS of (2.46) has its vertex at the point [ ^ ,  O] and its focal parameter is 
Plhs ~  2 - Similarly, the parabola defined by the RHS of (2.46) has its vertex at the point
K K^ LH [ a + ( l - a ) / r ]  ’ a^ R^{l-L) and its focal parameter is a + ( l —
From analytical geometry we know that if the focal parameter p o f a parabola is 
positive then the parabola faces upwards. That is definitely the case for the LHS of (2.46), 
i.e.  ^ >  0, while for the RHS of (2.46) that is true if  and only if 1 — L >  0, or C2 <  
But, given Ci >  C2 and Ci <  ü also follows that C2 <  Consequently, the parabola 
defined by the RHS of (2.46) is also facing upwards.
and their vertices lieFinally, we observe that both parabolas intersect at 0, 
on the right of their intersection point. Thus, for relatively small values o f 6, a sufficient 
condition for (2.46) to hold is 0 > — > or 1 — L >  0. But this has already been 
shown to be true, implying that the optimal regulatory contract stipulates a higher liquidity 
ratio than what the bank would voluntarily maintain under no intervention by the official 
sector.
Q.E.D.
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2.A.8 Proof of Proposition 6
Given that =  Uq, a necessary and sufficient condition for U (e) >  Uq, for small
values of £, is that the derivative of U with respect to e, evaluated at e =  0, is positive, i.e. 
> 0. With a bit o f algebra, we can shown that such a derivative is given by:^ U ( e )i?e e=0
dU
de -  (20 -  1) 1“ ~  +
(2.47)
where K  =  R  — L  =  R^Cl, ^  and a =  It the follows that a
necessary and sufficient condition for >  0 is:
e=0
1 7
K ~
a — 1
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Chapter 3 
Co-ordination failure and the signalling role of 
banks in debt-exchange offers
3.1 Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that banks play a potentially important role in facilitating the 
resolution of financial distress. Inspired by Corsetti et al. (2001), one possible explanation 
for this is that the actions of large creditors, such as banks, simply allow small creditors 
to coordinate more efficiently. In particular, if  a bank lender chooses to restructure, this 
may be taken by smaller, possibly less informed creditors, to imply that the going concern 
value of the firm, and thus the value of new claims offered, exceeds the liquidation value 
of the firm. In this way, banks and other large well-informed creditors could facilitate the 
resolution of financial distress by injecting a degree of strategic solidity in credit markets.
In the literature, there has been no theoretical work directed at examining this propo­
sition. Rather, this has tended to concentrate mainly on firms’ optimal choices between 
public and private debt, and the agency and other costs associated vrith diffiised versus 
concentrated ownership of debt when the firm is out o f financial distress. This is despite a 
steady accumulation of empirical work that has examined the role of banks in facilitating 
public debt exchange offers (out-of-court resolution o f financial distress) when creditors 
face co-ordination problems and banks are assumed to own some proprietary, though not 
necessarily superior, information about the going concern value o f the firm.
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Mooradian and Ryan (2004) examine cases o f out-of-court restructuring o f debt and 
the resolution of financial distress under Section 3(a)(9) o f the US Security Act and com­
pare them to investment-bank-managed exchange offers. They find evidence that when a 
commercial bank makes a concession -  which is almost always conditioned on a successful 
public debt restructuring -  the importance of the exchange offer increases and an invest­
ment bank is more likely to be involved. Their results suggest that investment banks play 
a very important role in certifying the exchange and facilitating debt reduction, but unlike 
commercial banks, they play little if  any role in resolving co-ordination problems.
James (1995, 1996) finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis that bank partic­
ipation in debt restructuring transactions facilitates public debt exchange offers. That is 
also supported by evidence provided by Gilson, Kose and Lang (1990) showing that the 
likelihood o f out-of-court debt restructuring is positively related to a firm’s reliance on 
bank debt. In particular, James (1995) finds that forgiveness o f principal by banks induces 
public-debt holders to accept a debt exchange offer more easily and to reduce principal 
more aggressively.^^ Also the likelihood of achieving minimum tendering rates -  which is 
a typical prerequisite in debt exchange offers -  increases.^* Moreover, he shows that trans­
actions in which banks forgive principal typically involve firms with more severe financial 
distress (e.g. higher leverage), which suggests that banks make concessions only when 
their claims are likely to be impaired. James (1996) also reports that, in all cases where
In fifteen debt restructuring transactions where banks took no action the average reduction in public debt 
was 19%, while in 14 cases where the bank reduced principle the average reduction in public debt was 56%.
In all cases where banks offer to scale down their loans actual tendering rates are above the minimum 
specified for success compared to 30% when banks do not make concessions.
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banks make concessions, they make their offers contingent upon the successful completion 
of the public debt exchange offer.
Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) analyse how financially distressed firms try 
to avoid bankruptcy through public/private debt restructuring, asset sales, mergers and cap­
ital expenditure reductions. Using a sample o f companies with high-yield,yw«A: bond issues 
with financial difi&culties, they find evidence that the firm’s debt structure affects the way 
financially distressed firms restructure their claims. In particular, a combination o f secured 
private debt and numerous public debt issues seems to impede out-of-court restructuring 
and the firm’s debt structure affects the way financially distressed firms restructure their 
claims.
In contrast to James (1996), Asquith et al. (1994) find that banks almost never loosen 
financial constraints by forgiving principal, while loosening financial constraints does not 
reduce the probability of bankruptcy.^  ^ They argue, however, that their sample is very spe­
cific as it focuses on the high-yield bond market, and the results should not be generalised. 
Gilson, Kose and Lang (1990) find evidence that the likelihood o f out-of-court debt restruc­
turing is positively related to the firm’s reliance on bank debt.
In the theoretical front, Bolton and Freixas (2000) discuss a model o f corporate fi­
nance where both supply and demand influence the availability o f finance within an equi­
librium set-up with asymmetric information. They argue that banks can help firms in times 
of distress because they can exploit their superior information/borrower screening skills. In 
addition, an important feature of their model is banks’ ability to securitise senior portions
59% of firms whose banks loosen financial constraints still went bankrupt vs. 68% of the firms whose 
banks tighten the constraints, though there are differences in restructuring periods until bankruptcy.
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of rescue finance they extend to firms in distress (e.g. in a debtor-in-pocession situation) 
and avoid the incentive to liquidate inefficiently a firm in financial distress. In equilibrium, 
banks choose to increase their supply of loans, provided that they can price effectively for 
the extra risk and they are not capital constrained. That way bank loans may substitute for 
other forms o f finance and facilitate the resolution o f financial distress.
Diamond (1993) argues that, because bank lenders are generally secured, they have 
little incentive to make concessions. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) provide a model that 
illustrates how bank participation in the restructuring transaction can mitigate holdout prob­
lems among public debt-holders. In doing so, however, they assume common knowledge 
about the firm’s economic fundamentals which allows perfect co-ordination o f creditors’ 
actions.
Jaffee and Shleifer (1990) examine how investment banks protect firms fi*om financial 
distress due to self-fulfilling failure of calls o f convertible bonds. They provide an analogy 
to Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) bank runs model by arguing that, by underwriting the 
forced conversion o f convertible bonds, investment banks essentially provide insurance (a 
put option) to the firm in the same way that deposit insurance provides protection against 
bank runs. Yet Jaffee and Shleifer assume that the economic fundamentals of the firm 
i.e. the value o f firm’s assets, is common knowledge among creditors and there is no 
uncertainty about equilibrium behaviour of creditors. This allows perfect co-ordination of  
creditors’ actions and results in multiple Nash equilibria.^® Moreover, it implies that there 
is only risk shifting from the firm to the bank and there is no information content in an
For a discussion on this issue see Morris and Shin (2000)
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investment bank’s action to accept the underwriting. It is exactly that information content 
that is central to our analysis.
In this paper, we consider an out-of-court renegotiation o f contractual obligations in 
a setting that is similar to a debt-exchange offer, where a bank creditor and a continuum 
of small claimants to a financially distressed firm interact in an environment of asymmet­
ric information about the firm’s solvency condition. Solvency is defined with respect to 
the ability o f the firm to repay all its contractual obligations after the completion o f a risky 
project that currently has in place. We investigate the extent to which acceptance by the 
bank to commit further funds to the firm, facilitates contract revision oflfers by other credi­
tors.
In our model, the bank is a large creditor by virtue o f its non-negligible financial 
mass, compared to all other creditors o f the financially distressed firm. However, bank’s 
financial capacity is assumed to be small relative to the balance sheet o f the firm and, as a 
result, insufficient to manufacture a bail-out just by itself. In addition, the financial capacity 
of each other individual creditor is assumed to be of measure zero and, in that sense, the 
game is asymmetric.
Moreover, the actions by the bank are assumed to be common knowledge among 
other creditors before they choose their own actions. In that sense, the game is sequential. 
Consequently, in equilibrium, the bank recognises both the information and the money- 
effect of its own action, while individual small creditors fail to see those effects in isolation 
and can only consider their impact as a whole.
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Throughout this paper, we assume that a bank creditor has an information advantage 
over other creditors. This is consistent with the literature on the importance o f banks’ 
monitoring abilities and how banks might get access to better information compared to 
other types o f creditors.®* In particular, we focus on the limited case where the relative 
information precision of small creditors, relative to that o f the bank, tends to zero. This is 
without loss o f generality and it is necessary for maintaining tractability in our analysis and 
deriving a closed form solution for equilibrium strategies.®^
The basic feature o f our analysis is that agents in the model exhibit one-sided strategic 
complementarities. That is, if  the proportion o f agents who undertake a certain action is 
relatively small then an agent’s incentive to undertake such an action increases with the 
proportion of other agents undertaking the same action. This allows us to derive Bayesian 
equilibria o f the restructuring game using the results of Goldstein and Pauzner (2004), who 
extend the global game methodology by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and 
Shin (2002). Yet, an innovation o f the model that adds to the existing literature on global 
games is that we consider the action by one class o f players -  namely, by the bank -  as 
conditional on the actions o f other creditors.
The analysis shows that a bank, by making a conditional concession and extending 
new credit to a firm in financial distress, may inject a degree o f strategic solidity in credit 
markets, facilitating the resolution of financial distress. This result is consistent with empir-
That literature includes, among others, Bolton and Freixas (1998, 2000), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), 
Houston and James (1996), Rajan (1992), Lummer and McConnell (1989), Fama (1985), to mention but a 
few.
In a similar setting, Corsetti et al (2001) show numerically that the direction of results is robust to any 
level of relative precision of agents’ private information.
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ical evidence showing that banks’ involvement in debt restructuring transactions facilitates 
debt-exchange offers by other creditors. In particular, controlling for money-effects, we 
show that debt-exchange offers become successful at lower levels o f firm’s fundamentals^  ^
compared to the situation where the bank has no role to play in the debt restructuring.
The intuition that underlies the above proposition is that a bank’s involvement in the 
restructuring can influence the decisions of other creditors to restructure by laying down 
a marker around which their average opinion coalesce. Also, by conditioning its accep­
tance o f the restructuring on the actions of other creditors, allows the bank to draw on the 
collective wisdom o f those creditors, avoiding errors that an unconditional response would 
possibly entail. That way, a bank lender may influence the beliefs o f other creditors in such 
a way that it could possibly induce a more efficient outcome o f the debt renegotiation.
However, for high minimum tendering rates, herding incentives may dominate co­
ordination problems as creditors tend rely more on average opinion, as reflected in the 
outcome of the debt restructuring, rather than on their private signals about the solvency of 
the firm. In equilibrium, herding incentives are common knowledge and the bank chooses 
its strategy in a way that accounts for suppliers’ motive to play a low strategy if  the bank 
plays a high one, and vice versa. That leads to multiple equilibria in the restructuring game, 
where the strategy that is followed by the bank is decreasing in the strategy that is followed 
by other creditors and vice versa.
In this model, we adopt a fairly generic characterisation o f the financially distressed 
entity and we do not make any specific reference to the ownership structure o f that entity.
For our fundamentals of the firm are defined with respect to the cash generating power of the
firm’s project upon its completion.
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the role for equity capital, or potential conflict o f interests between shareholders and bond­
holders in the spirit o f Jensen and Meckling (1976). Thus, our analysis by-passes possible 
conflicts o f interest between different classes o f security holders and concentrates on the 
workouts o f financial distress, the potential ineflBciencies that may arise firom creditors’ co­
ordination problems and how those inefficiencies can be alleviated via the involvement of 
a bank creditor. Consequently, our analysis does not allow for the simultaneous treatment 
o f both co-ordination problems among creditors, when the firm is in financial distress, and 
potential moral-hazard problems associated with the terms o f lending at origination, when 
the debtor is out o f financial distress. This, however, is a subject that we consider for future 
research.
The generic characterisation o f the firm’s balance sheet allows us to add also some 
thoughts that stretch beyond the resolution o f financial distress in the corporate sector and 
relate to the resolution of international financial crisis. In particular, we could draw a 
parallel between the balance sheet o f the financially distressed firm in our model, and the 
capital account o f a country during the onset o f financial crisis. We could then discuss 
implications of our model for the doctrine o f  catalytic finance and the scope and rationale 
for IMF lending to a debtor country when that country faces a situation, or the possibility, 
of financial distress.
In September 2003, for example, the Brazilian government has authorised the negoti­
ation of a new, one-year deal with the IMF. The government’s Treasury secretary, Joaquim 
Levy, was then quoted as saying®'^
64 FT, September 12,2003.
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...Obviously, our objective is to walk alone and not 
depend on the fund. But a one-year renewal could 
be an important mechanism o f  information to 
investors who did not follow Brazil’s progress closely.
The above statement is striking given the strong criticism of the IMF by president da 
Silva for more than twenty years in opposition. But, it also suggests that there is possibly 
something more than money in the involvement o f the IMF in the resolution o f financial 
distress. Namely, IMF lending may act as a mechanism o f  information that permits less 
informed -  and possibly small -  creditors to coordinate more efficiently. This is consistent 
with the result o f our paper that large, informed creditors may act as gate keepers to the 
system and, should debtors’ fimdamentals justify it, inject a degree o f strategic solidity 
among other creditors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 discusses the model. 
The solution proceeds in steps in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. Section 3.5 discusses empirical 
implications and possible extensions and Section 3.6 concludes adding also some thoughts 
on the role of catalytic finance and collective action clauses in the resolution o f international 
financial crises. Proofs o f our results are included in the appendix.
3.2 Basic environment
We consider a two-period setting {r  =  1,2} where, as o f r  =  1, a firm runs an illiquid 
risky project which generates a random pay-off i? at r  =  2. We also consider two types o f
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risk-neutral claimants to the firm that interact in an environment of asymmetric information 
about the firm’s solvency condition: a continuum of small, poorly informed suppliers to the 
firm o f total measure one and a large well-informed bank. Both types o f claimants and their 
relationship with the firm are described next.
3.2.1 Suppliers
Every supplier has agreed to deliver at r  =  1 a single unit of homogenous project-specific 
inputs at a price o f one. By project-specific inputs we mean that, if  inputs are not delivered 
to the firm on time, they need to be sold at a discount elsewhere. In other words, the firm is 
viewed as a monopsonist and full repayment of suppliers is conditional on the firm’s ability 
to pay. Thus, supply contracts may be cancelled (foreclosed) at r =  1 and suppliers who 
refuse to deliver their inputs face a certain discount c <  1 , i.e. at a price (1  — c).
That formulation is in line with Berlin, Kose and Saunders (1996) who assume that 
suppliers cannot be paid up front but only at r  =  1, i.e. when delivery takes place.^  ^ In that 
sense, inputs may also relate to factors of production such as capital, with suppliers then 
representing public debt holders and the firm being a monopsonist as far as redemption of 
its debt at maturity is concerned.^®
Moreover, we assume that if  a certain proportion o f suppliers refuse to deliver their 
inputs at r  =  1, then the firm’s project is interrupted and the firm is liquidated. We consider
Berlin et al. (1996) consider a similar situation, yet, with a perfectly co-ordinated set of suppliers, where 
suppliers may choose to terminate an established supply relationship with a firm should that relationship be 
severed by the firm.
Should the firm fail to redeem its paper at maturity, holders of public debt would face insolvency costs 
and a potential discount in their original claims.
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the situation where the firm requires a minimum quantity r o f inputs for its project to reach 
its final stage and generate a return R. Otherwise the project must be abandoned and 
the liquidation value of the firm is then normalised to zero. Consequently, the proportion 
(1  — r) o f suppliers that may not deliver could represent the maximum contraction o f firm’s 
operations before it becomes unable to operate as a going concern. Alternatively, and in the 
context o f a debt-exchange offer, the minimum proportion r  o f inputs could be interpreted 
as the minimum tendering rate in order for a public debt exchange offer to be successful; 
but we will revisit this point discussing it in more detail later on,
3.2.2 Bank
It extends loans to the firm and is a large creditor by virtue o f the face value o f its loans 
relative to individual credit exposures o f other creditors (suppliers), which are considered 
negligible as a proportion o f the whole (i,e, o f measure zero). Yet the bank is assumed to 
be of a limited financial capacity, meaning that the total amount o f funds it can extend to 
the firm is small compared to the firm’s total input costs.®^  In particular, at r  =  1, the firm 
has a secured bank debt (loan) with face value B  and maturity at r  =  2, Also at r  =  1, the 
firm is supposed to need an extra amount of funds C  in order to cover operating expenses 
(e,g, labour costs). Failure to meet those obligations would result in severe disruption of 
firm’s operations, abandonment o f the project and liquidation, in which case priority rules 
are assumed to be enforced for secured lenders.
That is more easy to imagine in case of large corporations, or sovereign borrowers, with a diverse set of 
creditors. Although each of those creditors may represent a small portion of the whole, some of them may be 
large by virtue of their relative size.
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3.2.3 Liquidity crisis
We consider the situation where the firm faces a liquidity shock at r =  1 and has no 
resources to pay both for its inputs and for its operating expenses C. Yet, the firm needs at 
least proportion r of inputs to be delivered at r  =  1 and an amount o f funds C  in order to 
reach the final stage of its risky project and avoid costly liquidation. In order to deal with 
the crisis, the firm requests its existing claimholders to provide extra credit. Henceforth, 
we will refer to such requests as the debt restructuring offer.
In particular, the firm requests the extension o f a senior unsecured loan C  by the bank 
that would result in an increase of bank’s credit exposure from B to B  +  C. Should the 
bank agree to provide such a loan, the firm also needs to offer new contracts to suppliers in 
exchange of old lOU claims and delivery o f goods at r  =  1. Such an exchange offer should 
allow the firm to receive the necessary amount of inputs to carry on with the project.^ **
Considering the firm as resorting to its existing claimholders for credit extension in 
case of crisis can be justified on grounds o f vested interests that existing claimholders have 
in the resolution of financial crisis and the possibility that may be willing to make conces­
sion in order to recover their original exposures. Also, an established working relationships 
with the firm would imply that existing claimholders may have an information advantage 
over other potential creditors and, altogether, that may imply more favorable terms in ex­
tending distress credit to a solvent, but illiquid, firm. Although the terms o f the debt re­
structuring are taken as given in this paper, focusing instead on how those terms may affect
It is worth reiterating that the financial capacity of the bank is limited and, as a result, the bank is unable 
to manufacture the bailout of the firm by extending both a new loan C  and by repaying the firm’s suppliers.
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the outcome of the offer, we distinguish between insolvency and illiquidity in terms of the 
firm’s ability to meet its contractual obligations at r  =  2 from the pay-offs o f its risky 
project. We consider the following definition:
Definition 1 As o f r  =  \  the firm is considered solvent if  and only if  it is considered 
capable o f meeting all its contractual obligations a t r  =  2.
Finally, before turning to discuss the debt restructuring offer in more detail, it is 
worth emphasising that this paper assumes away the possibility o f a firm prearranging 
credit lines with its creditors à la Holmstrom and Tirole (1998,2000), which would possibly 
provide some comfort to the firm in case o f a liquidity shock. Although we deem that as 
an interesting extension to our model, here we adopt an ex-post view o f liquidity crisis, 
focusing exclusively on the resolution o f financial distress and on ex post decisions of 
firm’s creditors to restructure their claims.
3.2.1 Debt-restructuring offer
Restructuring of supply contracts takes the form of a tender offer (henceforth debt-exchange 
offer), whereby all suppliers face the same terms of debt-exchange. Under those terms, a 
supplier is called to delivery a single unit o f inputs at r  =  1 in exchange o f an unsecured 
debt claim with face value equal to that is payable at r  =  2. Henceforth, we refer to 
the face value of the new claims offered as the debt-exchange ratio and we assume that 
it is greater than what suppliers are expected to receive by not delivering to the firm (i.e. 
Os > 1 — c). Moreover, under the debt-exchange offer, a minimum tendering rate r  has 
to met in order for the offer to be declared as successful. Thus, we assume that suppli-
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ers’ responses to the offer are pooled together and inputs are released in exchange o f new 
contracts only if  a minimum tendering rate r is met.
In line with empirical evidence/^ we assume that acceptance by the bank to make 
concessions -  i.e. to extend new credit to the firm -  is made conditional on success of the 
debt-exchange offer. In other words, a necessary condition for the bank to extend distress 
funding is that a minimum proportion r o f suppliers accept the new contract terms.
3.2.2 Pay-offs of the bank
At date r =  1 the firm has no collateral to offer but both the old and the new loan to the firm 
rank first in the firm’s capital structure. Yet, if  the bank rejects the offer then the firm will 
be liquidated immediately (e.g. under Chapter 7 proceedings). In that case, the seniority of 
the old claim to the firm is o f no value given that the claim is severely impaired (actually 
is worthless) due to zero liquidation value o f the firm at r  =  1. Given also that bank’s 
agreement to extend new credit to the firm is made conditional upon successful completion 
of the exchange offer to suppliers, the loss that the bank will incur if default takes place 
at r  =  1 is limited only to the old loan amount {B ) . In case o f default at r  =  2 the bank 
has the first claim on what the project has generated up to the total loan amount {B -\-C). 
Yet, if there is no default at all, the bank fully recovers both the new and the old loan 
amount {B -\-C). The following table summarises the bank’s loss function under different
See, for example, James (1996).
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scenarios:
Bank Default a t r  =  \  Default a t r  =  2 No Default
Accept -B -LGD x {B +  C) 0
Reject -B -B -B
where, LGD  is the loss-given-default (e.g. intemal-systems-based) associated with the 
situation of default in the final period.^® For convenience we assume that -LGD  x {B-\-G) <  
—B, or that LGD >  This assumption intends to capture the non-trivial nature of 
bank’s commitment to extend new credit at r  =  1 . This is, the amount of new credit G is 
not negligible compared with the original amount B. Moreover, banks usually claim that 
it is their policy when they extend credit to make sure that the firm is solvent. In other 
words, the provision of extra security (i.e. enhanced seniority, collateral etc.) other than 
affecting the terms of lending it is not the driving force behind bank’s decision to extend 
credit or not. As a result, it would be conceptually wrong, on an ex-ante basis, to relate 
explicitly the bank’s pay-off in case o f default at r  =  2 to the firm’s liquidation value. This 
would obstruct us from the original objective which is to capture the effect o f bank’s belief 
about the solvency status o f the firm on small claimants’ actions. Furthermore, it would 
computationally burden our analysis making it very specific to distributional assumptions 
about agents’ signals.
The use of a fixed LGD  is consistent with the foundations internal-ratings-based IR E  approach that has 
been proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The IR E  approach requires banks to assign 
a fixed LGD figure to particular classes of credit exposures.
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3.2.3 Pay-offs of suppliers
We assume that inputs are project-specific and if suppliers choose not to deliver at date 
r =  1 they have to sell the inputs at a discount c elsewhere.^* Rochet and Vives (2001) 
use a similar formulation where they interpret a fixed foreclosure cost c as a reputation 
cost of fimd managers due to bad judgement. Such an interpretation would be applicable 
to our model should instead of a continuum of suppliers we would assume a continuum of 
unsecured creditors (e.g. short term commercial paper investors).
Let us also assume that, as o f T =  1, suppliers expect to receive a small fixed pay-ofif 
in case of default at r =  2, which for notational convenience is set equal to zero.^  ^ Alter­
natively, one could consider suppliers’ beliefs, regarding their pay-offs in case of default 
at r  =  2 , as endogenously determined on the basis of their signals and conditional on suc­
cess of the debt-exchange offer at r  =  1. Yet, this would bring undue complication in the 
model given that what we intend to capture here is suppliers’ incentive to avoid the cost of  
not selling their inputs to the monopsonist firm, or extending credit to an insolvent firm. 
This assumption is also consistent with empirical evidence. White (1983), for example, 
observes that unsecured creditors receive little or no pay-off in liquidation.^^
We use that assumption in order to avoid the complication of explicitly building the term structure of 
credit spreads into the model or arbitrarily assume a gross rate of return (r > 1) at r  =  1 for every dollar of 
credit extended by suppliers to the firm at r  =  1.
In a similar setting, Rochet and Vives (2001) use a payoff equal to zero assuming that this is what a fimd 
manager would get for rollovering a credit exposure to an entity that has subsequently defaulted.
In a sample of 178 liquidated firms White (1983) finds that the average payoff rates to unsecured creditors 
is approximately 2.5%. Nevertheless, for firms reorganising under Chapter 11 proceedings the payoff rates 
are above 32%. He also argues that some unsecured claims such as trade creditor claims are generally not 
covered by subordination agreements and rank at the bottom of the seniority ranking.
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If there is no default both at r  =  1 and r  =  2, suppliers who restructured are expected
to receive an amount per unit of inputs supplied, which is higher than what they would
get should they had refused to restructure, i.e. (1 — c). Given the above, suppliers’ pay-off
function looks as follows:
Suppliers Default a t r  =  1 Default at r  =  2 No Default
Accept Offer \-c  0 Og
Reject Offer 1-c 1-c 1-c
where 0  <  c < 1 and 1 — c < a .^
3.2.4 Information
We assume that the minimum proportion r o f required inputs, the level o f bank debt B  and 
the aggregate claims by firm’s suppliers as well as the level o f operating expenses C  and 
the cost c of selling the goods in the outside market are common knowledge among agents. 
We also assume that prior beliefs about the return R  o f the firm’s risky project have an 
improper prior distribution.^ "*
At T =  1, creditors receive private noisy signals about the return of the firm’s risky 
project. Those signals constitute the only information available to creditors about the eco­
nomic value of firm’s investment. Let y  be the signal observed by the bank, which is of the 
following form:
y =  R  +  ve
Improper priors allow the analysis to focus exclusively on agents’ updated beliefs conditional on tiieir 
private signals, without taking into account the information contained in the prior distribution. In any case, 
our results with the improper prior can be seen as the limiting case as the information in the prior density goes 
to zero. See Hartigan (1983) for a discussion of improper priors, and Morris and Shin (2000) for a discussion 
of the latter point.
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where, z/ > 0  is a constant and £ is a normal random variable with zero measure and unit 
variance, density function g {•) and is independent o f R. We denote by G (•) the cumulative 
distribution function of ^  (•). Also at r  =  1 each supplier i privately observes the following 
signal:
Xi =  R  +  (JEi
where, cr > 0  is a constant and { s j  are independent, identically distributed normal random 
variables, independent of e, with zero measure, unit variance and density function denoted 
by /  (•). We also denote by F  (•) the cumulative distribution function of /  (•).
Rational creditors will use their noisy private signals in order to form beliefs about 
the return R  of the firm’s risky project and to infer the beliefs o f other creditors. Thus, a 
creditor will form beliefs not only about the underlying fundamentals o f the firm, but also 
about the beliefs of other creditors, other creditors’ beliefs about other creditors’ beliefs and 
so on. This is because rational creditors will realise that their pay-offs do not only depend 
on the firm’s fundamentals, but also on other creditors’ whether or not to restructure.
At r  =  1, the bank moves first and decides whether to increase its leverage to the 
firm. It does so conditional on its private signal y and taking into account the effect of its 
action on suppliers’ behaviour. Suppliers then decide unilaterally whether to extend credit 
to the firm by delivering their goods at r  =  1 for payment at r  =  2. Their actions are 
conditional upon their private signals Xi and the commonly observed action by the bank to 
extend new credit to the firm or not. We consider the following definition:
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Definition 2 A creditor's strategy is a rule o f action that maps each realization o f its 
signal to one o f two actions: to extend credit to the firm by accepting the offer, or to reject 
the offer.
Suppliers strategies are determined at equilibrium by balancing the benefit o f a par­
ticular strategy against the opportunity cost o f that strategy, taking into account strategic 
complementarities. Given that individually they are unable to influence the solvency of the 
firm, suppliers fail to account for the effect o f their individual decisions on the completion 
of firm’s project. Yet, they are able to account for the effect o f their actions as a whole. 
Thus, they foreclose whenever the expected benefit (1 — c) o f doing so is higher than the 
expected benefit of extending credit to the firm via the new contract. Similarly, the bank 
accepts to provide new credit to the firm if the total amount it expects to lose from doing 
so is less than the old loan [B) that it will definitely lose if  it will reject the offer.
3.2.5 Equilibrium Concept
Strategic interactions are modeled here by using the methods o f Carlsson and van Damme 
(1993) on global games as applied by Morris and Shin (2000, 2001), Rochet and Vives 
(2001) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2004). With the exception of the latter, the literature on 
global games typically builds on the assumption of full strategic complementarities. This 
is when an agent’s incentive to undertake a certain action increases with the proportion of 
other agents undertaking the same action. However, this condition is not satisfied in case 
of debt-exchange offers that are subject to a minimum tendering rate. That is because, a 
supplier’s incentive to tender is highest when the proportion of tendering suppliers reaches
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the minimum tendering rate -  i.e. the tender offer just succeeds -  while it drops thereafter 
given that the firm’s liability increases with the proportion o f suppliers who tender.
Nevertheless, as in Goldstein and Pauzner (2004), the property o f one-sided strategic 
complementarities is still satisfied in our model. Given that a supplier has nothing to lose 
by accepting an debt-exchange offer that fails -  i.e. if  the minimum tendering rate is not 
attained -  his incentive to tender increases with the proportion o f other tendering suppliers, 
provided that the proportion o f those who tender is relatively small. Thus, given one-sided 
strategic complementarities, we can borrow the uniqueness result of Goldstein and Pauzner 
and apply it to our benchmark case with no bank in the game. Then, by introducing a bank 
in the restructuring and by taking the bank’s strategy as given, we can show that suppliers 
follow a unique Bayesian equilibrium strategy, where the debt-exchange offer succeeds if  
and only if the actual investment return o f the firm is above a certain threshold.
In particular, we suppose that both types o f creditors -  i.e. suppliers and the bank 
-  follow trigger strategies around critical signal levels x* and y* respectively. That is, if  
the bank observes a signal y that is higher than y* then, it accepts to extend new credit, 
otherwise it rejects the offer and the firm is liquidated. Similarly, a supplier delivers his 
inputs to the firm, in exchange of new claims payable next period, if  and only if  he observes 
a signal higher than x*.
However, we consider a sequential move game where the bank moves first by re­
sponding to the debt exchange offer conditionally on other creditors’ actions.^  ^ Conse-
We may justify such a first mover advantage by the bank on the grounds that banks typically have credit 
policies in place to deal wifii the situation of financial distress by a debtor. Such policies are less likely to be 
in place by small creditors whose bargaining power to enforce them would anyway be limited.
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quently, an equilibrium here, if  any, is a pair {x*, y*) where the strategy x* that is chosen 
by suppliers takes into account the information that is conveyed in the restructuring deci­
sion by the bank, which then internalises suppliers response in its restructuring strategy y*. 
In order to derive a closed form solutions for the equilibrium strategies x* and y*, we are 
assuming that the relative precision in the bank’s signal (^ ) relative to that o f small credi­
tors (^) is such that  ^ > 0. As of Corsetti et al. (2001), that assumption is without loss of 
generality and is imposed solely for analytical tractability.
In order to derive suppliers’ equilibrium in trigger strategies, we need first to solve 
for the critical level R* o f the actual investment return above which proportion o f suppliers 
higher than the minimum tendering rate r  accept the debt-exchange offer. We prove the 
following lemma.
Lemma 4 Given suppliers ’ equilibrium in trigger strategies x*, the critical level o f  
investment return R* above which the debt-exchange offer succeeds, is given by R* =  
X* — oF~^ (1 — r )
Proof See appendix ■
In order to assess the role of banks in the resolution o f financial distress and how the 
terms of restructuring impact on creditors’ strategies, we consider the benchmark case with 
no bank in the game where, at the same time, we control for money-efifects o f bank’s in­
volvement in the restructuring. That is, we analyse the situation where suppliers respond to 
the debt-exchange offer conditionally only on their signals, without observing any restruc­
turing action by the bank.
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3.3 Equilibrium with no bank in the game
Let us think of a situation where at r  =  1 the firm does not face a liquidity demand C, 
but is has outstanding a total amount o f debt B' =  B  +  C, which is repayable at r  =  2 . 
In addition, if  the debt-exchange offer to suppliers succeeds then, the new claims become 
junior to the debt amount B' and repayable at r  =  2. Assuming that suppliers follow trigger 
strategies around a critical signal level x**, we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Suppose that supplier i observes a signal Xi =  x**. I f  there is no liquidation 
o f the firm at r  =  1 then, i supplier's belief about the proportion I** o f other suppliers 
receiving a signal lower than his is given by I** =
Proof See appendix ■
The critical signal level x**, above which suppliers accept the debt-exchange offer,
solves the following equation:
(1 -  c) V i { R  <  R** I T ,  =  X * * )  +
+üa Pr { R >  B' +  ÜS {1 — I) \ X i  =  X * * )  =  (1 — c)
where B' =  B  +  C,  R** is defined as in lemma (4), i.e. R** =  x** — crF~  ^ (1  — r), and I 
is the proportion o f suppliers who reject the debt-exchange offer.
Proposition 7 I f  there is no bank in the game, then under a minimum tendering rate r,
suppliers ' equilibrium in trigger strategies x** is given by:
x "  =  (B +  C) +  a J  ) +  a F1—1
(1  -  r) (1  -  c)
CLs
(3.2)
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Proof See appendix ■
Not surprisingly, x** increases in the leverage factors {B  +  C) and ( ^ ) .  More­
over, X** depends on an asymmetric information premium -  i.e. the third term in (3.2) 
-  which can either be positive or negative depending on the characteristics o f the debt- 
exchange oflfer, as well as on suppliers’ outside option (1  — c) and the extent o f noise in 
suppliers’ signals cr.
In particular, for r <  1 — 2(y-c)  ^the asymmetric information premium becomes pos­
itive as a result o f a standard co-ordination problem among suppliers. Otherwise, suppliers 
are willing to accept a discount in their signals before rejecting the offer, meaning that 
they become less sensitive to bad news about the firm. That is because, a high minimum 
tendering rate implies that a debt-exchange offer succeeds only if  there is a high level o f  
consensus among suppliers that the firm is solvent. Consequently, by free riding on aver­
age opinion, a supplier accepts the offer more easily given that he has nothing to lose by 
accepting an offer that subsequently fails. Similarly, the incentive to free ride on average 
opinion increases in the debt-exchange ratio a .^ That is because, the higher the the more 
a supplier’s decision to tender is driven more by income considerations -  i.e. by what he 
receives in case o f no default -  rather than his private information information. Thus, the 
higher the debt-exchange ratio the lower the asymmetric information premium.
In the following section we consider the case where restructuring decisions by sup­
pliers are sequential to the action by the bank. By taking the form o f the game as given 
and the characteristics o f the debt-exchange offer as exogenously determined, we focus on 
the impact of asymmetric information on creditors’ strategies and on how the bank’s re­
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structuring strategy relates to the strategy of other creditors. However, we stop short of 
considering what an optimal debt-exchange offer might be, which is postponed for future 
research.^®
3.4 Sequential move with bank in the game
Let us now consider the case where the bank acts as a Stackelberg leader in the restructur­
ing game and its action is publicly observed by the suppliers, affecting their beliefs and, 
possibly, their willingness to tender. We solve first for suppliers’ optimal trigger strategy 
X*, taking the bank’s strategy y* as given. By backward induction, we then solve for bank’s 
optimal trigger strategy y* and, with equilibrium (%*, y*) in hand, we discuss implications 
of bank’s involvement in the restructuring for the outcome of the debt-exchange offer.
3.4.1 Suppliers’ strategy
We suppose that the bank, having followed a trigger strategy y*, has accepted the debt 
restructuring offer. That is, we assume that the bank has observed a signal y  greater than 
y* and let x*, in that case, be suppliers’ optimal trigger strategy. Given that suppliers are 
now able to filter information out o f bank’s restructuring action, their equilibrium strategy 
is expected to be different from that under the benchmark case with no bank in the game.
In practice, the tender offer may be optimally set by the bank as part of its contingent offer to extend a new 
loan. It may be also set by bankruptcy law in order to maximise some measure of social welfare. Moreover, 
in the context of sovereign debt and the issue of bonds under New York Law containing collective action 
clauses (CACs), it is the debtor country that decides upon the minimum tendering rate. Yet analysing those 
issues here would require another layer of complexity in our model that would take into account incentives at 
the initial contracting stage. Given the current level of complexity in our model, we postpone such an analysis 
for future research.
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But before turning to solve for suppliers’ strategy x*, we need to prove first the following 
lemma.
Lemma 6  I f there is no liquidation o f the firm at r  =  1 and a supplier observes a
private signal X{ =  x* then, his belief about the proportion I* o f other suppliers receiving 
a signal lower than x* is given by
F  F  {t) f  {t) dt
( l - r ) F ( ^ )  
where, for the limiting case where -  —> 0 , it becomes
(è)' d -.)F (^ )
if»- >  0-5
Proof See appendix ■
We now solve for suppliers’ equilibrium in trigger strategies, focusing on the case 
where  ^ > 0. Although this is without loss of generality, we could apply numerical meth­
ods to derive equilibria for arbitrary values o f relative precision of g o f suppliers’ signals 
relative to that of the bank, given that most o f our results are also derived generically.
Conditional on bank’s positive response to the debt exchange offer, the critical signal 
level X *  solves the following equation:
( l - c ) P r ( i î <  | ÿ > ÿ * )  +
a, Pr (i2 > 5  +  C +  a. (1 — P) | y  >  y*) =  (1 — c) 
where the probability terms in (3.3) are taken conditional on signal Xi =  x* and I* is given
by lemma 6 . The first term on the LHS of expression (3.3) corresponds to the situation
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where the debt-exchange offer is not successful, regardless o f acceptance by the bank of 
the debt restructuring offer. If this is the case then, suppliers need to sell their goods 
elsewhere and face a discount c. The second term refers to the situation where the debt- 
exchange offer succeeds but there is default at r =  2 because o f insufficient proceeds from 
the project. Finally, the last term on the LHS corresponds to the situation where the project 
generates sufficient proceeds at r  =  2 to repay all creditors. The RHS of (3.3) is simply 
the price that a supplier will get by selling his inputs elsewhere. We prove the following 
proposition.
Proposition 8 I f  suppliers face a debt-exchange offer with minimum tendering rate r 
and debt-exchange ratio then, conditional on bank's strategy y*, suppliers’ equilibrium 
in trigger strategies x* satisfies the following:
Case 1: I f  x* >  (B +  C) +  Ug (1 — I*) and r < 0.5 then, suppliers optimal strategy x* 
solves
Case 2: I f  x* < (B 4- C) 4- Ug (1 — I*) and r < 0.5 then, suppliers optimal strategy x* 
solves
Case 3: I f  r >  0.5 then, suppliers optimal strategy x* solves 
a .F  (  + — r (3.6)
where I* {x' ,y") is given by lemma 6.
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Proof See appendix ■
Later, when in proposition 10 we solve for equilibria o f the form we verify
whether the solution for x* in cases 1 and 2  do in fact satisfy the respective inequalities on 
X * .  Moreover, by fixing an equilibrium selection of x* that is continues in bank’s strategy 
y*, equations (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6) define a unique optimal strategy x*. We also consider 
the following corollary to proposition 8 .
Corollary 3 For a minimum tendering rate r >  0.5, suppliers’ equilibrium in trigger 
strategies x* satisfies the inequality x* <  B  +  C  +  as {I — I*), where I* is given by lemma 
6.
Proof It follows immediately from case 1, in proposition 8, and the fact that >  1 — c ■  
Corollary 3 implies that, for a minimum tendering rate r  >  0.5, suppliers are willing 
to accept the debt-exchange offer even if  their private information suggests that the firm is 
insolvent. This is due to free-riding on average opinion o f other creditors and the fact that, 
if  the restructuring offer succeeds then, there is some consensus among other creditors that 
the firm is solvent.
Let us now solve for bank’s equilibrium y* in trigger strategies where the bank inter­
nalises the impact o f its action on suppliers’ strategies.
3.4.2 Bank’s strategy
Conditional on signal y, return R  is normally distributed with mean y  and standard devia­
tion u. As a result, the bank is able to form beliefs about the proportion o f suppliers that
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will restructure their claims. Assuming that the realised sample distribution o f suppliers 
is always the common distribution of suppliers’ signals and focusing on the limiting case 
where  ^ > 0 , we consider the following lemma:
Lemma 7 Conditional on signal y  — y* and on success o f  a debt-exchange offer with
minimum tendering rate r <  0.5, bank’s belief about the proportion o f  suppliers who
reject the debt-exchange offer is given by: =  F
Proof See appendix ■
Given that rejection by the bank would lead to default by the firm and loss of the 
original loan amount B, bank’s trigger point y* solves the following equation:
~ B Y > v ( R < R ’ \ y  =  y ’ ) - D V T { R '  < R < B  +  C  +  a , { l - t )  \ y  =  y ' ) =  - B
(3.7)
where, D  =  LGD  x (B +  C) and, from Section 3.2.2, LG D  >  5 ^ .  The first term on the 
LHS of (3.7) captures the conditional feature o f bank’s acceptance: Should, the bank agree 
to provide a new loan C,  but proportion of suppliers higher than the critical level (1  — r) 
reject the offer, there is default at r =  1 and the bank loses only the original loan amount 
B.  The second term refers to losses that the bank would incur in the situation where default 
takes place at r =  2 and both the original and the new loan become impaired. However, in 
case of no-default at r  =  2  the bank loses nothing and, essentially, faces a clear exit firom 
the firm. Should, however, the bank refuse to extend a new loan then, it bears a certain loss 
of —B, which appears on the RHS of equation (3.7). We prove the following proposition.
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Proposition 9 If suppliers follow a trigger strategy x* then, for the limiting case where
 ^ > 0 , bank's equilibrium in trigger strategies y* is determined by
y ' =  {B +  C) +  a ,F  ~  vF' ■(i) (3.8)
where x* is determined by proposition^, D  is the expected loss-given-default on the to­
tal credit exposure {B +  C) and is the debt-exchange ratio under the debt-exchange 
offer
Proof See appendix ■
From equation (3.8) and for a given strategy x* by suppliers, we can easily verify that 
there is a uniquely determined optimal strategy y* by the bank. That is illustrated in the 
following figure.
RHS of (8)
Fig. 3.1. Bank’s equilibrium strategy y* for given x*.
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From equation (3.8) it also follows that the more credit C  the bank is asked to provide 
at r  =  1 and the higher the loss-given-default {LGD)  associated with default at r  =  2, 
the higher the bank’s critical signal level y*. Furthermore, y* also increases with the debt- 
exchange ratio as o f the offer to suppliers, given that the higher it is the more leveraged the 
firm becomes at r  =  2 , if  the offer succeeds.
3.4.3 Equilibrium
Equilibria o f the form (x*, y*) can be calculated by solving simultaneously for x* and y* in 
propositions 8  and 9.
Proposition 10 I f  suppliers face a debt-exchange offer with minimum tendering rate
r and debt-exchange ratio Og then, there is a unique equilibrium (x*, y*) in suppliers’ and 
bank’s strategies if  and only / /  r < 0.5 and >  F  where x* and y*
are given by
X - =  ( B  +  C )  +  ( l  -  +  a F - i  ( ^ )
y- = (B + C) + ( l  -  -  v F - ^  (§ )
Otherwise, there are multiple equilibria o f the form (x*, y*), such that
y* =  {B +  C) +  a ,F  -  vF~^
and
y* > X *  -  crF-i ( 2(fc ) )  <  0.5
 ^ y* >  X *  -  ( 2(fc ) if  ^  ^  0.5
with I* given by lemma 6.
Proof See appendix ■
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For r <  0.5, it is easy to verify that condition 2{i-c) — ^  gener­
ally satisfied if  suppliers’ outside option (1 — c) is not very close to the debt-exchange ratio 
ÜS and the extent of noise in suppliers’ signals is not very low.^  ^ Consequently, for r <  0.5, 
we consider as standard the unique-equilibrium case, while for completion we also allow 
for the possibility of multiple equilibria if suppliers information is very precise, or if their 
outside option is close to the debt-exchange ratio.
However, for r >  0.5, proposition 10 suggests that there are multiple equilibria of the 
form (x*, y*) where the strategy y* by the bank is strictly decreasing in suppliers’ strategy 
X* and vice versa. In other words, if  one class o f creditors attains a high equilibrium 
strategy then, acceptance of the offer by that class is perceived as good news by the other 
who then decide to follow a lower strategy.
That effect is illustrated in figure 3.2 where the locus o f equilibria of type (x*, y*) is 
shown with a bold line down to the point of intersection with the line x* — ctF~^ ( 2(1- 0))  • 
Figure 3.2 also illustrates the non-standard, multiple-equilibria case for r < 0.5 where, this 
time, the locus o f equilibria is shown with a bold line down to the point o f intersection with
( 2^  +  r ) .
7 7 Both conditions can easily hold here give that >  1 and ^  0.
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- a F
2(1-c)
Fig. 3.2. Multiple equilibria {x*,y*) (bold line).
Proposition 10 relates, to some extent, to finance literature on cascading where a 
closely related problem is to establish conditions under which parties follow their own 
signals, or ignore their private information and follow others.^* In particular, for relatively 
small minimum tendering rates, i.e. for r <  0.5, the information pooling that is attained 
by a debt-exchange offer is limited because success o f the offer requires consensus that 
the firm is solvent by a small proportion of suppliers. Thus, for a small r, co-ordination 
problems tend to dominate herding incentives, leading to a unique equilibrium in creditors’ 
strategies, which is common in the global game literature.
However, for a relatively high minimum tendering rates, herding tends to dominate 
co-ordination problems and creditors rely more on average opinion -  as reflected in the out-
7 8 See, for example, Khanna (1998).
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come o f the debt-exchange offer and bank’s decision to restructure -  rather than on their 
private information about the solvency o f the firm. In equilibrium, herding incentives are 
common knowledge and the bank chooses its strategy in a way that accounts for suppli­
ers’ motive to play a low strategy if the bank plays a high equilibrium strategy, and vice 
versa. That leads to multiple equilibria, where the strategy that is followed by one class o f 
creditors is decreasing in the strategy that is followed by the other, as shown in figure 3.2.
3.5 Empirical implications and extensions
With equilibria of type {x*,y*) in hand, we may now assess the impact o f bank’s con­
ditional concession on the outcome of the debt-exchange offer. We prove the following 
proposition.
Proposition 11 I f  suppliers face a debt-exchange offer with minimum tendering rate 
r >  0.5 then, bank’s involvement in the restructuring induces suppliers to accept the offer 
more easily compared to the situation with no bank in the game.
Proof See appendix ■
In the real world, minimum tendering rates in debt-exchange offers typically spec­
ify qualified majority voting of 75% or above.^  ^ Consequently, proposition 11 is con­
sistent with empirical evidence by Mooradian and Ryan (2004), James (1995, 1996) and 
Gilson, Kose and Lang (1990) supporting the proposition that banks’ participation in debt
Also, under the G10 model of collective action clauses (CACs), a minimum tendering rate of 75% is spec­
ified for altering the financial terms of bonds, while private sector associations typically propose a minimum 
tendering rate close to 85%.
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restructuring transactions facilitates debt-exchange offers and increases the likelihood of  
out-of-court debt restructuring.*® Moreover, proposition 11 implies that, for relatively high 
minimum tendering rates, all equilibria under bank’s involvement in the restructuring im­
ply resolution o f financial distressed at lower levels of firm’s fimdamentals, compared to 
the situation with no bank in the game. Thus, we derive the following corollary.
Corollary 4 I f suppliers face a debt-exchange offer with minimum tendering rate r >  
0.5 then, bank’s involvement in the restructuring leads to resolution o f  financial distress at 
lower levels o f  firm’s fundamentals than with no bank in the game.
Proof It follows immediately from lemma 4 and proposition II M
However, one could possibly question whether or not it is desirable for a debt re­
structuring offer to succeed more easily and, in that respect, whether the impact o f a bank’s 
involvement in the restructuring is warranted from a welfare perspective. If herding, for 
example, induces creditors to become less sensitive to bad news about the firm then, debt 
restructuring may succeed regardless o f the going concern value o f the firm being lower 
than the extra credit it receives to overcome short term liquidity constraints. In that case, 
all creditors would be better off if  the bank had no role to play in the restructuring and the 
firm had failed. By taking a step backwards, we could then argue that this may have an 
adverse impact on the firm’s cost of capital at the initial contracting stage with counterpar­
ties. However, this is an issue that we are not able to address in this model, where we focus 
exclusively on the restructuring game, and we postpone it for future research.
This result also relates to Shleifer and Vishny (1986) who argue that, in the context of take-over bids, the 
existence of a large block holder ameliorates hold-out problems among a target firm’s shareholders.
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Also from an empirical perspective, it would be o f interest to analyse the character­
istics o f successful out-of-court debt restructurings that have subsequently led to an en­
hancement in credit quality o f exposures by those who accepted to restructure. It would 
also be worth searching for patterns in the characteristics o f out-of-court debt restructur­
ings by firms that have subsequently failed, leading to aggravation o f credit exposures by 
original claimholders. Such an analysis would possibly shed some light on factors that 
might lead to inefiicient resolution, if  not postponement, o f financial distress, such as the 
extent o f conditionality in debt-restructuring actions by certain creditors, or the character­
istics o f debt-exchange offers. But again, in order to draw predictions and address these 
issues from a theoretical perspective, we need a richer model where the pre-crisis stage is 
properly modeled and the structure o f the restructuring game is allowed to affect incentives 
and the cost o f capital that a firm faces in an out-of-crisis situation.
Finally, in the real-world, small lenders may “hold the others to ransom” and refuse 
to negotiate, pressuring instead for a recording of default. This is sometimes done with the 
intention to force a large creditor -  typically a hank -  to buy out positions o f small creditors 
at better terms than those creditors would otherwise be able to obtain via a debt-exchange 
offer. This is also a possibility that our model does not capture. Thus, it would be worth 
extending the model to analyse liquidity crises where the bargaining power o f creditors 
may not only depend on their size, but also on their voting power and how pivotal their 
roles are for the resolution of financial distress.
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3.6 Conclusions
We developed a model of debt restructuring consistent with institutional characteristics o f  
an out-of-court renegotiation o f a firm’s contractual obligations. Our results are consistent 
with empirical evidence, suggesting that banks play a potentially important role in facil­
itating the resolution o f financial distress and catalysing success o f debt-exchange offers. 
In particular, when a bank participates in the debt restructuring, debt-exchange offers suc­
ceed at lower levels o f the firm’s fundamentals compared to the situation where the bank 
has no role to play in the restructuring. In that sense, involvement by banks in debt restruc­
turing transactions may reduce the possibility o f inefficient liquidation due to co-ordination 
problems among other creditors.
By drawing a parallel between the simple balance sheet o f the financially distressed 
firm in our model, and the capital account of a country during the onset of a financial 
crisis, we may discuss possible implications of our analysis on the doctrine o f  catalytic 
finance regarding the resolution o f an international financial crisis. That doctrine rests on 
the premise that “under the right conditions, official assistance and private sector funding 
are strategic complements”.®^ Until before the Argentine crisis in 2001, the doctrine of 
catalytic finance was the cornerstone o f the official community’s strategy towards capital 
account crisis. The main idea was that official assistance to a country that experiences 
a liquidity crisis could encourage other creditors to act in a way that mitigates the crisis. 
Since the Argentine default, the doctrine of catalytic finance is less appealing among the
The September 2000 communique of the International Monetary and Finance Committee states that "the 
combination of catalytic official financing and policy adjustment should allow the country to regain full 
market access quickly” .
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G7. In particular, with respect to IMF interventions, there are voices nowadays arguing that 
the IMF’s assistance to a country is exploited by private creditors and, in a sense, the two 
sources o f funding become strategic substitutes during periods o f financial crisis, rather 
than complements. Those voices are further reinforced by a moral-hazard story, according 
to which, the inability o f the IMF to commit not always to intervene exacerbates the moral 
hazard problem on the part o f the debtor country.
As regards the work-outs of financial distress, our analysis supports the presumption 
that ofificial-sector assistance to a country in financial crisis could encourage other creditors 
to act in a way that facilitates resolution of the crisis. That is by alleviating co-ordination 
problems among creditors. However, our analysis also suggests that the extent o f condi­
tionality in creditors’ actions -  captured here through the minimum tendering rate -  could 
affect the balance between co-ordination problems and herding incentives.
In recent years, the issue of conditionality under debt-restructuring transactions has 
mainly been discussed in relation to collective action clauses (CACs) and how they could 
ameliorate co-ordination and hold-out problems among creditors in the event o f crisis.®^  
Moreover, there has been some discussion on how sovereign borrowers would choose the 
level o f majority voting under CACs. Thus, the focus has mainly been on how the level 
of conditionality affects, ex ante, the cost of borroAving given that, ex post, the level o f 
majority voting required to alter the lending terms makes it more or less easy for debtors to 
force unfavorable credit terms on lenders.*^
See, for example, Eichengreen and Portes (1995), Buchheit and Gulati (2002), Kletzer (2003) and Haldane 
etal  (2004).
See also Eichengreen and Mody (2003).
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To our knowledge, the possibility of free riding on average opinion by creditors, as 
a result o f conditionality in restructuring actions, has been ignored. Our analysis suggests 
that there is a conditionality threshold beyond which co-ordination problems convert into 
herding problems. That, especially in the corporate sector, could possibly lead to short 
term resolutions o f financial distress, at levels o f fimdamentals that, under full information, 
would be difi&cult to justify concessions by creditors. But, it can also be the case that, 
under asymmetric information, some degree of conditionality is warranted given that it 
allows creditors to make better informed decisions by basing their actions on the collective 
knowledge of other creditors. Thus, we may conclude that conditionality in the provision 
of financial assistance in case of crisis should be a balancing act.
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3.A Appendix 
3.A.1 Proof of Lemma 4
Conditional on actual investment return R, signal Xi is normally distributed with mean R  
and variance cr^ . Given that suppliers’ signals {a i^} are U .d , the critical level o f investment 
return i?*, below which rejection by suppliers generates default, is such that:
That is,
or
Ft [x < X* \ R  =  R*) =  1 — r
R* = x * ~  aF~^ (1 -  r)
QE.D.
3.A.2 Proof of Lemma 5
Given that suppliers’ signals are i.i.d , conditional on no default at r  =  1 (i.e. R  >  R**) 
and on signal Xi, i supplier’s belief about the proportion I o f other suppliers receiving a 
signal lower than his is defined as follows:
l =  F T { x j  < X i \ R >  R * * )  (3.9)
For Xi =  X** equation (3.9) gives the rejection rate I** that one expects to occur when he 
observes a signal equal to the critical signal level x**:
r  =  F i { x j < x * *  \ R > R * * )  =
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Vi {xj  < x * * , R >  R**)
(3.10)
Pr {R >  R**)
Conditional on signal Xi =  x**, signal Xj is normal with mean x** and variance 2a^.
Similarly R  is also normal with mean x** and variance a^. Moreover, conditional on
Xi =  X**, Xj and R  are correlated with covariance equal to Thus, {xj , R)  is a bi-
variate normal distribution with mean =  (x**, x**) and variance/covariance matrix S  =  
2(7^
. From the definition of the multivariate normal distribution and given that
(7^  (7^
1 - 1
- 1  2 
by the following expression:
1 r x * *  r + o o
and |S | =  cr'^ , it is easy to show that I** in equation (3.10) is given
r  =
( x i - R f + ( x * ^ - R f
20^ dRdXj
1 — r
(3.11)
By changing the order of integration in equation (3.11) and by applying the transformation
—  ±1Xi—R, we get the following expression:
r  =
Let w  =  ,
" Gxp [ - y ]  d z j  exp (R-x^*Ÿ2a2 dR
1 — r
r  =
1 r+oo
Æ  J - F - H l - r )
W2
2 F  {—w) dw
1 — r
or
r  =
1 — r
Let w =  —t  and applying the fact that /  is symmetric we finally get:
2 1 — r
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or
Q.E.D.
3.A.3 Proof of Proposition 7
By substituting R** — x** — crF~  ^ (1 — r) and I** =  in equation (3.1) we get the 
following equation:
/— r) r+oof  (z) dz  +  g . /  (z) dz =  { l -  e)
or
or
Q.E.D.
3.A.4 Proof of Lemma 6
Similar to the proof of lemma 5, if  there is no liquidation o f the firm at r  =  1 (i.e. R >  R* 
and y >  y*) then, if  a supplier observes a private signal Xi, his belief about the proportion 
I of other suppliers receiving a signal lower than his is defined as follows:
I =  P r {xj <  Xi\ R >  R *,y >  y*) (3.14)
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For X i  =  X *  equation (3.14) gives the rejection rate I* of the debt-exchange offer that one 
expects to occur when his signal is equal to the critical signal level x*:
r  =  Y^i {xj <x* \ R >  R \ y > y * )
or
Pi ( x j  < x ' , R >  R ' , y >  y ’ )
P T ( R > R * ) P i { y > y )  ^
From lemma 4, we already know that, conditional on a signal X{ — x * ,  the probability term 
Ft {R >  R*) in the denominator o f (3.15) is given by
Ft ( R >  R*) =  { l - r )  (3.16)
Also conditional on signal Xi =  x * ,  the second probability term in the denominator of 
(3.15) can be written as
Pr (y >  y*) =  F i { R  — ve >  y*)
or
Pr (y > y*) =  Pr {x* —y * >  asi  +  ve)
or
Regarding the probability term in the numerator of (3.15) then, conditional on signal X{ =  
X*, signal Xj is normal with mean x* and variance 2a^. Similarly,conditional on Xi =  x*, 
the actual investment return R  is normal with mean x* and variance while the signal y  
that is observed by the bank is normally distributed with mean x* and variance +  o^). 
Moreover, conditional on Xi =  x*, xj, y and R  are mutually correlated with all covari­
ances equal to cr^ . Thus, the vector of random variables ( x j , y , R)  follows a multivari-
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ate normal distribution with mean vector fj. =  {x*, x*, x*) and variance/covariance matrix 
S  =  cr^  . From the definition of the multivariate normal distribution,+  (7^  (7^
(7^  (7^  (7^
given that S   ^ ^ and |S | =  a^v^, it is easy to show that
0 —
0  — <7^
— — cr ^
equations (3.15), (3.16) and (3.17) imply the following expression for I*:
I* =_
/ I  exp ( - ^ -Ry+a^(y-Ry+v^(x*-Ry/t2«i2 d i î j  d î / |  d x j
(3.18)
By changing the order o f integration, (3.18) may easily become
[ r l  exp <i^i\ e^ cp ( - ^ ^ )  d y }  exp dR
r  =_  ( Æ ) ‘
By applying the transformation z =  I* becomes
( Æ ) 'v W  { - C ”  l î f  /  (^) ®^ P ( - ^ )  <^ 2/} exp ( - ^ ^ )  dR
I* =
or
I* =
( Æ ) W  ■1'^ -°° k~^°° ( - ^ )  4  ^  ( ^ )  ( - ^ ^ )
By applying the transformation u =  T becomes
vsb? /y °°  /  (“ ) H  ^  ( ^ )  exp
( l - r ) F ( ^ )
(3.19)
or
r  =
Æ ”  ^  ( ^ )  ^  ( ^ )  T s b  exp ( - ^ )  dR
(3.20)
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^  /-T -.(i-r ) ^  ( = ^ )  p  ( - “>) /  W  dw 2 1 )
Applying the transformation w — —t  and the fact that /  is symmetric -  i.e. /  {—t) =  /  (t) 
-  equation (3.21) becomes
We consider the following two cases: 1) r <  0.5 and 2) r >  0.5.
Case 1: For r <  0.5 and considering the limiting case  ^ 0, equation (3.22) becomes
I L  F  ( ) ^  (*) /  (t) dt +  F  ( ) F { t ) f  it) dt
( l - r ) F ( ^ )
or
2 ( l _ r ) F ( ^ )  
or
r =  -
1X3
2 j  ( l - r ) F ( ^ )  
Case 2; If r >  0.5 then, for  ^ 0, equation (3.22) becomes
2  ( l - r ) f  ( ^ )
or
2 F ( ^ )
Q.E.D.
I" =  % (3.23)
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3. A.5 Proof of Proposition 8
We first need to solve for the probability that the debt-excbange offer fails, conditional on 
signal Xi =  x*  and acceptance by the bank o f the debt restructuring offer. Such a probability 
can be written as
Pr ( il  <  iJ- I y >  f )  =  (3-24)
where from the proof o f lemma 6 , in particular from equation (3.17), we know that condi­
tional on signal Xi =  x*  the probability that the bank accepts the offer, i.e. y  >  y * \ s  given 
by
We prove the following lemma.
Lemma 8 Conditional on signal Xi =  x* and on acceptance by the hank o f  the debt 
restructuring offer, the probability that the debt-exchange offer fails is given by
where, for the limiting case where f  —> 0 , it becomes
0 i fr  < 0.5
Pr(il< il* I Î/> Î/*) = i
i f r  >  0.5
Proof Conditional on signal Xi =  x*, the vector o f random variables [R, y) is a bivariate 
normal distribution with mean vector p  =  (x*,x*) and variance/covariance matrix E =  
. From the definition o f  the multivariate normal distribution and the fact
<j^  +  cr^
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2 „ 2
+  cr^  —cr^
—a a
and |E | =  o^v ,^ we can show that
2 ^ 2 2 î;2
(3.26)
Considering first the transformation w =  equation (3.26) becomes
P i ( R < R \ y > y ' ) =  f /  W
/■+“  1 
/  ,—  exp
Jy* y/27rv
{y — X* — a w y  
2^2
dy dw
or
P i { R < R \ y > y * ) =  f
- F - l ( l - r )
/ H
/•+°° 1 
Jy- -J2\
dw
(3.27)
z =   ^ (3.27) becomes
—F-i(l-r)^(1-r) /  f+oo \
P i { R < R ' , y > y ' )  =  j  f  jw) [ f  { z ) d z ] dw
or
f - t  ^ l - r )  / x *  — 77* 4- 0 - w \
P i { R < R \ y > y * )  =  J  f  (w) F  f  ^  J dw (3.28)
Consequently, from equations (3.24), (3.25) and 3.28, the probability that the debt-exchange 
offer fails, conditional on the bank accepting the debt restructuring offer, is given by
" ( a )
For us consider the following cases: 1) r <  0.5 and 2) r >  0.5. 
Case 7; T/’r <  0.5 then, for  -  — 0, equation (3.28) becomes
(3.29)
Pr(77<7?*,T/>y*) =  0
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Case 2: I f  r then, equation (3.2S) can be written as
V r { R < R \ y > y ' )  =  f  (w) F  ~ d w + '' f  (w) F  (j ’ ~
where, for   ^ 0 , it becomes
V i { R < R * , y > y * ) =  f  f { w ) d w
Jo
—F-l(l-r) 
'0
or
Ft {R <  R*, y >  y*) =  r 
Summarising, for the limiting case  ^  ^ 0, equation (3.29^ becomes
F i { R < R *  \ y > y * )  =  <
I
0 ifr  <  0.5 
ifr  >  0.5
(3.30)
Let us now solve for the second term in (3.3), namely for the probability that, con­
ditional on signal Xi =  x* and on acceptance by the bank o f the restructuring oiBFer, the 
debt-exchange offer succeeds and the firm is solvent, i.e. it repays all its debt at r  =  2 . 
Such a probability can be written as
Pr (i? > B  -\- C  CLgif — l*^  ^y >  y*)
Pr [R > B  C  Og {1 — I*) 12/ > y*) —
We prove the following lemma.
Pr {y >  y*)
(3.31)
Lemma 9 Conditional on signal X{ =  x* and on acceptance o f the restructuring offer
by the bank, the probability o f no default a t r  =  2 is given by
Ft [R > B  C  ttg {1 — I*), y >  y*) =
=  /  (w) F  dw
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where, for the limiting case where  ^ ^  0 , it becomes
V v { R >  B  +  C  +  a s ( \ - l * ) \ y > y * ) =  < 
with I* given in lemma 6.
, / X* —(B+C)—aa(l —1*) \
A  L \
f ( ^ )
if 37* <C. B  C  CLs if  — /*)
Proof As in lemma 8, the probability o f  no default a t r  =  2 is given by.
Pt (R >  B  C  üg [1 — I*) ,y  >  y*) =
=  /BTc+a,(i-i-) exp ( - ^ ^ )  [ / ; ° °  exp ( - -Ü Ç g ll)  dy
Considering the transformation w  =  equation (332) becomes
Pr (R  >  ^  +  (7 +  ûs (1 — P ) , 2/ >  y*) =
=  /  (tv) exp ( - - )  dy  ^ dw
By setting z  =  , equation (i.33) becomes
dR
(3.32)
(3.33)
(3.34)
Pr ( iî  >  B  4- C 4- Bg (1 — I*) .y  > y * )  —
=  /  (w) F
Consequently, from equations (3.25), (3.3\) and 3.34, the probability o f no default a tr  =  2, 
conditional on the bank accepting the debt restructuring offer, is given by
f  (w) F  dw
? i ( R > B  +  C  +  a , { l - r ) \ y > y * )  =
y )
(3.35)
Let us consider the following two cases: 1) x* >  B  +  C  Og {1 — I*) and 2) x* <  B  +
C Og [1 — I*).
Case 1: I f  X* >  B  +  C  +  ag{l  — I*) then, for   ^ ^  0, equation (3.3A) becomes
Pr (i? >  .B +  (7 +  ttg (1 — P ) , 2/ >  2/*) =
=  /  {w) F dw  +  / / “  /  (B,) F  dw
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or
7 v { R > B  +  C  +  a , { \ - V ) , y > y ' )  =  ^ (3.36)
Case 2: I f  X *  < B  +  C  -\- ag{ l  — I*) then, for  J  ^ 0, equation (3.34^ becomes
Pr (JÎ >  ^  +  C +  flg (1 — /* ) , 2/ >  y*) —
=  fB^+C+ag(l-l*)-x* f  ( w )  d w
or
' P i { R>  B  +  C  +  as { l  — I*) , y  >  y*) =
_ p  ^a*-(g+C)—aa(l-f*)^
Summarising, for the limiting case  ^ 0, equation (3.35) becomes
Pr {R  > B C  CLg if  — I*) I y  >  y*) — <
if  X* >  5  +  C +  (1  — r )
jj,/a* —(B+C) —qj(l —<*) \
 -^----- if  3:* <  B  +  C  üg {1 — I*)
lemmas 6 , 8  and 9 in hand, we solve for suppliers’ equilibrium in trigger strate­
gies X* for the limiting case where J 0. We consider the following cases: 
1) X* >  B  +  C  +  Og {I — r )  and 2) x* <  B  +  C  +  ag{ l  — I*), distinguish between 
r <  0.5 and r >  0.5.
Case 1 X* ^  B  C  CL g (Jl — /*).
Subcase 1.1: If r <  0.5 then, equation (3.3) becomes
0 ‘S( ^ ) 2  (1  — c)
Subcase 1.2: If r >  0.5 then, equation (3.3) implies that
(3.38)
But this case can be rejected because r +  2{i-c) ^ 
Case 2  x* <c B  -\- C  4 - Ug (1 — f*).
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Subcase 2.1: If r <  0.5 then, from equation (3.3) becomes
=  (1  _  c) F  f (3.40)
Subcase 2.2: If r >  0.5 then, equation (3.3) becomes
F (3.41)
Q.E.D.
3.A.6 Proof of Lemma 7
Conditional on no default at r  =  1 (i.e. R > R*) and on signal y*, bank’s belief about 
the proportion o f suppliers that receive a signal lower than x* (i.e. reject firm’s offer) is 
defined as follows:
=  Pr (xj <  X* \ R  >  R*, y =  y*) =
Pr {xj <  x * , R >  R*)
(3.42)
Ft { R > R * )
Conditional ony  =  y* signal Xj is normally distributed with mean y* and variance 
Similarly, return R  is also normal with mean y* and variance v .^ Moreover, Xj and R  are 
correlated with covariance Thus, conditional on y*, {xj, R)  is a bivariate normal dis­
tribution with mean fi =  {y*,y*) and variance/covariance matrix S  =
From the definition of the multivariate normal distribution and the fact that
—V
■v^  H-
and ISI =  it is easy to show that in equation (3.42)
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is given by the following expression:
exp [ -  ( 4 #  +  d R }  dx,
Pr {y* — ve >  X *  — aF~^ (1 — r))
(3.43)
By changing the order o f integration in equation (3.43) and by applying the transformation
Xi—R
Z  = , we get the following expression:
V2b  exp dR
or
r  =
+  ( 1  -  t ) ]
r+oo p  ( x ^ \  . 1 \  (R-y*)
2Ü2 dR
^  (1  -  r)]
(3.44)
Let the transformation w =
 ^ F  f  (w) dw
'■ -  F [ ï ^  +  2 F - '  ( w j ]
For r <  0.5 and considering the limiting case where J > 0, equation (3.44) can be 
expressed as
'x* - y * \
r  =  F
Q.E.D,
3.A.7 Proof of Proposition 9
Conditional on signal y =  ?/*, the actual investment return R  is normally distributed with 
mean y* and variance v^. Thus, we may express equation (3.7) as
v 2 \  n B + C + a J l - ÿ ’^ i  /  / n  . .* \2
- B
7-00 \ /^
exp I I dR  = - B
(3.45)
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where, as of lemma 4, for a given strategy x* by suppliers, R* is given by R* {y*) =  
X *  (y*) — aF~^ (1 — r). Considering the transformation z =  and substituting R*, 
equation (3.45) becomes
- B  f { z ) d z - D  f  (z) dz  =  - B  (3.46)
J_oo  ^F-i(l-r)
For the limiting case where J ^  0, we consider two cases: 1) r < 0.5,2) r >  0.5.
Case 1: If r <  0.5 then, is given by lemma 7 and equation (3.46) becomes
—D f  f  (z) dz =  —B
J — OO
or
=  B  +  C +  (347)
provided that lim  (1  — r)] =  —oo.
Case 2; If r >  0.5 then, given that is bounder between zero and one, equation (3.46) 
becomes
—B  =  —B
Consequently, for r >  0.5, any trigger strategy by the bank can be an equilibrium strategy. 
However, given that the bank in this game acts as a Stackelberg leader, for consistency 
with the treatment o f financial distress in banks’ credit policies, we concentrate here on 
strategies y* that are characterised by equation (3.47).
Q.E.D.
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3.A.8 Proof of Proposition 10
We first consider the case for r < 0.5.
(3.48)
Case 1: If r <  0.5 then, for a;* >  (B +  C) +  (1 — /*), propositions 8  and 9 imply
that X* and y* solve
j/* =  (B +  C) +  a. -  a ,F  ( ^ )  -  vF~^ ( f  )
By substituting F  into y*, (3.48) becomes
y* =  (B +  C) F as ( l  -  2( f ^ )  “  {%)
Then, by substituting y* into the first equation and considering the limiting case where
(3.49)
0, (3.49) becomes
I *  =  (B +  C) +  a, -  2^ )  +  < t F - '
(3.50)
y ’ =  {B +  C) +  a , [ l - ^ ^ - v F - ^ { % )  
which implies a unique equilibrium of the form (x*, 2/*). We now need to show that such an
equilibrium is consistent with the initial conjecture that x* >  {B C)  +  as (1 — I*). Yet
this is the case if  and only if  the following inequality holds
a:
— a F
2 ( l - c )  V2 ( l - c )
By substituting I* from lemma 6  and F  from (3.48), (3.51) becomes
(3.51)
a.
2 ( l - c )
>  F
2a^  (1 -  r) -  (1 -  c)'
4(7 (1 — c) (1 — r)
(3.52)
However, if  (3.52) doesn’t hold then, x* <  (B F C) +  as {I — I*) and propositions 8 and 9
imply multiple equilibria of the form {x*,y*),  such that
r  =  (B +  C) +  a , F -  u F - i  (§ )
(£ !z1b±Q=2i(1 :± 1  j  =  ( i  -  c) F  (2^ )
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or
(3.53)
y- =  {B +  C) +  a ,F  -  vF~^ ( f  )
a .F  =  (1 -  c) F  ( 2 ^ )
By partial substitution of y* into the first equation in (3.53) and for J —> 0, (3.53) becomes
y- =  {B +  C) +  a ,F  -  vF~^ ( § )
^sF ( ^  +  ^  [/• -  F  ( ^ ) j )  =  (1 -  c) F  ( ^ )  
But we know that for (3.53) to hold, x*  must satisfy
X *  <  ( B  +  ( 7 )  +  Ug ( l  — / * )
where from (3.53) and for J —> 0, (3.55) is equivalent to
(3.54)
(3.55)
x * - y *  as I * - F x * - y ' \ < 0 (3.56)
Combining (3.54) and (3.56) we get multiple equilibria (a;*, y*), with x* and y* satisfying
Î/* =  (B  +  C ) +  a . F  ( ^ )  -  vF -^  ( f  )
or
y- =  {B +  C) +  a ,F  ( ! ^ )  -  vF~^ ( | )  
ÿ* >  I* -  <tF-i 
Let us now consider the case for r >  0.5.
Case 2: I fr  >  0.5 then, propositions 8  and 9 imply multiple equilibria o f the form 
{x*, y*), with X *  and y* solving
y- =  {B +  C)  +  a , F { y ^ ) - v F - ^ { § )  
a ,F  =  (1 -  c) [F ( 2 ^ )  -  r]
or
y ' =  (B +  C)  +  0 .F  ( ! ^ )  -  vF--^ (g )  
a ,F  =  (1 -  c) [F  ( 2 ^ )  -  r]
(3.57)
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By partial substitution o f y* into the second equation and considering the limiting case
J —> 0, (3.57) becomes
y  =  (B +  C) +  a , F { ’^ ) - v F - ^ ( i )  1
a . F { ^  +  ^ [ F - a , F { ^ ) ] )  =  i l - c ) [ F { ^ ) - r ]  J 
However, from corollary 3 we know that, for r >  0.5, suppliers equilibrium strategy x*
satisfies the following inequality:
X* < (B +  (7) +  Û5 (1 — I*) (3.59)
But given y* in (3.58), inequality (3.59) can be written as
X* - y *  as
 <  —
a a
where, for  ^ 0 , it becomes
( ^ ) -
x * - y *   ^ as
I* -  F < 0 (3.60)
Thus, combining (3.58) and (3.60) we conclude that, for r  >  0.5, there are multiple equi­
libria of the form {x*,y*)  that satisfy
y- =  {B +  C)  +  a , ~  vF--^ ( f  ) -  a ,F  { ^ )
F { ^ ) < r  +  ^ ^
or
Q.E.D.
y- =  {B +  C) +  a , ~  vF-^ {%) -  a ,F  ( ^ )
3.A.9 Proof of Proposition 11
We need to show that the equilibrium strategy x* in the presence o f a bank is lower than x**, 
as given by proposition 7, with no bank in the game. For r  >  0.5 and for a given strategy
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y* by the bank, proposition 8 implies that suppliers’ equilibrium strategy x* is given by 
X* — {B  +  (7) — fls (1 — Z*)
a .F =  (1  -  c) (3.61)
where, from lemma 6 , I* is given by I* =  noticing that I* >  Also, from
proposition 9, bank’s equilibrium strategy y* solves
y-’ =  {B +  C) +  a , F ( ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ - v F ~ ^ ( ^ ^  (3.62)
Clearly, the RHS of equation (3.61) is less than (1 — c) (1 — r), which implies that
a .F
X* — {B  +  C) — Ug (1 — /*)
(J ) < (1  -  c) (1  -  r) (3.63)
Given also that I* >  it follows that
X* — iJB +  C) —
asF  I ------- :--------- :------— ^  I <
(J \  o
asF  ^X* — ( 5  +  C) — Ug (1 — /*)) (3.64)
Consequently, from inequalities (3.63), (3.64) and from proposition 7, we derive the fol­
lowing relationship between suppliers equilibrium strategies x* and x** with and without a 
bank, respectively.
a .F
where, from the monotonicity of F  (•), it follows that x* <  x**. 
Q.E.D.
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